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Preface
Modern military operations are conducted in a dynamic environment usually with unan-
ticipated partners and irregular adversaries. In order to act successfully, they need technical
support that gives modularity, ﬂexibility and security in connecting heterogeneous systems of
cooperating allies. The eﬃciency of such operations strongly relies on communications and
information systems’ (CIS) ability to facilitate decision superiority, the state in which better-
informed decisions are made and implemented faster than an adversary can react. A key
challenge is to improve the situational awareness and reactivity, i.e., the capability to quickly
beneﬁt from new information that changes the operational situation. Usually, this depends
on a complete reaction process, involving environmental data, data services, and decision
makers, all of them interconnected. However, the broad use of information technology in
modern command and control system makes its infrastructure the most valuable asset and the
most vulnerable point of attack. Finding eﬀective ways to protect and defend communications
and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity and conﬁdentiality challenges
even the most advanced technology.
Many research eﬀorts aimed at elaboration and implementation of innovative communications
and information technologies in military systems, and especially at delivering new informa-
tion assurance and cyber defence capabilities have been undertaken world-wide. Selected
results of such activities are presented in this issue of the Journal of Telecommunications
and Information Technology. It contains 11 carefully selected papers that reﬂect the current
state of the art in selected areas of communications and information technology development
with application to the military domain. The papers cover a wide spectrum of questions
relevant to information assurance (IA) and cyber defence (CD) provision, service oriented
architecture (SOA) implementation in tactical domain as well as an eﬀective use of wireless
networks resources.
The ﬁrst group of contributions consists of 6 papers related to information assurance and
cyber defence. A discussion of digital signature scheme implementation in environments
with space and bandwidth constraints is a subject of the paper A New Short Signature
Scheme with Random Oracle from Bilinear Pairings by S. Akleylek et al. They propose a new
and eﬃcient short signature scheme constructed by bilinear inverse-square Diﬃe-Hellman
problem that does not require any special hash function. The exact security proofs are
also explained in the paper. The authors compare the results of the proposed solution
with the BLS and ZSS signature schemes. The next paper, Network Management in Non-
classified Data Hiding System Using Master Resident over Hidden Layer by K. Sawicki and
Z. Piotrowski, depicts a practical implementation of a system that takes advantage of hid-
den data transmission during voice communication leading to information superiority over
the adversary. The authors describe a mechanism of master resident, the transmission con-
troller that allows the system’s operator to use commands transmitted over hidden layer for
remote control of protocol interpreter. The third paper, Authentication in VoIP Telephony
with Use of the Echo Hiding Method by J. Rachoń, Z. Piotrowski and P. Gajewski, describes
an implementation of echo hiding technique for VoIP subscriber identiﬁcation. The au-
thors present the results of experiments performed in testbedding environment that conﬁrm
the eﬃciency of the proposed solution. A. Flizikowski et al. in the paper The INTER-
SECTION Framework: Applied Security for Heterogeneous Networks present an example of
security framework. The authors describe various ISO standards addressing telecommunica-
tion security management and intrusion detection architecture. They discuss the impact of
known network threats on connected networks and propose anomaly detection techniques. The
next paper, Anomaly Detection Framework Based on Matching Pursuit for Network Security
Enhancement by R. Renk and W. Hołubowicz, present a novel framework for recognizing
the anomalies in a network traﬃc based on correlation approach and propose new signal-
based procedure for intrusion detection using matching pursuit algorithm. They combine
and correlate parameters from diﬀerent layers that allow detection of 0-day attacks and re-
duction of false positives. The eﬀectiveness of the proposed approach has been proved in
attack and anomaly detection scenarios. The ﬁnal paper in this group, Tunneling Activities
Detection Using Machine Learning Techniques by F. Allard et al., describes a statistical
analysis of ciphered ﬂows that allows detection of the carried inner protocol. Regarding the
deployed security policy, this technology could be added in security tools to detect forbidden
protocols usages. In the defence domain, this technology could help preventing informa-
tion leaks through side channels. The authors present a high-level tunnel detection tool
architecture and discuss the results of experiments with a public database containing real
data ﬂows.
The next group composed of 3 papers is focused on vital aspects of service oriented ar-
chitecture implementation in military domain. The ﬁrst paper in this group, Success Fac-
tors for SOA Implementation in Network Centric Environment by J. Śliwa and M. Amano-
wicz, identiﬁes 9 fundamental challenges for the SOA approach that make the beneﬁt for
the network enabled capability (NEC) programme and increase the eﬀectiveness of mili-
tary missions. The authors propose the quick wins solutions that can speed up the process
of achieving network-enabled capability in heterogeneous multinational NEC environment.
B. Jasiul et al. in the paper entitled Authentication and Authorization of Users and Services
in Dynamic Military SOA Environments discuss the security requirements for a cross-domain
information exchange in a federated environment. The authors propose an eﬀective method
of secure access to information resources based on web services. A special attention is paid
to the authentication and authorization of users and services. The solution presented in the
paper was examined in multinational experimentations and military exercises. The last paper
in this group, Web Services Efficiency in Disadvantaged Environment contributed by J. Śliwa,
T. Podlasek and M. Amanowicz presents the experimental results of web services (WS) pro-
vision techniques carried out in a test-bedding environment that emulates tactical disruptive
network. The authors discuss the advantage of diﬀerent WS adaptation techniques that allow
minimizing the XML message size and JPEG image attachments. The presented results show
the eﬃciency of considered methods that adapt the WS provision scheme to the network’s
constraints.
The last group of papers deals with the questions of eﬀective use of resources in military
wireless networks. T. Ginzler and M. Amanowicz in the paper entitled Adaptation of the
Kademila Routing for Tactical Networks propose a modiﬁcation of the widely used Kademlia
peer-to-peer system to tactical environment. They show that optimizations in the routing
may lead to faster lookups and extend the battery lifetime of mobile nodes, as well as
increase the robustness of the network. The ﬁnal paper in this issue, Review of Distributed
Beamforming contributed by J. Uher, T. A. Wysocki and B. J. Wysocki, discusses the question
of improving the range of communications and saving the precious battery power in wireless
sensor networks by cooperative distributed beamforming. The authors present a review of
current solutions focused on distributed beamformers implementations. The paper covers the
calculation of ideal beamforming weights, practical considerations, such as carrier alignment
or smart antennas based on distributed beamformers, and concludes with open research
problems.
I would like to take this opportunity to express my thanks to the authors and reviewers
for their eﬀorts in the preparation of this issue of the Journal of Telecommunications and
Information Technology. I trust that the Readers will ﬁnd the papers dealing with the most
recent research results in the area of military information and communications technology
both useful and interesting.
Marek Amanowicz
Guest Editor
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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a new and efficient short
signature scheme from the bilinear pairings. Our scheme is
constructed by bilinear inverse-square Diffie-Hellman problem
(BISDHP) and does not require any special hash function. The
exact security proofs are also explained in the random Oracle
model. We give the implementation and comparison results
of our proposed signature scheme with the signature scheme
proposed by Boneh, Lynn, Shacham (BLS) and Zhang, Safavi,
Susilo (ZSS). Furthermore, we use this signature scheme to
construct a ring signature scheme.
Keywords—bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem, bilinear pairings,
ring signature, short signature.
1. Introduction
Digital signatures are one of the most important crypto-
graphic primitive for the daily life. Short signatures are
needed in environments with space and bandwidth con-
straints. Up to pairing-based cryptography, the best known
shortest signature was obtained by using the digital sig-
nature algorithm (DSA) [1] over a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq. The
length of the signature is approximately 2logq. On the
other hand, when the pairing-based cryptographic proto-
col is used the length of the signature is about ρ logr,
where ρ = logq/ logr and r is the largest prime divisor
of the number of the points in the elliptic curve. For exam-
ple, if one uses RSA signature 1024 bit modulus, the out-
put of elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA)
is 320 bit long for the same security level. However, short
signature provides the same security level only for 160 bits
for the best choice.
In 2001 Boneh, Lynn and Shacham [2] proposed the idea
of short signature scheme by using bilinear pairings. This
scheme is based on Weil pairing and needs a special hash
function [2], [3], [4]. Over the last years, there are various
applications of bilinear pairings in short signature schemes
to construct new eﬃcient schemes [5], [6], [7]. The main
improvement in short signature schemes is the use of cryp-
tographic hash function such as MD5, SHA-1 [7] instead
of special hash function called MapToPoint hash opera-
tion. It is known that short signature scheme with cryp-
tographic hash function is more eﬃcient than others since
MapToPoint hash operation is still probabilistic.
In this study, we describe a new short signature scheme in
a similar setting in ZSS scheme [7]. Our system is based on
bilinear inverse-square Diﬃe-Hellman problem a combina-
tion of bilinear inverse Diﬃe-Hellman problem (BIDHP)
and bilinear square Diﬃe-Hellman problem (BSDHP). The
main advantage of our scheme is that it can be used with any
cryptographic hash function such as MD5, SHA-1. To give
the exact security proofs, we deﬁne a new problem called
inverse square problem with k traitors (k−ISP). Then, the
exact security proofs of proposed scheme are also explained
in the random Oracle model. We give the comparison of
our scheme with the BLS scheme and ZSS scheme. Ac-
cording to the comparison results, our scheme is more ef-
ﬁcient than BLS scheme.
Furthermore, based on new proposed signature scheme, we
construct a ring signature scheme.
This paper is organized as follows: Some preliminar-
ies about bilinear pairings and some related problems to
pairings are given in Section 2. Proposed short signature
scheme and its security analysis are explained in Section 3.
A construction of ring signature scheme is given in Sec-
tion 4. We conclude in Section 5.
2. Pairing-Based Cryptography
In this section, we give some facts about bilinear pairings
and deﬁne some new problems. The proposed short signa-
ture scheme uses bilinearity like others.
2.1. Bilinear Pairings
Definition 1: Let G1 and G2 be additive cyclic groups of
order n. Let G3 be a multiplicative cyclic group of order
n. A bilinear pairing is an eﬃciently computable map e :
G1 ×G2 −→ G3 which satisﬁes the following additional
properties:
1. (bilinearity) For all P,R ∈ G1 and all Q,S ∈ G2, we
have e(P + R,Q) = e(P,Q)e(R,Q) and e(P,Q+ S) =
e(P,Q)e(P,S).
2. (non-degeneracy) For all P∈G1, with P 6= IdG1 , there
is some Q ∈ G2 such that e(P,Q) 6= IdG3 . For all
Q ∈ G2, with Q 6= IdG2 , there is some P ∈ G1 such
that e(P,Q) 6= IdG3 . When G1 = G2 and n is prime,
e(P,P) is a generator of G3 for all P 6= IdG1
The following lemma which is related to the properties of
bilinear pairings can be easily veriﬁed.
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Lemma 1: Let e : G1×G2 −→G3 be a bilinear pairing. Let
P ∈ G1 and Q ∈ G2. Then
1. e(P, IdG2) = e(IdG1 ,Q) = IdG3
2. e(−P,Q) = e(P,−Q) = e(P,Q)−1
3. e(kP,Q) = e(P,kQ) = e(P,Q)k for all k ∈ Z.
4. e(kP, lP) = e(P,P)kl for all k, l ∈ Z.
2.2. Some Problems
We consider the following problems in the additive group
(G,+) of order n.
• Discrete logarithm problem (DLP): For P,Q ∈ G,
ﬁnd k ∈ Z∗n such that Q = kP whenever such k exists.
• Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP): For
a,b,c ∈ Z∗n, given P,aP,bP,cP decide whether c≡ ab
(mod n).
• Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP):
For a,b ∈ Z∗n, given P,aP,bP compute abP.
There are two variations of CDHP:
• Inverse computational Diffie-Hellman problem
(ICDHP): For a ∈ Z∗n, given P,aP, compute a−1P.
• Square computational Diffie-Hellman problem
(SCDHP): For a ∈ Z∗n, given P,aP, compute a2P.
The following theorem shows the relation of these problems
that the proof can be found in [8].
Theorem 1: CDHP, ICDHP and SCDHP are polynomial
time equivalent.
The security of some applications of bilinear pairings in
cryptography relies on the diﬃculty of bilinear Diﬃe-
Hellman problem (BDHP) which was ﬁrst stated in [4].
Definition 2: Let G be a ﬁnite additive cyclic group of or-
der n with a generator P, let e be a bilinear pairing on G,
and let a,b,c be integers. The BDHP is to compute the
value of the bilinear pairing e(abcP,P), whenever aP, bP
and cP are given.
The well known pairing-based protocols are three-party key
exchange in one round protocol proposed by Joux in [9],
identity-based encryption scheme by Boneh-Franklin in [4]
and short signature scheme by Boneh-Lynn-Shacham in [2]
that the security of them depends on the BDHP. There are
variants of BDHP:
• Bilinear inverse Diffie-Hellman problem
(BIDHP): For a,b∈Z∗n, given P, aP, bP to compute
e(P,P)a−1b.
• Bilinear square Diffie-Hellman problem
(BSDHP): For a,b∈Z∗n, given P, aP, bP to compute
e(P,P)a2b.
It is not hard to obtain bilinear inverse-square Diﬃe-
Hellman Problem as a combination of BIDHP and BSDHP:
• Bilinear inverse-square Diffie-Hellman problem
(BISDHP): For a,b ∈ Z∗n, given P, aP, bP to com-
pute e(P,P)a−2b.
Theorem 2: BDHP, BIDHP, BSDHP and BISDHP are
polynomial time equivalent.
Proof:
BDHP ⇒ BIDHP is trivial.
BIDHP ⇒ BSDHP:
Given P,aP,bP, set the input of BIDHP as
Q = aP, Q1 = P = a−1Q, Q2 = bP = ba−1Q,
then BIDHP outputs
e(Q1,Q2) = e(Q,Q)(a−1)−1ba−1 = e(aP,aP)b = e(P,P)a2b
BSDHP ⇒ BISDHP:
Given P,a2P,bP, set the input of BSDHP as
Q = a2P, Q1 = a−2Q = P, Q2 = a−2bQ = bP,
then BSDHP outputs
e(Q1,Q2) = e(Q,Q)(a−2)2ba−2 = e(P,P)a−2b
BISDHP ⇒ BDHP:
Given P,aP,bP,cP, set the input of BSDHP as the triples
(P,aP,cP), (P,bP,cP), (P,aP+ bP,cP),
then we have e(P,P)a−2c, e(P,P)b−2c and e(P,P)(a+b)−2c,
respectively. Therefore, we obtain
e(P,P)abc =
(
e(P,P)a−2c·e(P,P)b−2c
e(P,P)(a+b)−2c
)1/2
.

3. New Short Signature Scheme From
Bilinear Pairings
In this section, we propose our signature scheme, and then
explain its security. Moreover, we compare our scheme
with BLS and ZSS schemes from the implementation point
of view.
3.1. Signature Scheme
A signature scheme consists of four steps: a parameter gen-
eration algorithm ParamGen, a key generation algorithm
KeyGen, a signature generation algorithm Sign and a sig-
nature veriﬁcation algorithm Verify.
We describe the new signature scheme as follows:
Let (G1,+) and (G2, ·) be cyclic groups of prime order n,
P ∈ G1, G1 =< P > and e : G1 ×G1 → G2 be a bilinear
map. Let H : Z∞2 → Zλ2 , where 160≤ λ ≤ log(n) be a cryp-
tographic hash function such as SHA1 or MD5. Suppose
that A wants to send a signed message to B.
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• ParamGen: {G1,G2,e,n,P,H}
• KeyGen: A randomly selects x ∈ Zn and computes
Ppub1 = x2P and Ppub2 = 2xP. In this structure, P,
Ppub1 and Ppub2 are the public keys, x is the secret key.
• Sign: Given a secret key x and a message m, A com-
putes the signature, s = (H(m)+ x)−2P.
• Verify: Given the public keys P, Ppub1 and Ppub2,
a message m and a signature s, B veriﬁes the sig-
nature if
e(H(m)2P+ Ppub1 + Ppub2H(m),s) = e(P,P) holds.
The veriﬁcation is done by using bilinearity in the following
equations:
e((H(m)+ x)2P,(H(m)+ x)−2P) =
e(P,P)(H(m)+x)2(H(m)+x)−2 = e(P,P).
3.2. Signature Security
The well-known attacks against signature schemes are with-
out message attack and chosen-message attack. The stron-
gest version of these attacks is an adaptive chosen-message
attack. In this scenario, the attacker can ask the signer to
sign any message that he/she chooses. He also knows the
public key of the signer. Then, he can customize his queries
according to the previous message and chosen signature
pairs.
The strongest notion of security for signature schemes
that is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen-
message attack was deﬁned by Goldwasser, Micali and
Rivest [10]. Here, we use the deﬁnition of exact secure
signature schemes by Bellare and Rogaway [11] stated as
follows:
Definition 3: A signature scheme S, deﬁned by S =
< ParamGen,KeyGen,Sign,Verify >, is (t,qH ,qS,ε)-
existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message
attack if for every probabilistic polynomial time forger al-
gorithm F running in t processing time, at most qH queries
to the hash oracle and qS signatures queries, there does not
exist a non-negligible probability ε .
A signature scheme S is (t,qH ,qS,ε)-secure if there is no
forger who (t,qH ,qS,ε) breaks the scheme.
We introduce a new problem that was called k-ISP (inverse
square problem with k traitors) to give the security proof
of the new signature scheme. This problem is similar to
k-CAA (collusion attack algorithm with k traitors) that was
proposed by Mitsunari, Sakai and Kasahara in [12].
Definition 4: (k-ISP) For an integer k, and x ∈ Zn, P ∈G1,
given
{P,xP,H1,H2, · · · ,Hk,(H1 + x)−2P,(H2 + x)−2P, · · · ,(Hk +
x)−2P},
compute (H + x)−2P for some H /∈ {H1,H2, · · · ,Hk}.
k-ISP is (t,ε)-hard if for any t-time adversaries A, we have
Pr


A
(
P,xP,H1,H2, · · · ,Hk,(H1 +x)−2P,(H2 +x)−2P, · · · ,
(Hk +x)−2P)|x ∈ Zn,P ∈G1,H1,H2, · · · ,Hk ∈ Zn
)
= (H +x)−2P,H /∈ {H1,H2, · · · ,Hk}

< ε
where ε is negligible.
The following theorem shows that proposed signature
scheme is secure against the adaptive chosen-message at-
tack.
Theorem 3: If there exists a (t,qH ,qS,ε)-forger F us-
ing an adaptive chosen message attack for the signa-
ture scheme proposed in Section 3.1, then there exists
a (t
′
,ε
′
)-algorithm A solving qS − ISP, where t
′
= t and
ε
′
≥ ( qSqH )
qS · ε .
Proof: Assume that the output of the hash function is uni-
formly distributed and the hash oracle will give a correct
response for any hash query.
Suppose that a forger F (t,qH ,qS,ε)-break the signa-
ture scheme using an adaptive chosen message attack.
One needs an algorithm A to solve qs − ISP. In this
structure, the challenge is to compute (H + x)−2P for
some H /∈ {H1,H2, · · · ,Hk} for given P ∈ G1, Ppub1 =
x2P, Ppub2 = 2xP, H1,H2, · · · ,Hqs ∈ Zn and (H1 + x)−2P,
(H2 + x)−2P, · · · ,(Hqs + x)−2P
A is the signer and answers hash and signing queries by
itself. Algorithm is as follows:
Step 1: {H1,H2, · · · ,HqH} are the responses of the
hash oracle queries for the corresponding messages
{m1,m2, · · · ,mqH}.
Step 2: F makes a signature oracle query for each Hi for
1 ≤ i ≤ qH . If the hash oracle answers truely, A returns
(Hi + x)−2P to F as the response. Otherwise, the process
stops.
Step 3: F outputs a message-signature pair (m,S). The
hash value of m is some H and H /∈ {H1,H2, · · · ,HqH}. It
satisﬁes:
e(x2P + 2xP+ H2P,S) = e(P,P)
So, S = (H + x)−2P. A outputs (H,S) as a solution of
challenge.
Since the operations are the same for A and F, the running
time of A and F is equal, t = t
′
. The success probability
of A is qSqH is Step 2. A will not fail with probability
p≥ ( qSqH )
qS . Then, the success probability of the algorithm,
A for all steps is ε
′
≥ ( qSqH )
qS ·ε . This completes the proof.

Note that, one can obtain a good bound if qS and qH are
very closed.
We now recall k-weak computational Diﬃe-Hellman prob-
lem (k-wCDHP) proposed by Mitsunari et. al [12].
Definition 5: (k-wCDHP ) For an integer k, and x,H ∈ Zn,
P ∈G1, given k + 1 values
{P,(H + x)P,(H + x)2P, · · · ,(H + x)kP},
compute (H + x)−1P.
We deﬁne a new problem that is called k + 1 inverse ex-
ponent problem (k+1-IEP) to give a speciﬁc evaluation of
the security of our proposed signature scheme.
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Definition 6: (k+1-IEP) For an integer k, and a ∈ Zn, P ∈
G1, given k + 1 values
{P,aP,a−2P, · · · ,a−kP},
compute a−(k+1)P.
Theorem 4: k-wCDHP and k+1-IEP are polynomial time
equivalent.
Proof:
k-wCDHP ⇒ k+1-IEP:
Given k + 1 values P,(H + x)−1P,(H + x)−2P, · · · ,(H +
x)−kP, let Q = (H + x)−kP, tQ = (H + x)−(k−1)P, and so
t = (H + x).
Set the input of k-wCDHP to be
(H + x)−kP = Q, (H + x)−(k−1)P = tQ,
(H + x)−(k−2)P = t2Q, · · · ,
(H + x)−1P = tk−1Q, P = tkQ.
Then, k-wCDHP outputs
t−1Q = (H + x)−1(H + x)−kP = (H + x)−(k+1).
k+1-IEP ⇒ k-wCDHP:
Given k+1 values P,(H +x)P,(H +x)2P, · · · ,(H +x)kP, let
Q = (H + x)kP, t−1Q = (H + x)(k−1)P, and so t = (H + x).
Set the input of k+1-IEP to be
(H + x)kP = Q, (H + x)(k−1)P = t−1Q,
(H + x)(k−2)P = t−2Q, · · · ,
(H + x)P = t−(k−1)Q, P = t−kQ.
Then, k+1-IEP outputs
t−(k+1)Q = (H + x)−1P.

We note that k+1-IEP and k-wCDHP are no harder
than the CDHP. There is a special case that k+1-IEP or
k-wCDHP can be easily solved :
Given
P0 = P, P1 = (H + x)−1P, P2 = (H + x)−2P, · · · ,
P(k−1) = (H + x)−(k−1)P, Pk = (H + x)−kP,
if Pi = Pj for i 6= j, this means that (H +x)−iP≡ (H +x)− jP
(mod q), so the order of (H + x) in Zq is j− i. Then,
(H + x)−1P = Pj−i−1 or (H + x)k+1P = Pk+1 mod ( j−i).
This case gives an attack on our proposed signature scheme.
However, because of considering (H + x) as a random el-
ement in Z∗q, we can show that the success probability of
this attack is negligible.
Let q be a prime. Then, for any a ∈ Z∗q, the order of a,
ord(a), is a divisor of q−1. Given k > 1, assume that the
number of element a ∈ Z∗q such that ord(a) ≤ k is given
by N. Since Zq is a ﬁeld, N < k2 for k > 1. Let ρ be
the probability that a randomly chosen element in Z∗q has
order less than k, then
ρ = N
q
<
k2
q
.
This gives us an opportunity to give a bound on k, such as,
if q≈ 2256, we limit k≤ 264, which means that the attacker
has at most 264 message-signature pairs. Therefore, using
the above attack, the success probability is
(264)2
2256
= 2−128 ·0.29387 ·10−38.
As a result, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1: Assume that there is no polynomial time al-
gorithm to solve the problem k+1-IEP with non-negligible
probability, then the proposed signature scheme is secure
under the random Oracle model.
3.3. Efficiency
We compare our signature scheme with the BLS scheme
and ZSS scheme from the implementation point of view.
PO, SM, PA, Squ, Inv, MT P and H denote the pairing op-
eration, scalar multiplication in G1, point addition in G1,
squaring in Zn, inversion in Zn, MapToPoint hash opera-
tion and hash operation in Zn, respectively. In the light of
above, Table 1 summarizes the result.
Table 1
Comparison of our scheme with the BLS scheme
and ZSS scheme
Scheme BLS ZSS Proposed
Key generation 1 SM 1 SM 2 SM
1 MT P 1 H 1 H
Signing 1 SM 1 Inv 1 Inv
1 SM 1 SM
1 Squ
1 MT P 1 H 1 H
2 PO 1 SM 1 SM
Veriﬁcation 1 PO 1 PO
2 PA
1 Squ
We implemented proposed signature scheme by using
Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) Library [13] and The
GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library (GMP) [14].
Both libraries are installed as default installation. We run
Cygwin as Linux simulator for GMP. The performance of
signature schemas was measured on an Intel Core Duo
Table 2
Time comparison of our scheme with the BLS scheme
and ZSS scheme
Scheme BLS ZSS Proposed
All time including:
key generation, 0.171000 0.098000 0.101000
signing, veriﬁcation [s]
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1.6 GHz with 2 GB RAM, running Windows XP SP2. We
have used standard functions of GMP 4.2.1/PBC 0.4.18
and compiled by GNU C Compiler. It should be noted that
computation of pairing is the most time-consuming part in
short signature schemes. According to the implementation
result given in Table 2, our new scheme is more eﬃcient
than BLS scheme since it requires less pairing operation.
4. A Ring Signature Scheme
Ring signature schemes were proposed in [15]. Main
purpose of a ring signature is to provide anonymity for the
signer, by making it impossible to determine who among
the possible signers is the actual one. By this way, the sig-
nature provides anonymity for the signer. Ring signature
schemes satisfy signer ambiguity and security against an
adaptive chosen message attack. A ring signature scheme
is deﬁned by:
• ring signing (m,P1,P2, · · · ,Pr,xi) produces a ring
signature σ for the message m and a ring with r
members, given the public keys P1,P2, · · · ,Pr together
with secret key of the signer xi.
• ring verifying a signature pair (m,σ) includes the
public keys of all the ring members i.e. possible
signers.
The system parameters are {G1,G2,e,n,r,P,H} which are
deﬁned in Section 3.1.
• Sign: Assume that the ith member of the ring sign
the message. Let the public keys of the ring members
be Ppub1 j and Ppub2 j, the secret key of the signer be xi.
Then,
Si = (H(m)+ xi)−2P+(H(m)
r−1
∑
j=1,i6= j
2x jP
+
r−1
∑
j=1,i6= j
(x2jP+ H(m)2P))
• Verify:
r
∏
j=1
e((H(m)+ x j)2P,Si) = e(P,P).
Proof:
r
∏
j=1
e((H(m)+ x j)2P,Si)
= e(
r
∑
j=1
(H(m)+ x2j)P,Si)
= e(
r
∑
j=1
(H(m)+ x2j)P,(H(m)+ xi)
−2P
+ (H(m)
r−1
∑
j=1,i6= j
2x jP +
r−1
∑
j=1,i6= j
(x2jP+ H(m)
2P))
= e(P,P).

The security of the proposed ring signature scheme is simi-
lar as given in Section 3.2 since it is based on the signature
scheme described in Section 3.1.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new short signature scheme not
requiring any special hash function. The security of this
signature scheme depends on a new problem called bilin-
ear inverse-square Diﬃe-Hellman problem (BISDHP). It is
shown that this problem and BDHP are polynomial time
equivalent. We also propose a new complexity assumption
called the k +1 inverse exponent problem. The exact secu-
rity proofs are also explained in the random Oracle model.
We give the implementation and comparison results of our
proposed signature scheme with the BLS and ZSS schemes.
According to the implementation results, our new scheme
is more eﬃcient than BLS scheme since it requires less
pairing operation. Finally, we construct a ring signature
scheme based on our proposed scheme.
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Paper Network Management
in Non-classified Data Hiding System Using
Master Resident over Hidden Layer
Krzysztof Sawicki and Zbigniew Piotrowski
Military University of Technology, Warsaw, Poland
Abstract—The paper presents a practical implementation of
the non-classified data hiding system (NDHS) understood as
a military platform for information warfare that takes advan-
tage of the hidden data transmission for voice connections in
order to gain informational lead over a potential enemy. The
NDHS performs here as a botnet network that is managed
by the hidden transmission controller referred to as the mas-
ter resident. Research studies are dedicated to investigation
of various connections in heterogeneous links as well as func-
tionalities of such components as hidden protocol bridges and
the master resident.
Keywords—hidden protocol bridge, hidden protocol interpreter,
master resident, non-classified data hiding system, steganogra-
phy, voice over IP, watermarking.
1. Introduction
Telecom IT networks present an important component of
the contemporary telecom world. Safeguarded circulation
of information with its continuous supervision pose sub-
stantial challenges for contemporary science. From the mil-
itary point any attack to the national IT network (along with
the entire telecom infrastructure) is the ﬁrst step to initial
warfare actions. In case of public IT networks one has to be
aware that such networks may be used as reserved commu-
nication means between military troops to substitute, when
necessary, commonly used communication means operated
regularly by the army. Total destruction of public IT net-
works is extremely diﬃcult as these networks are really
extensive and incorporate great number of protecting mea-
sures to preserve their integrity when one or several their
components are disrupted.
Beside cryptographic methods the safeguarding measures
use also techniques of information hiding that are comple-
mentary to cryptographic ones.
This paper deals with the mechanism of the master resi-
dent (MR), the possibility to remote control network de-
vices using hidden layer and implementation of those con-
cepts. As stated in [1] “Network Management normally has
4 components: The component that supervises (...); The
component that is supervised (...); A protocol that trans-
fers the information between the agent and the server. (...);
A list of possible things to manage”. In non-classiﬁed data
hiding system (NDHS) the component that supervises is
the master resident, components that are supervised are
hidden protocol interpreters (HPI), simple protocol used to
communicate between master resident and hidden proto-
col interpreters is transmitted over hidden layer and allows
to send commands to HPIs thus NDHS is network man-
agement mechanism that is designed to work on hidden
networks.
The master resident makes it possible to control hetero-
geneous IT networks using hidden and conﬁdential trans-
mission of commands and data that takes advantage of the
digital watermark technology and encoding with use of the
variably modiﬁed permutation composition (VMPC) key
scheduling algorithm (KSA) [2]. That mechanism is a part
of the NDHS [3], [4]. NDHS can be classiﬁed as the mech-
anism of electronic defence (ED) [5], [6] and uses infor-
mation hiding techniques to transmit information between
NDHS functional elements (hidden protocol interpreter
and master resident) [3], [7] and allows the NDHS operator
to remote control every hidden protocol interpreter using
commands transmitted in hidden layer. In case of a hos-
tile conﬂict such a mechanism, if widely applied in public
networks, makes it possible to take control over selected
components of public IT networks and then continuous op-
eration of the overall telecom systems is conducive to gain
an informational lead.
The remaining part of the paper is structured in the follow-
ing way: the second part presents the historical solutions
that have been developed so far related to the issues of mak-
ing the information hidden whilst the third part describes
the mechanism to be implemented. Finally, the fourth part
outlines how the intended mechanism was implemented.
2. Related Works
Continuously more and more research eﬀorts of scientiﬁc
circles are targeted to the application opportunities of hid-
den transmissions via IT network. The past interest was
focused on data transmission itself via individual segments
of the network. Some examples of proposed solutions
can be found in studies [8]–[11], where stress is put onto
hidden transmission exclusively by one type of channels.
Some attempts towards application of hidden transmission
were undertaken in studies related to: the steganographic
router [12] as well as to the system for hidden transmis-
sion of information [4]. There are also other solutions that
can be used for authentication procedures in networks. For
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wireless networks to IEEE 802.11 such a mechanism is de-
scribed in [13]. A similar mechanism is also applied to RF
communication within the VHF bandwidth [14], [15].
The mechanism that is outlined in this paper combines var-
ious approaches to the issues how to apply hidden transmis-
sion to manage IT networks and was purposefully designed
thus it would be operated in a heterogeneous environment
and use the hidden layer to supervise the network infras-
tructure which is the unique feature.
3. Mechanism Description
Operation principle of the mechanism is based on use of
voice transmission (phone conversation). Transmission of
voice signals is carried out with use of various technologies:
voice over IP (VoIP), phone calls within public switched
telephone networks (PSTN) as well as connections with
use of a military VHF radio stations.
The transmitted voice signal is considered as the transport
layer for the binary signature of the watermark. Boundary
components of the network (take-over points) that switch
voice signals to subscribers can be furnished with suitable
software HPI [3], [7] that make it possible to carry out
actions on those components in remote manner. Remote
commands with instructions to initiate required actions can
be transmitted in a hidden manner by means of the voice
signal.
The research studies employed three options of voice sig-
nals: male speech in English (track no. 1), male speech in
German (track no. 2) as well as pop music (track no. 3).
The watermarked records that had been processed with use
of one of the two following methods: orthogonal frequency-
division multiplexing (OFDM) [16] with its information
capacity P = 21 bits as well as the method of drift correc-
tion modulation (DCM) [17] with two options of data pay-
load P = 84 and P = 147 bits. Parameters of the records
were the following: sampling frequency fS = 48000 Hz,
16 bits per sample, mono mode.
3.1. Examination of Transmission Channels
In order to carry out the experiments it was necessary to
examine individual transmission channels. The test con-
sisted in transmission of a voice signal with an embedded
digital watermark with further reception of the signal and
recording it at the other end of the network segment. The
recorded signal was then delivered to the watermark ex-
tractor where the binary signature of the watermark was
obtained at the extractor output. In addition the binary sig-
nature bit error rate (BSBER – bit error rate of the binary
signature embeded in watermark) was determined for the
extracted binary signature of the watermark. The examina-
tion procedure covered the following types of transmission
channels: RF channel of the NDHS-WiFi type where the
voice signal was transmitted as VoIP phone call, PSTN
telephone line as well as VHF radio channel. The aim of
tests the performed tests was to ﬁnd out whether a hid-
den transmission is feasible via such channels and to se-
lect optimum transmission parameters. Figure 1 presents
Fig. 1. Measurement results for the binary signature bit error
rate when the OFDM method was used.
results for measurements of the bit error rate for the digi-
tal signature of transmitted watermarked tracks for signals
determined with use of the OFDM method, transmitted
via RF channels of the NDHS WiFi type as well as via
a PSTN channel. Figure 2 shows corresponding results for
Fig. 2. Measurement results for the bit error rate when the DCM
method was used (P = 84 bits).
Fig. 3. Measurement results for the binary signature bit error
rate when the DCM method was used (P = 147 bits).
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signals where watermarks had been embedded with use
of the DCM method and with the watermark data pay-
load P = 84 bits. Similarly, Fig. 3 presents results for the
DCM method and information capacity P = 147 bits. The
analysis covered 30 seconds of a signal recorded at the
other end of the examined transmission channel. The test
demonstrated that the DCM method is less vulnerable to
degradation of voice signals introduced by the IT networks
under tests.
3.2. Examination of Bridges
For needs of the experiments the term of hidden proto-
col bridge (HPB) was introduced. The bridge is a hard-
ware or software unit that is capable to handle the water-
mark embedded into a voice signal and to forward it be-
tween transmission channels of diﬀerent types. Two bridge
types were distinguished, i.e., the hardware bridge HPB-H
that is incapable to process hidden information and merely
forwards voice signals as well as the software bridge
HPB-S that extracts binary signatures from voice signals
transmitted via networks and uses corrective code extractors
to recover information represented by the signatures. For
that purpose two types of extractors can be used: the BCH
type in case of the DCM method or the Reed-Solomon (RS)
type when the OFDM method is used. Finally, the re-
covered information is recoded back into the watermark
of the voice signal that is forwarded to that second net-
work. In that way information to be forwarded in the hid-
den layer is refreshed. The completed experiments involved
the following corrective codes: the BCH type (n = 84,
k = 28, t = 7), where n – length of the code vector, k
– length of the information vector and t – correction ca-
pacity of the code, another BCH type (n = 147, k = 91,
t = 7) as well as the Reed-Solomon (RS) type (n = 21,
k = 9, t = 3).
Fig. 4. General diagram of the hardware bridge HPB-H.
Figures 4 and 5 present general diagrams for individual
bridge types. The following types of bridges were set
up for the experiments: PSTN-NDHS WiFi as well as
VHF-NDHS WiFi. Investigation of bridges included ver-
iﬁcation of their information bit error rates (IBER) for
information recovered from the BCH and RS extractors.
The calculated error rate served as the criterion to assess
whether hidden transmission of commands to boundary ap-
pliances is possible or not.
Figure 6 presents measurement results for the bit error
rate calculated for the hidden information (a control com-
mand) recovered from BCH and RS extractors for the hard-
ware bridge PSTN-NDHS WiFi. One can clearly see that
path no. 3 (pop music) is incapable to eﬃciently transmit
control commands via such a bridge. In other cases correc-
tive codes could recover the original form of information.
Similar results were obtained for the software bridge (with
information refreshment) of the PSTN-NDHS WiFi type.
The obtained results can be seen in Fig. 7.
Experiment results for the software bridge VHF-NDHS
WiFi are shown in Fig. 8. The graph contains only those
paths that were substantially deteriorated so that extrac-
tion of the watermark binary signature proved infeasible.
The next picture (Fig. 9) presents measurements results
for the hardware implementation of the VHF-NDHS WiFi
bridge. In such a case the OFDM method proved inca-
pable to extract the watermark binary signature. On the
other hand, the second path (male speech in German) with
the watermark embedded by means of the DCM method
proved suﬃciently invulnerable to transmission degrada-
tion factors and recovery of the original command was
possible.
3.3. Collaboration between Master Resident and Hidden
Protocol Interpreter
The master resident is a speciﬁc component of the NDHS
system as it is intended to supervise operation of individ-
ual stations that make up components of a hidden network
(botnet) as it is the station where hidden protocol inter-
preters are installed. The hidden protocol interpreter en-
hances the forwarding station (router) with the functional-
ity of a network-centric router [12]. The HPI unit analyzes
streams of voice packages that pass through the speciﬁc
router with the aim to detect hidden transmission or embeds
a watermark into the forwarded voice signal. The master
resident communicates with HPI units operated within the
existing network in a hidden or open manner (depending on
available possibilities and importance of information trans-
mitted). The master resident makes the decision on the
basis of information about data streams forwarded by every
speciﬁc HPI unit and provides that HPI unit with relevant
commands. The commands are always encrypted with use
of the symmetric VMPC code. Encryption keys that are
used to encode communication sessions between MR and
HPI are stored in the MR database (repository) and are
unique for each speciﬁc HPI unit. After receiving the com-
mand the HPI unit undertakes the required action. There
are many possible actions, starting from simple recording
of the voice signals through modiﬁcation of these signals
(injection of an additional content or extraction of some
fragments of the voice package) up to disabling the entire
voice signal or forwarding the latter to another subscriber.
In extreme cases the entire components of the network in-
frastructure where the speciﬁc HPI is installed can be elim-
inated or some functions attributable to these components
can be disabled.
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Fig. 5. General diagram of the software bridge HPB-S.
Fig. 6. Results for measurements of information bit error rates
(IBER) for information recovered from the PSTN-NDHS WiFi
bridge implemented as HPB-H.
Fig. 7. Results for measurements of information bit error rates
(IBER) for information recovered from the software bridge PSTN-
NDHS WiFi.
Fig. 8. Results for measurements of information bit error rates
(IBER) for information recovered from the software bridge VHF-
NDHS WiFi.
Fig. 9. Results for measurements of information bit error rates
(IBER) for information recovered from the hardware bridge VHF-
NDHS WiFi.
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4. Implementation of the Mechanism
The described mechanism was implemented in practice on
the basis of the GNU/Linux operating system. HPI units
were developed as kernel modules whilst the MR repre-
sented an independent application developed in C program-
ming language.
To conﬁrm operability of the mechanism two hardware
bridges were set up, namely VHF-NDHS WiFi as well
as PSTN-VHF (in that way a heterogeneous network was
developed) where two HPI were operated. The network
layout with the established bridges is shown in Fig. 10.
Fig. 10. Diagram of examined heterogeneous network (PSTN-
VHF-NDHS WiFi).
The network was used to transmit voice packages with
embedded watermarks equivalent to encrypted commands.
The record no. 2 was selected for experiments (male speech
in German) with the watermarks embedded with use of the
DCM method (where the both information capacities were
applied). The command was encrypted and then encoded
with use of the BCH code. HPI units, after having the com-
mand decoded and decrypted, were forced to perform the
speciﬁc operation, namely to have the voice message “con-
versation monitored, conversation monitored” introduced
into the voice package transmitted between terminal 1 and
terminal 2. The completed experiments conﬁrmed the as-
sumption that IT networks can be managed with use of
hidden and conﬁdential information transmitted via hetero-
geneous environment with use of HPI units, the master
resident and HPB.
5. Conclusion
Nowadays none of the voice telephone systems (VoIP,
PSTN, GSM) fails to be invulnerable to hidden transmis-
sion, which enables wide application of hidden transmis-
sion systems similar to the described one. Therefore there is
the potential risk that the unauthorized hidden transmission
shall be used to control components of network infrastruc-
tures. Consequently, development of mechanisms intended
to safeguard the network against such an unintended use is
an urgent must.
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Paper Authentication in VoIP Telephony
with Use of the Echo Hiding Method
Jakub Rachoń, Zbigniew Piotrowski, and Piotr Gajewski
Military University of Technology, Warsaw, Poland
Abstract—The paper describes the method intended to au-
thenticate identity of a VoIP subscriber with use of the data
hiding technique that is speciﬁcally implemented by means
of the echo hiding method. The scope includes presentation
of experimental results related to transmission of information
via a hidden channel with use of the SIP/SDP signalling pro-
tocol as well as results of subjective assessment on quality of
a signal with an embedded watermark.
Keywords—authentication, BS 1116-1 test, digital watermark-
ing, echo hiding.
1. Introduction
Nowadays, when the VoIP technology is being rapidly de-
veloped, the problem of subscriber authentication is appear-
ing as the more and more important problem. The existing
threats to safety of telephone connections [1], [2] have led
to the need to seek for alternative methods robust against
intentional attacks. Encryption of dedicated phone calls is
only a partial solution of the problem as most of PSTN
calls that are currently made are incapable to cope with
conﬁdentiality of connections. There appeared an attempt
to resolve the problem with use of the electronic appliance
called personal trusted terminal (PTT) [3] that bases on
an objective (numerical) veriﬁcation of radio subscribers
and that is also applicable to VoIP, GSM and PSTN net-
works. The concept associated with objective veriﬁcation
of telephone subscribers on telecom lines with use of the
information hiding technique can be also applied to hid-
den authentication of subscribers for telephone and radio
links [4]. The present study deals with the method of water-
marking by means of the echo hiding technique. Alongside,
results of studies on robustness of the watermark to vari-
able conditions attributable to wide area networks (WAN)
are presented. In addition, the emulation method for WANs
link path conditions is also described, where the emulation
is carried out with use of the VMware Player software and
the Debian operating system that is derived from the Linux
kernel. The mentioned software is free of charge and com-
monly available from Internet.
2. Echo Hiding Method
2.1. Embedder Design
The echo hiding method consists in ﬁltering of the origi-
nal signal where one of two ﬁlters with the ﬁnite impulse
response is used. The two ﬁlters diﬀer with the following
parameters: response delay, rate of the response fading as
well as number of delays that produce the echo (kernels).
The speciﬁc ﬁlter is selected pursuant to the bit value of the
transmitted watermark. The encryption method with use
of the echo hiding technique is described with more details
in [5] as well as in [6] and [7]. The applied algorithm
implements the module of the detector that is capable to
recognize sounding vowels and consonants, which makes it
possible to incorporate the watermark to selected frames of
the acoustic signal. For that purpose the average magnitude
diﬀerence function (AMDF) is used. It is the method that
for the ﬁrst time was explained in [8]. Consequently, when
information on structure of the applied detector of sound-
ing consonants and vowels is unavailable it is infeasible to
correctly detect the watermark on the receiver side.
Fig. 1. Design of the watermark embedder.
In that way transmission of the watermark becomes hidden
and adopts features of a conﬁdential transmission as it is
the case when the process of trials and errors is suitable
to detect only selected fragments of the transmitted signal.
Taking account for the fact that the information represented
by the watermark is used only once for the speciﬁc phone
connection session, it becomes much more diﬃcult to fake
identity of the subscriber. Design of the watermark embed-
der is shown in Fig. 1.
2.2. Design of the Watermark Embedder
Operation principle of the embedder consists in computa-
tion of the auto-cepstrum function intended to detect delay
of the echo. It is the method that was described for the ﬁrst
time in [9]. The algorithms takes advantage of a voice ac-
tivity detector (VAD) for sounding vowels and consonants
as it is reasonable to ﬁnd out only those fragments (frames)
of the signal, where the watermark can be embedded. The
same VAD is also used on the receiver side. The water-
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mark extractor demands for more computation power than
the embedder due to the reason that for each signal frame
it must ﬁnd out the auto-cepstrum function that is deﬁned
by the following equation:
fd =
{
IFFT
[
log(FFT(uw (n)))2
]}2
, (1)
where:
uw – amplitude of subsequent samples within the frame,
FFT – fast Fourier transform,
IFFT – inversed fast Fourier transform
2.3. The Real-Time Mode Process of Watermark
Embedding and Extraction
Owing to the fact that the algorithm for watermark embed-
ding is relatively uncomplicated, it is feasible to implement
it in the real-time mode to system platforms with low com-
putation capacities. It makes possible to use the algorithms
in such portable devices as PDA, mobile phones or other ap-
pliances, where, e.g., the Java virtual machine is installed.
Due to more demanding requirements of the extractor, the
stream of received bits must split into two paths, where the
ﬁrst part is forwarded to the D/A converter and then deliv-
ered to the loud-speaker (handset), whereas the second part
arrives to the watermark extractor. Therefore, it is possible
to embed and extract watermarks with no compromise to
the voice quality.
3. Measurement Test Bed
In order to measure robustness of the watermark to variable
conditions typical for WANs links, two virtual machines
created within the VMware Player [9] were used. VMware
Player is the software application that makes it possible to
assign a part of hardware computer resources to establish
an isolated architecture that enables to run any operating
system. Furthermore, the virtual machines are capable to
communicate by means of the IP protocol. To emulate
WAN environment one machine called router was used to
launch the packets forwarding service (IP forwarding) and
then the tool called traﬃc control was applied to manage
traﬃc of outgoing packets (Fig. 2). The router forwards
packets to the virtual telephone exchanger PBX Asterisk.
Fig. 2. WAN emulation.
The traﬃc control tool allows emulation of the following
parameters:
– packet delay,
– packet loss,
– packet repeating,
– packet damage by random bit swapping,
– packet reordering.
The foregoing conﬁguration of the test bed made it possi-
ble to carry out the following experiment. The stream of
speech signal was redirected to the subscriber’s voice mail-
box, whereas the stream of RTP packets was controlled by
the router, where traﬃc of outgoing packets was delayed in
accordance with the Gaussian distribution with the constant
mean value of 100 ms and increasing standard deviation
across the jitter experiment. The acoustic signal transmit-
ted with use of the RTP protocol was encoded by means
of the G.711 µ-Law codec. The experiments were carried
out in the following way:
1. The binary signature of the watermark was embedded
by means of the echo hiding algorithm with use of
the Matlab environment.
2. The WAVE ﬁle containing the examined soundtrack
was reproduced as a sound source for the SIPCLI
software. It is the software tool that is used to estab-
lish connections when the SIP protocol is applied.
3. The recorded voice message stored on the voice mail-
box was transferred to the local disk.
4. The ﬁle with the recorded message was decoded by
the watermark extractor within the Matlab environ-
ment.
The connection between the client and the machine, where
the VMware Player environment was launched, was es-
tablished with use of the Ethernet cable UTP cat. 5 with
the length of 1.2 m. The connection was handled by net-
work cards operating according to the IEEE 802.3u stan-
dard (100Base-TX Fast Ethernet).
4. Measurement Results
Figure 3 presents comparison between quality of the water-
mark extraction depending on the type of the ﬁnite impulse
response (FIR) ﬁlter applied to embed the echo. The ex-
periments were carried out within a closed loop for the
male English speech. The signal was sampled with the fre-
quency of 8 kHz and 16-bit resolution. The d0 parameter
stands for the echo delay expressed as a number of samples
for the bit with the low logic level (0), whereas the d1 pa-
rameter is meant for the echo delay expressed as a number
of samples for the bit with the high logic level (1). The
echo fading factor is 0.4 for the both cases. The values
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Fig. 3. Eﬃciency of detection as a function of echo delay and
number of echo kernels: (a) = 1, (b) = 3, (c) = 5 for the English
speech signal and for signature with 32 [b] payload (d) bilateral
echo methode.
of d0 were selected on the basis of the experimental study
described in [10]. The presented graphs serve as the proof
that any increase in number of echo kernels is not enough
to substantially improve the detection eﬃciency. Only the
ﬁlter with the preceding or delayed kernel (also known as
bilateral kernel) signiﬁcantly improves extraction quality.
On the other hand, the watermark quality estiamtion tests
demonstrate that such a solution considerably deteriorates
the original signal and leads to distortions that make the
watermark easily hearable. To reach a compromise be-
tween satisfying results of the watermark extraction and
the watermark inaudibility, the following parameters of the
watermark embedder were selected for the male English
speech:
– d0 = 15 samples,
– d1–d0 = 5 samples,
– number of echo kernels = 1,
– echo fading factor = 0,4.
To guarantee correct detection of the signature secured by
means of the error detecting and correcting code BCH, the
elementary error rate must be below 10%. As one can
see in Fig. 4 detection/extraction of the watermark is fea-
Fig. 4. Robustness of the watermark against jitter in the RTP
channel, f s = 8 kHz
sible when the standard deviation of packet delays ranges
within the interval of 9 ms. It imposes the requirement to
guarantee relative steady parameters of the line that was
established for the needs of the voice connection to the SIP
protocol. The average standard deviation for the packet
delays is equivalent to the average value of the parameter
that is referred to as jitter. For digital transmissions such as
transmission with use of the RTP protocol the watermark
is correctly extracted at the receiver side, even in case of
conversion from the PCM format 16 bits per a sample to
the G711 µ-Law 8 bits per a sample and the reverse con-
version to the PCM format 16 bits/sample at the side of the
PBX Asterisk switchboard. The approximate transmission
watermark data payload is 7 bit/s. The following paragraph
comprises statistical information on parameters of the RTP
channel. The parameters have been determined with use of
the RTP stream analysis software application incorporated
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into the Wireshark package on the basis of data packets
captured at the side of the PBX telephone switchboard.
Max delta = 66,16 ms at packet no. 1746
Max jitter = 15,23 ms. Mean jitter = 10,19 ms.
Total RTP packets = 1150 (expected 1150)
Lost RTP packets = 0 (0,00%)
Sequence errors = 120
Duration 23 s
(-386 ms clock drift,
corresponding to 7868 Hz (-1,65%)
The above statistics have been found out for the connection
with the emulated standard deviation of 9 ms. It turns out
that for such circumstances the drift of phase angle amount-
ing to –1,65% occurs. Therefore, the proposed method is
also insensitive to the eﬀect of phase angle drift, which is
very common on telecom links.
Fig. 5. Subjective ﬁdelity assessment for the signal with the
embedded watermark. The results are provided for the conﬁdence
interval of 95% and were determined with use of the ITU-R BS
1116-1 test. Details about sound tracks used in this test can be
found in Table 1.
To subjectively assess ﬁdelity of signals with embedded wa-
termarks the test deﬁned by the standard ITU R BS.1116-1
was carried out. The test was completed with participa-
tion of 10 listeners. Test results were subject to statistic
computations with the conﬁdence interval of 95% and then
shown in Fig. 5. The SDG values above –1 mean that the
watermark is not hearable. The obtained results enable to
come out with the following conclusions:
• Authentication of SIP subscribers with use of water-
marks is possible for networks where QoS is applied.
• Watermark signal is robust against variable delays of
packets transmitted within the network.
• Increase both: echo signal numbers, as well as the
echo scaling factor, makes the watermark better hear-
able on the background of the original signal.
• The subjective assessment how much embedded wa-
termarks distort the original speech signal may vary
with the language of conversation and gender of
speakers.
The experimental results serve as the conﬁrmation that
authentication of subscribers who use VoIP telephony is
possible when watermarks are embedded by means of the
echo method and the original signal at the receiver side
may remains unknown. It was also demonstrated that the
proposed method is robust against conversion with use of
the G.711 µ-Law codec. In addition, the experiments pro-
vided the proof that the method is robust against the phase
angle drift (signal jitter) that commonly occurs in telecom
channels. Therefore, the ‘blind’ extraction of watermarks
is possible, i.e., the original signal at the receiver side is
not necessary to correctly extract the binary signature that
is represented by the embedded watermark.
Table 1
Description of sound tracks that were used to assess
quality of the watermarking technique
Track Type of Echo decay Number of BER
number speech signal factor echo signals [%]
1 French female 0.4 1 6.56
2 English female 0.4 1 5.71
3 English male 0.4 1 0.00
4 German male 0.4 1 5.56
5 English male 0.4 1 5.00
6 French female 0.8 1 1.64
7 English female 0.8 1 0.00
8 English male 0.8 1 0.00
9 German male 0.8 1 0.00
10 English male 0.8 1 1.67
11 French female 0.6 2 0.00
12 English female 0.6 2 0.00
13 English male 0.6 2 1.35
14 German male 0.6 2 2.78
15 English male 0.6 2 0.00
16 French female 0.4 3 4.92
17 English female 0.4 3 4.29
18 English male 0.4 3 1.35
19 German male 0.4 3 5.56
20 English male 0.4 3 6.67
21 French female 0.4 bilateral echo 3.33
22 English female 0.4 bilateral echo 20.29
23 English male 0.4 bilateral echo 1.35
24 German male 0.4 bilateral echo 1.39
25 English male 0.4 bilateral echo 0.00
5. Recommendations
The studies on implementation of watermark embedding
with use of the echo hiding method serve as the evidence
that the RTP channels set up for connections to both the
H.323 and SIP protocols are suitable for transmission with
watermarks embedded into voice signals.
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Abstract—Inherent heterogeneity of the networks increases
risk factor and new security threats emerge due to the variety
of network types and their vulnerabilities. This paper presents
an example of applied security framework – the INTERSEC-
TION. By referring to the ISO/IEC security standards and
to the FP7 INTERSECTION project results, authors under-
line that in the processes of managing and planning security,
investigating technology and business governance should be
at least as important as formalizing the need for decisions
on security cooperation between operators. INTERSECTION
provides security mechanisms and introduces capability pos-
sible only with a management solution that is at a higher level
than that of any of the connected systems alone.
Keywords—IDMEF, IDS, IPFIX, security framework.
1. Introduction
Information technology industries as well as telecommu-
nication operators are seeking eﬃcient and comprehensive
security solutions. This crucial task not only aims at pro-
viding protection against malicious or sometimes inadver-
tent attacks – it must also address the business requirements
for conﬁdentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation,
accountability, authenticity, and reliability of information
and services. Still, an information system is as secure as
the weakest element of the system. In many cases network
security consists of building blocks provided by vendors
specializing in a single aspect of security. This is why in-
teroperability should be considered. Basic interoperability
could be achieved by deploying standard protocols for data
exchange between security components. Intelligence of the
system could be further enhanced with implementation of
a management component capable of aggregating such in-
formation and able to link otherwise unrelated events into
a big picture view. Such a system may provide compre-
hensive and eﬃcient security defense even in the case of
zero-day exploits. Furthermore, the heterogeneity of net-
works should be taken into consideration, as it may add new
vulnerabilities or open otherwise independent networks to
new threats.
At the same time another perspective of the same situa-
tion can be observed – there is a value in having access
to additional monitoring data for correlation in a security
framework. Turning adverse situation of supporting var-
ious and complex connections between networks into an
advantage of high level managed security solutions capable
of preventing complex attacks from spreading into multiple
networks and geographic areas may be especially interest-
ing to telecom service provides. This task is the aim of the
European research project INTERSECTION. Additionally
the project focuses on developing new anomaly detection
algorithms that can be used with the traﬃc correlation en-
gine to predict the network behavior and prevent malicious
users from accessing the network, stealing information or
disrupting a service. By detecting zero-day exploits and au-
tomated remediation the security level is further improved.
This paper is divided into sections organized as follows:
Section 2 is a summary of the related work in the ﬁeld of
security frameworks. Section 3 describes the various ISO
standards addressing telecommunication security manage-
ment and intrusion detection framework architecture. Sec-
tion 4 describes the impact of known network threats (like
viruses) on companies network and some information about
anomaly detection techniques. Section 5 describes the idea
of INTERSECTION and protocols used in framework. Sec-
tion 6 describes the plausible test scenarios for demonstrat-
ing the INTERSECTION capabilities. Section 7 introduces
idea of converged security. Section 8 then presents security
as a service concept. We conclude in Section 9.
2. Related Work
In order to align the described INTERSECTION frame-
work with current state of the art research authors have
reviewed most related papers. The areas covered by ana-
lyzed papers span from describing technical solutions for
improving security: [1], [2], through business perspec-
tive: [3], [4], [5] ﬁnally to evaluation criteria. In [3] au-
thor describes ten aspects that should be taken into account
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when planning information security. It is interesting to
note that infrastructure, tools and supporting mechanisms
are the last items on the list of important factors to include.
According to author, even more important then security
mechanisms is the need for corporate governance responsi-
bility (security is a business issue and not technical issue)
as well as enforcement of information security compliance
and monitoring.
According to the autor, the latter are absolutely essential.
Framework for uniﬁed network security management is pre-
sented in [1]. This paper deﬁnes architecture of a uniﬁed
security management system for security framework for
converged networks. The framework is based on the fol-
lowing principles: coordination of heterogeneous detection
tools performing vulnerability and multistage attack anal-
ysis visualization and delivering strategic responses across
network boundaries. The architecture of the security frame-
work consists of 3 layers: scanning, modeling and applica-
tion. Scanning layer is monitoring traﬃc data from diﬀerent
types of network; it analyzes the data by using vulnerabil-
ity information and database in order to provide security
assessment. The modeling tier provides a functional rep-
resentation of weaknesses found on networks in the form
of requirements and impact. The application tier provides
a view of the security features of the network to help iden-
tifying potential threats to an enterprise. It provides an-
alytical and correlation tools which can be visualized to
provide administrators with information that allows to take
eﬀective decisions against security threats.
Similarly Onwubiko et al. in [2] propose integrated security
framework. The framework deﬁnes four types of compo-
nents: sensor components that contribute evidence about
security related events, analysis components that imple-
ment autonomous software agents capable of synthesizing
evidence, an abstract “security space” through which com-
ponents communicate and ﬁnally response components that
implement countermeasures. Response components can be
conﬁgured to incorporate human decision-making in pro-
tecting networks. The logical components of the frame-
work are realized on physical network nodes. A physical
network node may realize one or more logical components
and may interact with one or more security spaces. The
above framework follows the generic model for intrusion
detection presented in [6].
Hunter in [4] presents the Tivoli case to create an integrated
framework approach and the problems found when the com-
pany had to interoperate with other management products
not embraced by the framework. He underlines that inte-
gration is required and that there is a need for standards
and protocols that allow diﬀerent vendors to inter-operate
rather than having dedicated integration frameworks. In
addition, the idea of autonomic-management is presented,
even though the preliminary stage is to identify potential
security threats in advance and to alert security managers
so that proactive action can be taken. The longer term ob-
jective of the Tivoli case is to provide self healing security
management and to ﬁx problems automatically.
On the other hand authors in [5] show that although con-
ventional security solutions have been implemented as stan-
dalone systems, designed for solving very speciﬁc regional
problems it is feasible to create integrated security in-
frastructure with capabilities for dynamic and automatic
interaction between heterogeneous security devices. Pre-
sented solution combines ﬁrewall, intrusion prevention sys-
tem (IPS), vulnerability scanners and honeypot technolo-
gies to assure a security infrastructure. Each component
collaborates with the others in order to choose the best ac-
tion and to launch adequate countermeasures. Exchange
of security events between individual security components
allows automatic corrective action without user interven-
tion, while keeping the ability to adapt to an evolving envi-
ronment. Another possibility for improving security level
within large organizations is outsourcing.
Author in [7] state that security falls within the area that
does not lend itself well to outsourcing because it is too
closely tied to the running of the business. Moreover, Gart-
ner suggests that outsourcing security is not appropriate
for everyone and has developed decision framework to de-
termine whether in-house or outsourced security is more
appropriate [7]. The typical scope of security outsourc-
ing extends to: monitoring security architecture, continu-
ous conﬁguration of security infrastructure, prevention and
recovery of incidents. According to the author the major
beneﬁt of outsourcing is achieved when the scope of threats
is much larger than a company (operator) can provide in
its own right. Even if a company has resources to contin-
uously monitor all the events being generated it can only
correlate those events happening within its own perimeter.
3. Security Management Standards
The International Organization for Standardization oﬀers
suite of standards responsible for providing detailed guid-
ance on the security aspects of the management, operation
and use of information system networks, and their inter-
connections. Security requirements have been gathered in
the ISO/IEC series of standards addressing the following
areas:
– (ISO/IEC 18028-1) establishes network security re-
quirements and introduce possible control areas and
the speciﬁc technical areas,
– (ISO/IEC 18028-2) deﬁnes a standard security archi-
tecture,
– (ISO/IEC 18043) deﬁnes the methods for selecting,
deployment and operations of intrusion detection sys-
tem,
– (ISO/IEC 7498-2) the security issues that have to be
address within a security system.
Identiﬁcation and analysis of the communication related
factors that should be taken into account to establish net-
work security are the scope of the ISO/IEC 18028-1 stan-
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Fig. 1. Conceptual model of network security risk areas [8].
dard. These factors and the corresponding areas of risk are
depicted in the Fig. 1.
The results of security risks assessment of a network con-
nection depend on the type and number of networks com-
municating (e.g., WAN, WLAN, broadband, radio). Se-
lected key risk factors for each type of network are shown
in Table 1. When referring to Table 1 one should distin-
guish between threats and key risk factors. WLAN will
certainly be vulnerable to DoS attacks but the impact of
such is more severe in WAN or broadband. The same
applies for wireless networks. Although radio networks
share the same primary security risk with WLAN, there
are more prone to disruption due to the possibilities of
jamming the system and aﬀecting a considerably greater
Table 1
Key risk factors according to connection type [8]
Risk WAN WLAN Radio Broadband
Intrusion +
DoS + + +
Eavesdropping + +
Unauthorized access +
Misconﬁguration + +
Flawed WEP or TKIP +
Session hijacking +
Propagation of mali-
cious code
+
UL/DL of unautho-
rized access
+
number of users. Columns in the Table 1 represents the
key risks related to particular network whereas speaking
about connection that uses for instance WLAN and WAN
one should intersect risk factors from both networks. Each
risk factor represents certain threat to the system.
Fig. 2. Security conceptual architecture [10].
According to the ISO 7498-2:1989 speciﬁcation [9] various
threats may be grouped and categorized as follows:
– destruction of information and/or resources (I),
– corruption or modiﬁcation of information (II),
– theft, removal of loss of information and other re-
sources (III),
– disclosure of information (IV),
– interruption of services (V).
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Particular threats should be addressed by deﬁning a set
of principles that describe a security structure for the end-
to-end security solution. According to ISO/IEC 18028-2
the most generic security framework aimed at combating
broad range of threats can rely on the eight-dimensional
model as presented in Fig. 2. The ﬁgure depicts the concept
of protecting a network by deﬁning security dimensions at
each security plane of each security layer to provide com-
prehensive security solutions. Thus according to [10], to
be resilient, an end-to-end security solution must address
the spectrum of depictured areas and dimensions. Protec-
tion elements have to be placed throughout the network to
protect the company from malicious attacks. The target
coverage of threats by the well established security dimen-
sions in an organization is presented in Table 2.
Table 2
Threats and security dimension relation [10]
Security Security threat
dimension I II III IV V
Access control Y Y Y Y
Authentication Y Y
Non-repudiation Y Y Y Y Y
Data conﬁdentiality Y(∗) Y(∗)
Comm. ﬂow security Y Y
Data integrity Y(∗) Y(∗)
Avaliability Y(∗) Y(∗)
Privacy Y
(∗) feasible with IDS.
Network security is achieved by addressing a speciﬁc group
of threats (column name refers to the numbering in the
threat list above) with a security component or system
that provides functionalities described by given dimen-
sion (row). When mitigating particular risk with the proper
countermeasure a certain level of security is achieved –
which can further be extended by applying more mature so-
lutions and robust security components. A practical way to
enhance the security level is to introduce an intrusion detec-
tion system (IDS) in the network. IDS will, by deﬁnition,
cover certain threats in the context of eight-dimensional
security model (Table 2). According to [11] generic IDS
should address the authentication, integrity, conﬁdentiality
Fig. 3. Generic model of intrusion detection [6].
and availability dimensions as indicated by Table 2. It is
worth noticing that by addressing only four out of eight
security dimensions IDS can cover a complete spectrum of
security threats. A generic model for IDS deﬁned by [11]
is presented in Fig. 3.
The event detection module will gather data scattered
around the network; this will include information about
interfaces, traﬃc, active users and system logs. Data cor-
relation will take place inside the analysis block, where
patterns of properly functioning network will be deﬁned.
All data is stored in a data storage module. If an IDS
works in anomaly detection mode the system can compute
the traﬃc proﬁles for normal behavior and compare it to
ongoing traﬃc to determine possibility of an attack. Once
the attack is detected the IDS can in turn scan set of avail-
able countermeasures and with a presence of a response
module – reconﬁgure the network devices or interfaces to
slow down the attack, thus providing enough time for the
system administrator to trace the intrusion source. A secure
network may contain single IDS as well as multiple IDSes
spread through the network. Hierarchical architecture is
proposed in [11] for multiple IDS management as shown
in the Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. An intrusion detection management model [6].
The more data is gathered from agents for analysis the more
reliable decision can be made by manager and an ongo-
ing attack may be detected in less time. Thus according
to [6] it could be beneﬁcial for operators to share data
on intrusion information and interconnect their IDS. The
ISO/IEC 18043 advises such solution but also points out
that operators are not willing to give their knowledge of
intrusions that have aﬀected their IT systems to the public,
as it could reveal their business operations. This is even
more important when we take zero day exploits under con-
sideration. Well known worms like Witty or Slammer [12]
have caused tremendous ﬁnancial losses to many companies
around the world. Would the worms be more destructive
and target mostly critical infrastructure networks their im-
pact could be far more severe. The next section provides
use-case rationale for developing applied security infras-
tructure that is capable of aggregating and linking other-
wise unrelated events into a big picture view to increase
protection level.
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4. Rationale for INTERSECTION
On the 25th January 2003 a virus called Slammer (some-
times also Sapphire) started infecting hosts by exploiting
a buﬀer-overﬂow security hole in computers connected to
Internet that were running the Microsoft SQL server and
Microsoft SQL server desktop engine (MSDE) 2000 [12].
Once a host was infected the worm started scanning ran-
dom IP addresses to spread further. Figure 5 presents the
number of packets send by Slammer from infected loca-
tions during the ﬁrst 12 hours after activation. Because
Slammers behavior was highly anomalous (e.g., regarding
ampliﬁed traﬃc envelope) it could be detected by a method
called network telescope [12]. Success in suppresing the
virus was achieved by analyzing intrusion detection sys-
tem logs gathered from attacked companies and history of
events collected by NMS systems.
Fig. 5. The response to Slammer during the 12 hours after its
release [12].
Would the infected systems been able to exchange infor-
mation between diﬀerent companies IDS the worm could
have had respectively smaller impact and could have been
suppressed from spreading worldwide. The distributed IDS
could suﬃciently increase the security of network oper-
ator infrastructures engaged in a supporting communica-
tion with malicious traﬃc in-band. The data for analy-
sis could be spread through the network so if one opera-
tor would face the attack another one could beneﬁt from
his experience by exchanging information about pattern
of anomalous (attacked) traﬃc between IDS. The INTER-
SECTION framework among other goals aims at propos-
ing new anomaly detection algorithms as well as inves-
tigation of known algorithms [13] and providing a se-
curity framework that interconnects diﬀerent network op-
erators, which in turn allows exchanging traﬃc ﬂow in-
formation between them. This could lead to enhancing
the current security solutions by the factor proportional
to the synergic eﬀect of information exchange between
operators.
5. A View on INTERSECTION
The aim of the INTERECTION project is to come up with
speciﬁcations of an integrated framework for security and
resiliency in complex and heterogeneous communication
networks. Three objectives have been identiﬁed during the
architecture process:
– to deﬁne what data must be shared among security
systems of critical infrastructures and to specify hi-
erarchy of communication and rules for data access,
– to design an integrated framework for securing net-
worked systems,
– to specify appropriate protocols enabling communi-
cation between security systems in order to assure
interoperability in an inter-domain environment.
Figure 6 presents a general overview of the proposed IN-
TERSECTION framework. The INTERSECTION frame-
work includes the following components for: monitoring,
detection, reaction, remediation, visualization, and topol-
ogy discovery. Integration of these components and ex-
change of information between modules collecting data
from heterogeneous environments leads to improved net-
work protection and security for participating systems.
Monitoring, detection, reaction, and remediation compo-
nents cooperate in real time and in automated fashion.
These modules gather data from probes and network el-
ements, analyze it, detect intrusions and anomalies, and
select the most suitable reaction (e.g., reconﬁguration of
network components).
Remediation module is responsible for taking appropri-
ate action in order to prevent similar attacks in the fu-
ture. A network must operate at least one remediation
point (e.g., at a gateway) in order to eﬀect remedies,
but may operate several if appropriate (e.g., one per bor-
der router) or additional that actually exist in neighbor
networks (provided co-operation of those networks). The
INTERSECTION framework also includes oﬄine functions
aiming at using data coming from the network, or pro-
vided by the real-time elements, to help the human opera-
tor in analyzing the network state and to evaluate conﬁg-
uration changes implemented by remediation module. The
oﬄine functions include topology discovery, visualization
and anomaly detection. It is also important to highlight the
relevant protocols used for data exchange within INTER-
SECTION. These include: IDEMF and IPFIX. A short
description of each protocol is provided in the next two
subsections.
5.1. IDEMF
IDMEF is an XML domain speciﬁc language (DSL) for in-
trusion detection systems. Its purpose is to provide an ho-
mogeneous environment to improve the network security.
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Fig. 6. INTERSECTION framework.
Fig. 7. Usage of IDMEF in INTERSECTION.
Figure 7 shows how IDMEF format is used in INTER-
SECTION. The decision engine (DE) aggregates events
gathered from multiple probes (Host IDSes, Network ID-
Ses, DB monitors, etc.). Correlation of these events is per-
formed by complex event processor (CEP), namely Borealis
correlation engine, developed jointly by Brandeis Univer-
sity, Brown University and MIT.
IDMEF messages are used to transmit information from the
probes, and to send alerts to the remediation component.
5.2. IPFIX
IPFIX is an IETF working group standard [14]. It was
created from the need for a common, universal standard
for exporting the Internet protocol ﬂows information from
routers, probes, and other devices that are used by medi-
ation systems and network management systems to facili-
tate services such as measurement, accounting and billing.
Within INTERSECTION IPFIX was used for the measure-
ment task – a task that can be initiated by one of three
components: measurement controller, IDS or visualization.
Probes in INTERSECTION are called OpenIMP probes.
Figure 8 shows that the monitoring system uses multiple
measurement units (probes), which are distributed within
the network and passively monitor network traﬃc. In addi-
tion, the monitoring system includes a postprocessor, col-
lector, management and control interface.
The following section describes the proposed test scenarios
within INTERSECTION project.
6. Test Scenarios
The INTERSECTION deﬁned the suite of test scenarios
to evaluate performance and detection, remediation and
visualization capability of the proposed framework. This
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Fig. 8. Role of IPFIX in INTERSECTION.
section enumerates ﬁve diﬀerent demo scenarios that have
been designed to show how the INTERSECTION frame-
work can eﬀectively detect and resolve attacks by analyz-
ing diﬀerent pieces of information obtained from diﬀerent
networks. Furthermore, some scenarios show how the IN-
TERSECTION framework is capable of detecting attacks
by correlating data that, when analyzed separately would
not provide enough information to detect the attack and to
correct the system conﬁguration settings. Each one of the
ﬁve scenarios has been designed to be run over an intercon-
nected infrastructure, the INTERSECTION demo network
presented in Fig. 9, which is setup by the project part-
ners. This interconnection of networks is necessary since
an important premise, when designing the demo scenarios,
was heterogeneity. In fact, the heterogeneity in the demo
scenarios is addressed in the following ways:
• Each demo scenario involves at least two demo labs
of diﬀerent access technology interconnected, thus
showing that the designed INTERSECTION frame-
work can deal with access network heterogeneity.
The interconnected infrastructure of the diﬀerent
demo labs, called INTERSECTION demo network,
consists of ﬁve laboratories of diﬀerent communi-
cation technologies (including satellite, wireless and
wired networks) connected in a full-mesh network.
• Demo scenarios show how the INTERSECTION
framework combines detection techniques from dif-
ferent access technologies with other detection tech-
niques independent from the access technology, thus
providing a richer framework for detection of attacks.
Even if the attack exploits a vulnerability related
to a speciﬁc access technology, information from
other networks can contribute to the detection of the
attack.
The demo scenarios are based on exploiting speciﬁc vul-
nerabilities that are currently present in networks. In sum-
mary, a demonstration case is a realistic story about how
a vulnerability of a certain technology or equipment can be
exploited, how the attack will be detected, how some mech-
anisms will be activated to solve the attack and how this
process of detection and remediation can be shown to the
network administrator through a visualization framework.
Unlike a usual attack scenario, in these demo cases the at-
tack is not detected by just analyzing the network where the
Fig. 9. he INTERSECTION demonstrator.
attack is performed, but by correlating the information from
diﬀerent networks involved in the monitored environment.
The demo scenarios investigated by the INTERSECTION
project are:
– loss of access to a content provider by hijacking pre-
ﬁxes of its corresponding autonomous system,
– satellite PEP spooﬁng,
– multistage attack on high proﬁle roaming user and
his network,
– injection of bogus packets in a wireless sensor net-
work,
– distributed denial of service attack.
One of the INTERSECTION objectives is to show the ap-
plicability of the advanced decision support tools for miti-
gation, response and recovery in a heterogeneous environ-
ment. For this reason, a set of the aforementioned demo
scenarios have been identiﬁed. Even though INTERSEC-
TION is a research framework it is designed to be deployed
by any operator already using commercial solutions that are
incorporating IDMEF and IPFIX protocols.
7. Towards Converged Security
Numerous network security systems are currently available
on the market. Authors envisage two categories of systems:
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– systems that can manage one or more security areas,
but not the end-to-end security environment of the
organization,
– systems that have the capability of aggregating in-
formation from multiple sources and managing the
whole environment.
First branch of systems include (but is not limited to) net-
work access control, self-defending networks, and security
gateways whereas the second is focused on so called man-
agement solutions. The latter include COTS products used
for collecting, maintaining and reporting network traﬃc
providing services such as centralized log system, user no-
tiﬁcation, activity monitoring. It can be seen that INTER-
SECTION does not address all security issues like privacy,
communication ﬂow security, non-repudiation and access
control required for a complete security management sys-
tem. However, a strong correlation of INTERSECTION to
standard protocols for data exchange and proposed strategy
for interconnecting networks of independent operators and
their customers shows the way towards uniﬁed approach to
network security in our highly interconnected world. One
way to evaluate security solution is to map it against the
security maturity model. Attributes such as company size,
industry regulations, liability, technical complexity, culture,
risk tolerance, and the level of dependence on physical and
logical assets all create distinct requirements for risk man-
agement and security convergence. However, there are sev-
eral attributes common to a mature, converged security or-
ganization. In [15] maturity attributes of a company are
presented (Table 3).
Table 3
Converged security maturity attributes –
excerpt from [15]
Maturity attribute Defense-in-depth
Immature (ad hoc) There is no formal security
structure
Aware (repeatable but
intuitive)
Security is focused on perime-
ter defense
Management and risk-
based (deﬁned)
Safeguards extended beyond
the perimeter, but remain tech-
nically focused
Common (optimized) There is true defense-in-depth
encompassing people, policy,
and processes with technol-
ogy. Thrid-party and mobility
issues are included
INTERSECTION framework, while not covering some of
the aspects of the converged rank in maturity model in
some way may stretch the model beyond current deﬁnition.
INTERSECTION framework envisions participation in
a solution that not only includes internal policies and pro-
cesses of an organization but provides enhancements and
introduces capability possible only with a management so-
lution that is at a higher level than any of the connected
systems alone.
8. Security as a Service
As the software paradigm shifts towards cloud computing
the more important it appears not only to provide means
for better security but also to incorporate security solu-
tions that span across domains and gain from the knowl-
edge/experience of “ﬁrst” victims in order to protect others.
In computer networks there is a problem of extremely high
speed of data/message exchange between host/networks dur-
ing attack. The so called zero-day exploits are the eﬀects of
malicious activity of attackers that may aﬀect huge num-
ber of network users (from individual to corporational).
Thus important dimensions for improved threat detection
and prevention (also tolerance) are time and knowledge.
Time factor covers the time period to detect malicious ac-
tivity as well as time to ﬁnd and apply countermeasures
best matching to the context. On the other hand knowl-
edge sharing is essential in keeping security best practices
up to date each time security ﬂaw is detected and provid-
ing framework for building and exchanging rules to apply
(e.g., in the context of security threat) remediation pol-
icy of an organization. Some aspects limiting the proper
take-oﬀ of the 3S paradigm are related to both business
view (security maturity of an organization, information ex-
change strategy) and regulatory framework of a given coun-
try (obligation for anonymization of logs). Deployment of
INTERSECTION enables implementation of the paradigm
of security as a service external to an organization. One
can imagine that monitoring and decision engines are lo-
cated outside of a company network and managed by trusted
third party.
9. Conclusions
The growth of Internet connectivity results in increased
security requirements for enterprises to achieve services
availability as described by SLA agreements (for end users
and between operators). Inherent heterogeneity of the net-
works increases risk factor and new security threats emerge
due to the variety of network types and their vulnerabilities.
The solution proposed by INTERSECTION aims at provid-
ing security-level interoperability between many operators
using diﬀerent network technologies and diﬀerent security
solutions. The real beneﬁt of exploiting INTERSECTION
as an example of applied security framework paradigm can
be capitalized if the key operational assumptions are ful-
ﬁlled. The network owners and service providers should
agree on the need to foresee security related data exchange
as an important substrate of a successful security policy.
The wide spread of malicious code that is remotely com-
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manded to trigger distributed DoS attacks at any time de-
cided by a hacker, calls for the real cooperation that is
fostered by telecommunication regulatory institutions. Cur-
rently the Polish telecommunication law for instance states
that cooperation between telecommunication operators is
the obligation of the operator only at times of crisis situa-
tions [16]. So it is up to the operator to make its internal
information accessible for other operators. The continual
improvement (as a business process) of individual organi-
zations security infrastructure is essential but there is an
even more important aspect in holistic security supremacy
that is only possible when security information exchange
requirement is fulﬁlled. It should be at least as impor-
tant to investigate technology and business governance as
to formalize the need for decisions on security cooperation
in the process of managing and planning security. From
this perspective the meaning of the attribute of converged
security maturity of an organization is stretched as IN-
TERSECTION provides enhancements and introduces ca-
pability possible only with a management solution that
is at a higher level than any of the connected systems
alone.
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Abstract—In this paper, a framework for recognizing network
traffic in order to detect anomalies is proposed. We propose
to combine and correlate parameters from different layers in
order to detect 0-day attacks and reduce false positives. More-
over, we propose to combine statistical and signal-based fea-
tures. The major contribution of this paper are: novel frame-
work for network security based on the correlation approach
as well as new signal based algorithm for intrusion detection
using matching pursuit.
Keywords—anomaly detection, intrusion detection, matching
pursuit, network security, signal processing.
1. Introduction and Motivation
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are based on mathe-
matical models, algorithms and architectural solutions pro-
posed for correctly detecting inappropriate, incorrect or
anomalous activity within a networked systems. Intrusion
detection systems can be classiﬁed as belonging to two
main groups depending on the detection technique em-
ployed: anomaly detection and signature-based detection.
Anomaly detection techniques, that we focus on in our
work, rely on the existence of a reliable characterization
of what is normal and what is not, in a particular network-
ing scenario. More precisely, anomaly detection techniques
base their evaluations on a model of what is normal, and
classify as anomalous all the events that fall outside such
a model. If an anomalous behavior is recognized, this does
not necessarily imply that an attack activity has occurred:
only few anomalies can be actually classiﬁed as attempts
to compromise the security of the system.
Anomaly detection systems can be classiﬁed according to:
– the used algorithm,
– analyzed features of each packet singularly or of the
whole connection,
– the kind of analyzed data - whether they focus on the
packet headers or on the payload.
Most current IDS systems have problems in recognizing
new attacks (0-day exploits) since they are based on the
signature-based approach. In such mode, when system does
not have an attack signature in database, such attack is not
recognized. Another drawback of current IDS systems is
that the used parameters and features do not contain all
the necessary information about traﬃc and events in the
network.
Therefore, in this paper we present the framework in which
anomaly detection system based on correlation and diver-
sity approaches are used, such as:
• Item diversity – diﬀerent network layers parameters
are monitored and used. In such approach we do not
have information from transport layer only – such in-
formation is merged/correlated with application layer
events.
• Correlation – correlation is used twofold (during de-
cision):
– item both anomaly and signature-based ap-
proaches are correlated,
– parameters/features from various network layers
are correlated,
– statistical and signal-based features are used and
correlated.
2. Technical Solution
In this paper, a new solution for aanomaly detection sys-
tem (ADS) based on signal processing algorithm is pre-
sented. ADS analyzes traﬃc from Internet connection in
certain point of a computer network. The proposed ADS
system uses redundant signal decomposition method based
on matching pursuit algorithm. ADS based on matching
pursuit uses dictionary of base functions (BFD) to de-
compose input 1D traﬃc signal (1D signal may repre-
sent packets per second) into set of based functions called
also atoms. The proposed BFD has a ability to approxi-
mate traﬃc signal. Number and parameters of base func-
tions was limited in order to shorten atom search time
process.
Since some attacks are visible only in speciﬁc layer
(e.g., SQLIA), in our approach, we propose to use network
parameters from diﬀerent layers.
Transport layer, network layer and application layer param-
eters are used.
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In the further step, we use the presented parameters to
calculate characteristics (features) of the observed traﬃc.
Some of the parameters are used for statistical features
calculation and/or for signal-based feature calculation re-
spectively. Feature extraction methods are presented in the
following subsections.
2.1. Statistical Features
The chi-square multivariate test for anomaly detection sys-
tems can be represented by:
X2 =
p
∑
i=1
(Xi −X i)2
X i
, (1)
where X = (X1,X2, . . . ,Xp) denote an observation of p vari-
ables from a process at time t and X = (X1,X2, . . . ,X p) is
the sample mean vector.
Using only the mean vector in Eq. (1), cause that chi-square
multivariate test detects only the mean shift on one or more
of the variables.
2.2. Signal Processing Features
Signal processing techniques have found application in net-
work intrusion detection systems because of their abil-
ity to detect novel intrusions and attacks, which can-
not be achieved by signature-based approaches [1]. It
has been shown that network traﬃc presents several rel-
evant statistical properties when analyzed at diﬀerent levels
(e.g., self-similarity, long range dependence, entropy vari-
ations, etc.) [2].
Approaches based on signal processing and on statistical
analysis can be powerful in decomposing the signals re-
lated to network traﬃc, giving the ability to distinguish be-
tween trends, noise, and actual anomalous events. Wavelet-
based approaches, maximum entropy estimation, princi-
pal component analysis techniques, and spectral analysis,
are examples in this regard which have been investigated
in the recent years by the research community [3], [4],
[5], [6], [7]. However, discrete wavelet transform provides
a large amount of coeﬃcients which not necessarily reﬂect
required features of the network signals.
Therefore, in this paper we propose another signal pro-
cessing and decomposition method for anomaly/intrusion
detection in networked systems. We developed original
anomaly detection type IDS algorithm based on matching
pursuit.
In the rest of the paper, our original ADS method will
be presented in details. Moreover, results of experimental
setup will be given. We tested our method with standard
traces in worm detection scenario as well as in anomaly
detection scenario. Discussion on redundant dictionary pa-
rameters and ﬁnal conclusions will be provided.
Matching pursuit
Matching pursuit signal decomposition was proposed by
Mallat and Zhang [8].
Matching pursuit is a greedy algorithm that decomposes
any signal into a linear expansion of waveforms which
are taken from an over complete dictionary D. The dictio-
nary D is an over complete set of base functions called
also atoms.
D = {αγ : γ ∈ Γ} , (2)
where every atom αγ from dictionary has norm equal to 1,
‖αγ‖= 1, Γ represents set of indexes for atom transforma-
tion parameters such as translation, rotation and scaling.
Signal s has various representations for dictionary D. Sig-
nal can be approximated by set of atoms αk from dictionary
and projection coeﬃcients ck
s =
|D|−1
∑
n=0
ckαk . (3)
To achieve best sparse decomposition of signal s (min) we
have to ﬁnd vector ck with minimal norm but suﬃcient for
proper signal reconstruction. Matching pursuit is a greedy
algorithm that iteratively approximates signal to achieve
good sparse signal decomposition. Matching pursuit ﬁnds
set of atoms αγk such that projection of coeﬃcients is max-
imal. At ﬁrst step, residual R is equal to the entire signal
R0 = s.
R0 = 〈αγ0 , R0〉αγ0 + R1 . (4)
If we want to minimize energy of residual R1 we have to
maximize the projection. |〈αγ0 , R0〉|. At next step we must
apply the same procedure to R1
R1 = 〈αγ1 , R1〉αγ1 + R2 . (5)
Residual of signal at step n can be written
Rns = Rn−1s−〈Rn−1s
∣∣αγk 〉αγk . (6)
Signal s is decomposed by set of atoms
s =
N−1
∑
k=0
〈αγk |R
ns〉αγk + R
ns . (7)
Algorithm stops when residual Rns of signal is lower then
acceptable limit.
Our approach to intrusion detection algorithm
In basic matching pursuit algorithm atoms are selected in
every step from entire dictionary which has ﬂat structure.
In this case algorithm causes signiﬁcant processor burden.
In our coder dictionary with internal structure was used.
Dictionary is built from:
– atoms,
– centered atoms.
Centered atoms groups such atoms from D that are as more
correlated as possible to each other. To calculate mea-
sure of correlation between atoms function o(a, b) can be
used [9]
o(a,b) =
√
1−
(
|〈a,b〉|
‖a‖2‖b‖2
)2
. (8)
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The quality of centered atom can be estimated according
to
Ok,l =
1
|LPk,l| ∑i∈LPk,lo
(
Ac(i), Wc(k,l)
)
, (9)
where: LPk,l is a list of atoms grouped by centered atom,
Ok,l is mean of local distances from centered atom Wc(k,l)
to the atoms Ac(i) which are strongly correlated with Ac(i).
Centroid Wc(k,l) represents atoms Ac(i) which belongs to the
set i∈ LPk,l . List of atoms Lk,l should be selected according
to the equation:
max
i∈LPk,l
o
(
Ac(i),Wc(k,l)
)
≤ min
t∈D\LPk,l
o
(
Ac(t),Wc(k,l)
)
. (10)
In the proposed IDS solution 1D real Gabor base function
(equation was used to build dictionary) [9], [10], [11]
αu,s,ξ ,φ (t) = cu,s,ξ ,φ α
( t−u
s
)
cos
(
2piξ (t−u)+ φ), (11)
where:
α(t) =
1
√
s
e−pit
2
, (12)
cu,s,ξ ,φ – is a normalizing constant used to achieve atom
unit energy.
In order to create over complete set of 1D base functions
dictionary D was built by varying subsequent atom param-
eters: frequency ξ and phase φ , position u, scale s.
Fig. 1. Example atom from dictionary.
Base functions dictionary D was created with using
10 diﬀerent scales (dyadic scales) and 50 diﬀerent frequen-
cies. In Fig. 1 example atoms from dictionary D are pre-
sented.
3. Experimental Results
Percentage of the recognized anomalies as a function of en-
coded atoms from dictionary of base functions is presented
in Fig. 2. Five dictionaries with diﬀerent parameters (dif-
ferent number of scales and frequencies) were used in our
ADS system.
Percentage of the recognized anomalies for dictionary of
base functions with approximately constant number of
atoms is presented in Fig. 3. In this case we try to
Fig. 2. Percentage of the recognized anomalies as a function of
encoded atoms.
leave approximately constant number of atoms in dictio-
nary but with diﬀerent proportions of scales and frequen-
cies.
Fig. 3. Percentage of the recognized anomalies for Dictionary of
Base Functions with approximately constant number of atoms.
In Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 there are example results taken from
our ADS system. Traﬃc traces were analyzed by pro-
posed ADS with the use of 20 minutes windows (most
attacks (more than 80%) last no longer then 20 minutes).
In every window we calculate matching pursuit mean pro-
jection parameter in order to recognize suspicious traﬃc
behavior. Analyzed traces are infected by worms (Tables 1
and 2), DDos (Table 4) and DDoS SYNFlood (Table 3)
attacks.
4. Conclusions
In this paper a framework for recognizing attacks and
anomalies in the computer networks is presented. Our
methodology is based on both statistical and signal based
features. The major contribution and innovation is the ap-
plication of matching pursuit algorithm to calculate network
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Table 1
Matching pursuit mean projection for TCP trace [12]. Traces are analyzed
with the use of 20 minutes windows
TCP trace
Window1 Window2 Window3
Mean
Mean
MP-MP MP-MP MP-MP
MP-MP
MP-MP
for trace
for normal
trace
Mawi 2004.03.06 tcp 210,34 172,58 239,41 245,01 240,00
Mawi 2004.03.13 tcp 280,01 214,01 215,46 236,33 240,00
Mawi 20.03.2004 (attacked: worm Witty) 322,56 365,24 351,66 346,48 240,00
Mawi 25.03.2004 (attacked: worm Slammer) 329,17 485,34 385,50 400,00 240,00
Table 2
Matching pursuit mean projection for UDP trace [12]. Traces are analyzed
with the use of 20 minutes windows
UDP trace
Window1 Window2 Window3
Mean
Mean
MP-MP MP-MP MP-MP
MP-MP
MP-MP
for trace
for normal
trace
Mawi 2004.03.06 tcp 16,06 13,80 17,11 15,65 16,94
Mawi 2004.03.13 tcp 20,28 17,04 17,40 18,24 16,94
Mawi 20.03.2004 (attacked: worm Witty) 38,12 75,43 61,78 58,44 16,94
Mawi 25.03.2004 (attacked: worm Slammer) 56,13 51,75 38,93 48,93 16,94
Table 3
Matching pursuit mean projection for TCP trace [13] (traces consist of DDoS SynFlood attacks).
Traces are analyzed with the use of 20 minutes windows
TCP trace
Window1 Window2 Window3
Mean
Mean
MP-MP MP-MP MP-MP
MP-MP
MP-MP
for trace
for normal
trace
One hour trace from unina1 1211 3271 3007 2496,333 860,00
One hour trace from unina2 1906 1804 1251 1653,667 860,00
Table 4
Matching pursuit mean projection for TCP trace [14] (traces consist of DDoS attacks).
Traces are analyzed with the use of 20 minutes windows
TCP trace
Window1 Window2 Window3
Mean
Mean
MP-MP MP-MP MP-MP
MP-MP
MP-MP
for trace
for normal
trace
Backscatter 2008.11.15 147,64 411,78 356,65 305,35 153,66
Backscatter 2008.08.20 208,40 161,28 153,47 174,38 153,66
traﬃc features. The eﬀectiveness of the proposed approach
has been proved in attack and anomaly detection scenarios.
Our framework can be applied to enhance military net-
works since it uses signal-based features. Such features can
be calculated for encrypted traﬃc since ﬂow characteristics
are extracted without considering the payload. Future work
focuses on algorithms optimization so that our framework
can be applied to real-time network security enhancement
and to protect federated network systems (e.g., in national
project SOPAS).
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Abstract—Tunnel establishment, like HTTPS tunnel or re-
lated ones, between a computer protected by a security gate-
way and a remote server located outside the protected net-
work is the most effective way to bypass the network security
policy. Indeed, a permitted protocol can be used to embed
a forbidden one until the remote server. Therefore, if the re-
sulting information flow is ciphered, security standard tools
such as application level gateways (ALG), firewalls, intrusion
detection system (IDS), do not detect this violation. In this
paper, we describe a statistical analysis of ciphered flows that
allows detection of the carried inner protocol. Regarding the
deployed security policy, this technology could be added in
security tools to detect forbidden protocols usages. In the
defence domain, this technology could help preventing infor-
mation leaks through side channels. At the end of this article,
we present a tunnel detection tool architecture and the results
obtained with our approach on a public database containing
real data flows.
Keywords—cyberdefense, network security, decision trees, hid-
den Markov models, HTTPS tunnel, RandomForest.
1. Introduction
Controlling flows going through network boundaries is
a key point of information systems security. The filtering of
these flows and the verification of their conformance to the
network security policy is done in security gateways by ap-
plication level gateways (ALG) and firewalls. In particular,
these tools enforce the restrictions on forbidden protocols
over the network. This task is achieved by packets filtering
techniques and deep inspection of carried payloads.
Nonetheless, firewalls and ALG may become completely
ineffective in two cases: if a permitted protocol is used to
embed a forbidden one or if the flow is ciphered. This en-
Fig. 1. High level scheme of a TLS tunnel.
ables a legitimate or malicious user to infringe the security
policy of an information network, using covert application-
layer tunnels to bypass security gateways (Fig. 1).
Tunneling tools such as HTTPHost [1] or STunnel [2] are
easily available on the Internet, and may be used by a le-
gitimate user to establish a forbidden connection with an
external Internet server. These connections consist in a pro-
tocol usually filtered by the gateway (e.g., ICQ, FTP, SSH,
Skype, Gnutella, BitTorrent, etc.) embedded in a hyper-
text transfer protocol (HTTP) or hypertext transfer protocol
secure (HTTPS) connection. The resulting data exchange
is not controlled by the security gateway and may lead to
critical information leaks or malware intrusions. For exam-
ple, an invited participant to a meeting on a military vessel
may use a hidden tunnel to leak out classified information
via a VoIP protocol. Moreover, similar hidden tunnels are
used by attackers on the Internet to communicate with local
hosts that have previously been infected by a backdoor.
In this paper, we propose a solution to this problem based
on machine learning techniques. Our system relies on a sta-
tistical analysis of ciphered flows enabling identification
of the carried inner protocol, and therefore, detection of
tunneling activities. This solution consists in computing
features for each flow and comparing these parameters to
a statistical model previously built. The parameters used
are derived from the size and the inter-arrival delays of the
packets in the flow.
2. Related Work
Many flow level classifiers have been presented in former
works and applied to protocol identification [3], [4], [5], [6].
These studies use different parameters and machine learn-
ing techniques (Bayesian methods, support vector machine,
etc.) to classify the flows into several categories (SSH,
HTTP, P2P, GAMES, etc.), with promising results. How-
ever, none of these studies specifically address the security
issues. Therefore, they use parameters easily tampered with
by an attacker, such as port numbers or transmission control
protocol (TCP) flags.
To our knowledge, the methods presented in [7] and [8] are
the only ones that share our goal to classify encrypted or
encapsulated traffic. Nonetheless, both of these works use
only the first packets of a connection to classify the entire
flow. Thus, by simulating a legitimate flow using only the
first packets, an attacker can easily bypass these systems.
Considering the security approach specifically, i.e., tun-
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nels detection, we describe a classification method based
on a decision trees forest. This method leads to better
results than other machine learning algorithms. A study
dealing with the impact of transport layer security (TLS)
encapsulation on flows features used for classification is
also presented. Then, we present a tunnel detection tool
architecture and the classification results obtained with our
approach. Finally, we propose a means to decrease the false
positive rate.
3. Machine Learning Techniques
Applied to Tunnel Detection
Many different machine learning tools have been applied
to the flow classification problem. A machine learning al-
gorithm is used to classify a vector among several pre-
determined classes. It consists in two phases:
• A learning phase, taking as input a set of vectors for
each class and returning a classifying model. During
this phase, the class of each vector is known.
• A challenge phase taking as input a set of vectors,
each belonging to a hidden class, the model and re-
turning the class of each vector.
In our case, the classes are the protocols (HTTP, etc.), and
the vectors are the flows (TCP, etc.) over the gateway.
However, related studies were conducted on different
databases, with different parameters, and results cannot be
compared from one paper to another. An interesting quali-
tative survey of several methods is presented in [6], but no
quantitative comparison is carried out.
In order to determine the most effective algorithm and
the best parameters to use for classification, we con-
ducted several experiments on a public database described
in [9] and [10]. This database is composed of more than
20,000 flows captured on a real network. The distribution
of the database flows by traffic classes are presented in
Table 1.
Table 1
Distribution of the database flows by traffic classes
HTTP
Mail
FTP Attack Peer-
Multimedia Services Inter-
(POP, (WMplayer, (X11, active
SMTP, ...) to-peer real DNS (SSH,
IMAP player, ...) NTP, ...) Telnet)
5707 3519 3107 1822 5717 649 2150 283
First, we selected the parameters that will be used to build
statistical models. In order to classify the ciphered or en-
capsulated flows, these parameters must not be related to
the packets payload. We thus kept only the parameters cal-
culated from the sizes of exchanged packets and the inter-
packets delays. In order to select the most discriminating
ones, a correlation based feature selection with BestFirst
search was applied, as described in [11]. A subset of 10 pa-
rameters was determined by this means:
– the number of transmitted packets, client to server
direction,
– the number of transmitted bytes, client to server di-
rection,
– the IP packets mean size, client to server direction,
– the IP packets maximum size, client to server direc-
tion,
– the minimum inter-arrival delay between two IP pack-
ets, client to server direction,
– the maximum inter-arrival delay between two IP
packets, client to server direction,
– the number of transmitted bytes, server to client di-
rection,
– the maximum IP packets size, server to client direc-
tion,
– the variance of the IP packets size, server to client
direction,
– the number of uploaded bytes/total number of ex-
changed bytes’ ratio.
Afterwards, we applied six different machine learning al-
gorithms to the database, using a cross-correlation method
to classify the entire database. These methods are: support
vector machine (SVM), Gaussian mixture model (GMM),
K-Means, nai¨ve Bayes method, C4.5 decision tree and Ran-
domForest (a forest of random decision trees). For each al-
gorithm, several criterions were evaluated, such as correct
classification rate, false positive rate, computation time, etc.
Figure 2 shows the correct classification rates obtained for
each algorithm.
Fig. 2. Correct classification rates for tested machine learning
algorithms.
It appears that RandomForest, a machine learning tool never
applied before to flow classification, leads to the best per-
formances in terms of correct classification rate and com-
putation time.
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4. Impact of TLS Encryption on
Classification Parameters
Previous experiments were carried out on a database made
of clear flows. Unfortunately, there is no publicly available
payload trace set composed of ciphered flows. Our work
aims at demonstrating the feasibility of tunnel detection
for ciphered flows, and thus it is necessary to prove that
results similar to those mentioned above would be obtained
on ciphered flows. We conducted a complementary study
to evaluate the impact of encapsulation on classification
parameters. In particular, we studied the effect of TLS
encryption on the set of 10 parameters we use to classify
a flow (note that TLS encryption is used to establish an
HTTPs tunnel) following these steps:
– pairs of clear/ciphered flows and extracted are gener-
ated for different protocols (HTTP, SCP, SSH, etc.),
– the classification features are extracted for each flow,
– an affine transformation function from clear to ci-
phered was estimated for each parameter,
– the accuracy of these transformation functions was
estimated by calculating the residual quadratic error
of approximation.
The results obtained showed that the transformation in-
duced by TLS encryption on classification parameters can
be correctly approximated by affine functions for 8 features
out of 10. On the opposite, two of them (minimum inter-
arrival delays between packets from client to server and
variance of the size of packets from server to client) were
transformed in a more complex way.
We can reasonably conclude from this results that TLS
encryption will not lead to a significant loss of performance
for the classification algorithm mentioned above.
5. A Tunnel Detection Tool
Architecture
The biggest drawback of statistical methods is their high
rate of false positive (i.e., legitimate flows classified as ma-
licious). We propose a specific tunnel detection tool archi-
tecture designed to lower the false positive rate. Figure 3
describes this architecture.
The system consists in a network capture tool (such as
TCPDump [12]) combined with a flow demultiplexer. Clas-
sification features are then extracted from each flow, and
a RandomForest model is used to determine the class of
each connection. In order to minimize false positive cases
due to errors of classification, a set of heuristic rules is
applied to generate an analysis report composed of a list of
alerts. These rules take into account past results of clas-
sification, and a level of confidence for each classification.
No alert is raised if the confidence level is too low, if the
IP address of the local or remote host is on a white list, etc.
Fig. 3. High level tunnel detection tool architecture.
The analysis report generated by the application of this set
of rules could have the syslog format, for future integration
in a complex intrusion detection system.
The proposed architecture was implemented on an experi-
mental platform and give very encouraging qualitative re-
sults. These results are presented in the next section.
6. Qualitative Results of the Proposed
Solution
6.1. Network Simulation
At first, we implemented our detection tool on a network
simulator. The simulator consisted in 3 machines, simu-
lating respectively the local network, the gateway and the
Internet. This simulator has been used to measure the TLS
impact (Section 4) and the efficiency of the detection tool.
The resulting detection rates for the protocols shown in Ta-
ble 2 are close to 100%. However, this did not provide
a convincing proof because the diversity of the flows is
reduced compared to a real network:
– the topology of the network is too simple,
– the behavior of the user is unique,
– the material is also unique (one OS, one hardware,
etc.).
Table 2
Distribution of the database flows according
to the protocols
HTTP HTTPs SSH SMTP
DNS
FTP
Active
POP3s NetSteward(over
directory
TCP)
2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 1069 1503 1611
The results obtained for the TLS impact remain valid, but in
order to evaluate the accuracy of the tool, a more complex
set of flows had to be tested.
6.2. A Flows Database in Order to Evaluate Our
Detection Tool
The public database containing real data flows used for
our experimentations is provided by the MAWI working
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Table 3
Confusion matrix obtained using the RandomForest method to classify the database
HTTP HTTPs SSH SMTP DNS FTP
Active
POP3s NetSteward Protocols
directory
93.08 4.36 0.0 1.08 0.04 0.24 0.08 0.36 0.76 HTTP
2.36 91.56 0.08 3.2 0.0 0.48 0.48 2.36 0.28 HTTPs
0.0 0.12 99.44 0.08 0.0 0.08 0.0 0.28 0.0 SSH
0.96 2.28 0.0 91.12 0.2 3.48 1.12 0.72 0.12 SMTP
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.32 99.64 0.0 0.04 0.0 0.0 DNS
0.08 0.6 0.0 3.0 0.0 95.88 0.2 0.24 0.0 FTP
0.19 0.09 0.0 0.47 0.0 0.0 99.16 0.0 0.09 Active directory
0.13 1.2 0.27 0.73 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.67 0.0 POP3s
1.37 0.06 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.57 NetSteward
group [13]. The database is a recording of the whole set
of flows carried by a transpacific 150 Mbit/s network line
between Japan and USA, during 96 hours. The payloads
have been removed and the headers from layers 1 to 4 from
the OSI model have been anonymised.
In order to illustrate the performance of our solution, we
classified nine kind of network flows. For each protocol,
the number of flows contained in the database and used for
the experimentation is shown in the Table 2.
Note that the flows used for the experimentation are
mostly clear flows, i.e., unciphered flows. Indeed, there
is unfortunately no public database of ciphered flows pre-
cising for each flow which protocol is ciphered. Nev-
ertheless, our analysis with this database is interesting
and can be extended to ciphered flows for the following
reasons:
– the flow classification features can be calculated with
ciphered flows exactly as for the clear flows,
– the impact of ciphering on the parameters is limited.
Parameters like the delay induced by the user behavior (as
the password capture for a secure shell (SSH) session or the
frequency of HTTP request while surfing) are not affected
by the encryption.
6.3. Classification Results
Table 3 shows the corresponding confusion matrix obtained
with this algorithm. The procedure used to get the confu-
sion matrix is:
1. For each flow, compute the features regarding the full
connection.
2. Train the classifying model (i.e., RandomForest) on
a subset (the learning set) of flows.
3. Challenge the model on the remaining vectors (the
challenge set.
4. Report the results.
For example in this table:
– the number 93.08 in the first row indicates that
93.08% of HTTP flows have been correctly classi-
fied as HTTP,
– the number 4.36 in the first row indicates that 4.36%
of HTTP flows have been erroneously classified
as HTTPs.
Therefore, the correct classification rates are on the ta-
ble’s diagonal. The average rate of correct classification
is 95.81%.
In a standard configuration, the only allowed protocol
might be HTTP and HTTPs. Any flow classified in an
other class (e.g., SSH, POP3, . . . ) would then be con-
sidered as malicious. Hence, if we set this configuration,
the tool detects 98.68% of illegitimate flows (corresponding
to 1.32% of false negatives) with 4.72% of false positives
(i.e., false alarms). This last rate is too high for an actual
use, since most of flows are legitimate. In Subsection 6.7
we propose a way to decrease the number of false alarms
sent by the tunnel detection tool.
6.4. Classification Computation Time
As shown in Table 4, the classification computation time
is quite short. The implementation has been realized on
a 3.06 GHz PC platform running under a Debian distribu-
tion. The langage used is Java, therefore this computation
time could be reduced using a faster langage such as C if
needed.
Table 4
Computation time with a 2500 flows database
Phase Time
Learning phase 1143 ms
Challenge phase 223 µs
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6.5. Impact of the Flows Length
The procedure described in Subsection 6.3 works with
a full connection. Thus, it does not allow the gateway
to take a real time decision such as ending a session as
soon as an illegitimate flow is detected (the decision is
a posteriori). In order to take a proactive decision, a small
number of packets can be used rather than the full con-
nection. As a consequence, it increases dramatically the
computation power required by the security gateway. Our
study showed that the decision can be taken with only very
few packets (about 3 packets). This could be explained by
the fact that the considered protocols have different behav-
iors from the beginning of the connection, which helps to
distinguish them with a small number of packets.
6.6. Impact of the Database Size
Another issue is the size of the learning database. Depend-
ing on the context, it may be hard to generate a large
database for each flow. For example, the database built
with our simulator had to be manually filled. Figure 4 il-
lustrates the impact of the database size on the detection
accuracy.
Fig. 4. Impact of the database size on the detection accuracy.
6.7. A Simple Method to Lower the False
Positive Rate
We saw in Subsection 6.7 that the false positives rate
(i.e., legitimate flows classified as malicious) is too high
for an actual use while the illegitimate flows rate is, on the
opposite, very good. Depending on the use case, it could
be better to limit the number of false positives, because it
could disturb most of the network users.
For this reason, we propose to set a confidence indica-
tor. Therefore, a flow with a confidence indicator below
a specific threshold will be automatically considered as le-
gitimate. This rule can be added in the heuristic part of the
tunnel detection tool architecture (Fig. 3).
Figure 5 shows the rates of false positives and false neg-
atives obtained by applying this simple heuristic, based
on the confidence indicator set. We can see that such
a rule can reduce the false positives rate. However, this
method seems too ’naive’, because the increase of false
negatives rate (i.e., illegitimate flows allowed by the se-
Fig. 5. Impact of a rule based on a confidence indicator on the
rates of false positives and false negatives.
curity gateway) is significantly faster than the decrease of
false positives rate.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a solution to the key problem
of encapsulated illegitimate flows detection across network
boundaries. In a first part, we compared the performances
of different machine learning algorithms and identified the
best one in our specific case. In a second part, we con-
ducted a complementary study showing that the effect of
TLS encryption on classification features should not signif-
icantly affect classification performances. Finally, in a last
part, we described a high-level tunnel detection tool archi-
tecture. We pointed out qualitative results using this tool
with a public database and the impact of variation around
the protocol on its accuracy. Finally we proposed, regard-
ing the results obtained, a simple method to lower the false
positive rate.
The construction of our solution is generic and can be tuned
to be used for automatic classification, pro-active reaction
or small learning database. In a global cyberdefense sys-
tem, the proposed architecture could be efficiently used with
a classical security tool, such as an IDS, in order to improve
the security level.
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Abstract—This paper discusses challenges and success factors
for service oriented architecture (SOA) implementation in net-
work centric environment. The authors identify 9 fundamen-
tal challenges for the SOA approach in order to make the
biggest beneﬁt for the NATO NEC (NNEC) and increase the
mission eﬀectiveness to the highest extent. They cover the ar-
eas of applicability to existing military communications and
the ability to reﬂect military processes. Their range is quite
broad, pointing out technological as well as SOA governmen-
tal problems. The authors emphasize that any COTS solution
available on the market today is able to overcome all of them
at once. However, they propose solutions to some of the prob-
lems and present quick wins that can speed up the process of
achieving capabilities in a heterogeneous multinational NEC
environment.
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1. Introduction
Modern coalition operations are conducted in a dynamic
environment, usually with unanticipated partners and irreg-
ular adversaries. This new situation has forced the NATO
Alliance to pursue the achievement of the so-called “NATO
network enabled capabilities” (NNEC) concept, which is
the “ability to collect, fuse and analyze relevant information
in near real time so as to allow rapid decision making and
the rapid delivery of the most desired eﬀect”1. The main
tenet of the net-centricity is to achieve information supe-
riority by sharing reliable information collected from vari-
ous sources, creating situational awareness and distributing
it among mission participants, across domain, context and
organizational boundaries on the basis of extended collab-
oration.
The NNEC concept, followed in the “NNEC Data Strat-
egy” [2] emphasizes two primary objectives in this process,
i.e., the necessity to increase the data that is available to
communities in the network-enabled environment; and to
ensure that the data is usable by authorized anticipated and
unanticipated users and applications. In order to accom-
plish this goal, the change of focus must take place: from
the idea of standalone, stovepiped systems (i.e., platform-
oriented) to the idea of shareable, universal information.
This would allow unanticipated (but authorized) users to
1Citation from [1].
discover information, as opposed to being pushed to them
via a pre-deﬁned mechanism.
The improvement of collaboration and information sharing
in a highly dynamic, unpredictable NEC environment is
a great challenge. It assumes transfer of information with
a required quality of service and security, independently of
the underlying infrastructure as well as a common access
to relevant information by the authorized users. These re-
quirements are to be satisﬁed by the use of service oriented
architecture (SOA), that succeeded in commercial world
lately and is recommended by NATO as the crucial NEC
enabler [3]–[5]. SOA can make military information re-
sources available in the form of services that can be dis-
covered and used by all mission participants that do not
need to be aware of these services in advance.
2. Service Oriented Architecture
in the Context of NEC
Service orientation is a conceptual architecture which
asymmetrically provides services to arbitrary service con-
sumers, facilitating the information sharing in a heteroge-
neous environment, and thus supports to some degree the
open-ended aspects of net-centricity.
By OASIS deﬁnition [6], service oriented architecture
(SOA) is “as an architectural paradigm for organizing and
utilizing distributed capabilities that may be under the con-
trol of diﬀerent ownership domains”. It provides a “uniform
means to oﬀer, discover, interact with and use capabilities
(as well the ability to compose new capabilities from ex-
isting ones) all in an environment that transcends domains
of ownership”.
The use of service oriented architectures has emerged as
a major trend within the commercial sector and among na-
tions developing NNEC type capabilities, because of the
ﬂexibility they provide in sharing information and infor-
mation processing capabilities. SOAs provide mechanisms
for using existing information services as well as providing
the basis for developing new, more advanced information
services. Such mechanisms will allow many command and
control processes to be satisﬁed by linking together existing
information sources in a modular, ﬂexible fashion that can
be readily adapted to changing operational context. The
ﬂexibility provided through the use of SOAs is particularly
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well suited to support the needs of coalition based network-
centric operations using systems of various nations, on dif-
ferent levels of transformation, without the need to replace,
but only to integrate them into the SOA environment. The
concept is that clients see other servers and applications
as “services”, accessible using a known and common tech-
nology, independently of the underlying implementation of
the service (platform – independent approach). In fact,
this interaction does not have to be between client applica-
tions on user terminals and the servers, but can be between
peer applications that relate to each other as a client and
a service. This approach allows both user-to-system – and
direct system-to-system – interactions that have not previ-
ously been generally feasible except by system speciﬁc and
proprietary implementations.
It is also worth noting that, in a true service oriented en-
vironment, developers of services do not know who will
access their services at run time. There is a great ﬂexibility
in how, when and by whom the services will be used. This
idea of “unanticipated users” is a key element of SOA, par-
ticularly advantageous in the dynamic NATO environment,
where the components of missions change over time and
the consumers of services today may not be the consumers
of the services tomorrow.
The technological background of NNEC implementation,
i.e., networking and information infrastructure (NII) strat-
egy assumes that the NII will be implemented as a fed-
eration of systems2 (FoS), involving the use of SOAs [1],
[3], [4], [7]. The NNEC feasibility study [4] has made
it clear that the Information and integration services (IIS)
layer of NII will be formed by a federation of services,
within which any NATO or national information system
will be autonomous and will provide speciﬁc services by
means of implementing a standardized service interface [4].
The most mature implementation of SOAs, recommended
by NATO and widely applied in the commercial sector, are
web services (WS) and other extensible markup language
(XML) technologies. Current trends show great levels of
maturity and adoption of these technologies – within the
IT industry, within the NATO nations, and within various
multinational programs – leading to the belief that this is
a direction already being followed and that there is already
much force behind it. WSs are described by a wide range of
standards that deal with diﬀerent aspects of WS realization,
transport, orchestration, semantics, etc. They provide the
means to build a very ﬂexible environment that is able to
dynamically link diﬀerent system components to each other.
These XML-based standards have been designed to oper-
ate in high bandwidth links. XML gained wide acceptance
and became very popular for the reason that it solves many
2Federation of systems – complex environment built of heterogeneous
autonomous systems governed independently, taking advantage of coop-
eration. “(. . . ) formed by the synergistic amalgamation of a dynamic
set of globally interconnected, multi-national, autonomous systems, each
comprised of networking and information infrastructure components, pro-
viding information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for
collecting, processing, storing, disseminating and managing information
to authorized users on demand, on an end-to-end basis” [4].
interoperability problems, is human- and machine-friendly
and facilitates the development of frameworks for a soft-
ware integration, independent of the programming lan-
guage. Nevertheless, it undoubtedly adds signiﬁcant over-
head, both in terms of computation and network resources
while being transported.
The value of SOA is though, that it provides a simple scal-
able paradigm for organizing large systems that require the
interoperability to realize the value inherent in the individ-
ual components. Moreover, apart from its inherent ability
to scale and evolve, the SOA – based infrastructure is also
more agile and responsive than the one built on an expo-
nential number of pair-wise interfaces. Therefore, SOA can
also provide a solid foundation for developing operational
context, based on business agility and adaptability.
The remainder of this paper is organized as described be-
low. Section 2 describes a set of challenges that SOA ap-
plication in military NEC-centric environment must over-
come. They derive both from the architecture itself and
from the characteristics of the environment, that must
integrate systems owned and governed by diﬀerent na-
tions/organizations, built by use of diﬀerent (modern and
legacy) technologies, lacking standardization in many ar-
eas (e.g., management, cross-domain security, QoS, etc.),
and facing disadvantaged communications links. Section 3
presents the SOA success factors that should be taken in or-
der to support dynamic, ﬂexible and scalable SOA – based
environment to conduct a net-centric multinational opera-
tion. We conclude this paper in Section 4.
3. SOA Challenges
Service oriented architecture, as presented above has a great
potential deriving from the paradigm and framework it re-
lates to. It has undoubtedly many beneﬁts, however its
Fig. 1. SOA challenges deriving from the SOA concept and
NNEC environment.
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application in a highly dynamic, heterogeneous and disad-
vantaged NEC environment is a challenge.
This paper identiﬁes 9 fundamental challenges for the SOA
approach in order to make the biggest beneﬁt for the NNEC
and increase the mission eﬀectiveness to the highest extent
(see Fig. 1). They cover the areas of applicability to existing
military communications and the ability to reﬂect military
processes. Their range is though, quite broad, pointing out
technological as well as SOA government problems. No
COTS solution available on the market today is able to
overcome all of them at once.
3.1. Real World Effect
A service is a mechanism that enables access to one or
more capabilities, based on the use of a predeﬁned interface
and exploited consistently with constraints and policies as
speciﬁed by the service description.
Following OASIS SOA Reference model [6], the main
tenets of SOA services are:
– visibility (provided by the service description),
– interaction (described in the service contract and re-
alized between SOA components),
– real world eﬀect.
The ﬁrst two of them are inherent to the interaction pat-
terns that will exist in the system. However, the last one is
strongly related to the business model that exists over the
technical model. The design of the SOA services layer must
start with identifying business processes that are the heart
of the “military enterprise”. Only after identifying actors
that take part in the net-centric operation and deﬁning the
information needs and ﬂows between them, it is possible to
create services of a true value to the enterprise.
Business processes are considered to be the basis for devel-
oping service oriented architecture [3], [4]. At the national
level, it is necessary to initiate activities that are to develop
overarching architecture of the C4I on the basis of the ser-
vice oriented architecture in order to have a SOA – based
C4I system that supports creation of the national NNEC.
It should integrate new and legacy systems and reﬂect real
user requirements. It is impossible to carry out this process
without having previously deﬁned and properly described
the operational processes conducted in every moment of
a net-centric operation. These actions would lead to devel-
opment of the service map and service layer based on real
information needs.
3.2. Semantic Interoperability
Taking advantage of the wide spectrum of services that
will arise in the federation of systems (FoS) built based
on SOA, requires that all of the domains connected speak
with “the same language” and “understand” each other.
Achieving the interoperability in terms of network protocols
(e.g., based on TACOMS STANAGS) or data (e.g., based
on the NC3A Data Strategy), does not cover all its as-
pects. It must be ensured that the meaning of terms used
by applications in domains owned by diﬀerent countries,
diﬀerent kinds of military services (land, air, navy) is the
same. It is necessary to establish a high degree of corre-
lation and similarity between the details of their respective
descriptions and deﬁnitions, on which they intend to reach
an agreement. This implies that a shared understanding re-
quires shared deﬁnitions. It is, though highly recommended
to provide ontological models for diﬀerent domains of the
NEC environment within NATO that could be used by ev-
ery country joining a multinational operation.
The role of ontologies in transformation to NNEC has been
emphasized by the NC3A in the NC3A Technical Archi-
tecture [7] supplement. It points out that in a dynamic
multidomain environment, the goal is to implement seman-
tic web solutions that would enable the users to locate,
select, employ, compose and monitor the web services au-
tomatically. Ontologies are needed especially in the area of
services description, enabling semantic services selection,
as well as providing the possibility to employ orchestration
and choreography. To make use of a NNEC service, soft-
ware agents need a computer – interpretable description of
that service, and the means by which it is accessed. An
important goal for semantic web languages is to establish
a framework within which these descriptions are made and
shared.
It should be emphasized that for automated tasks of the
systems, it is also necessary to provide semantic metadata
descriptions needed, e.g., for provision of the quality of
service, service level agreement (SLA) support, security,
management, etc. What is more, in order to achieve the
understanding of data distributed among systems, common
data ontologies for domains (e.g., particular communities
of interest) are needed.
The application of ontologies and providing foundation for
creating the, so called, semantic web, does not restrict it-
self to the formal semantic description of service resources
for machine-to-machine exchange and automated integra-
tion and processing. One important feature of formally
describing resources is to allow computers to reason by in-
ference. Once the resources are described using facts, as-
sociations, and relationships, inference engines, also called
reasoners, can derive new knowledge and draw logical con-
clusions from the existing information.
Sharing information among diﬀerent systems creates the
problem of understanding what the data means. Ontolo-
gies and inference services, by expressing the meaning in
ontology for the speciﬁc data sources and deﬁning the rela-
tionships among the diﬀerent concepts or terms appearing
in those apparently diﬀerent ontologies, are able to perform
the data and information integration. Moreover, the appli-
cation of ontologies provides the possibility of an auto-
mated reasoning, semantic search for information, enabling
the decision support and advanced searches for informa-
tion in the SOA environment. It is though, very impor-
tant to start work on developing domain ontologies en-
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abling to provide such information integration. This may
be done on the basis of the JC3IEDM model, developed
by the MIP community and applied by many NATO coun-
tries to provide automated data exchange and replication.
It must be emphasized, however, that JC3 is very broad,
and not divided into smaller ontologies, would be ineﬃ-
cient to be processed by devices with limited computational
resources.
3.3. Orchestration and Choreography
One of the most important advantages of the service orien-
tation is that, it supports, by the use of service reusabil-
ity, the automation of processes. The orchestration and
choreography makes it possible to create new services and
arrange them into process ﬂows on demand. Therefore,
in order to take full advantage of what SOA brings, it is
necessary to provide a high level management of the busi-
ness processes mapped into services, enabling a dynamic
reaction on new information needs, change into business
process to create dynamic service environment that ﬂexi-
bly changes in order to meet the information needs. These
functionalities that may be built on top of SOA services are
getting more and more popular as the amount of work on
building ontologies also increases.
In order to support the realization of operational pro-
cesses’ goals, services form a set that can be orchestrated.
These orchestrations may be reconﬁgured diﬀerently, when
needed, to regain support of an operational process after
its ad hoc arrangement has changed to suit new or changed
operational needs.
A service orchestration, in general, refers to an executable
business process that may interact with both internal and
external services, capable of satisfying certain operational
objectives that cannot be achieved by any of the services
alone. It requires the various composing systems to col-
laborate in a controlled (orchestrated) manner. Depending
on the purpose, it may not be enough to only determine
which services are used. It may also be necessary to re-
solve timing issues, semantic misunderstandings, and the
quality of service discrepancies, which may appear when
services interact.
Orchestration leads to the emergence of higher level ser-
vices, where the combined use of services is to deliver
a higher level functionality or eﬀect. In case of web ser-
vices, this creates a composite web service.
On the other hand, choreography is more collaborative in
nature. Each party involved in the process describes the
part they play in the interaction. Choreography describes
a process ﬂow between services and processes themselves
and tracks the sequence of messages that may involve mul-
tiple parties and multiple sources.
Orchestration and choreography become more and more
popular among solutions for semantic search for services,
trying to correlate oﬀered inputs and required outputs.
More and more often, the search for services bases also
on proprietary quality of service descriptions that makes
it possible to provide services meeting user preferences,
adapted to the possibilities of the network. The utilization
of orchestration and choreography together with ontologies,
enables to automate many processes realized during the
course of the operation and to provide the possibility to
gather all the necessary information for the operators in-
volved.
Furthermore, it is necessary to emphasize that the semantic
description used on the daily basis in the software applica-
tions need to be tailored to the computational resources
of that devices. Web ontology language (OWL), most
commonly used to express ontologies, is a very expressive
language, and enables to perform reasoning over ontologies
and infer knowledge that is not explicitly stated. However,
the reasoning engines for OWL typically require a lot of
resources, and are, therefore, not well suited for resource-
limited handheld devices. It has been stated in [3] that in
an ad hoc wireless environment utilization of ontologies is
possible only when ontologies are small, so that the hand-
held devices can process them and reason over. That is
why creating ontologies need to be carefully carried out,
preferably based on one of the commonly applied method-
ologies (e.g., methontology), acquiring them to the envi-
ronment where they will be used.
3.4. Open Solutions
Realizing the beneﬁts of the SOA approach will require
agreeing on a standardized set of protocols, data formats
and foundational (core) services (e.g., covering such areas
as service discovery security, metadata management, iden-
tity management, service management and mediation), that
provide means to establish the interoperability in the tech-
nical ﬁeld. NII is to be formed based on the Internet model,
major advantage of which is the use of common set of pro-
tocols enabling to create dispersed, dynamic environment
for sharing information without central governing author-
ity [3], [4]. In order to take advantage from the success of
the Internet, the utilization of open standards that will help
to ensure interoperability is necessary.
Obviously, a military environment diﬀers from the Inter-
net in many aspects (e.g., security constraints, policy), so
that it will be impossible to adhere only to commercial
standards. However, in order to provide coherent NATO –
supported coalition network environment enabling to act
eﬃciently in multinational missions, it is recommended to
revise the consequences of using open standards and as-
sess the risk that is related to the increased interoperability
problems when using some proprietary solutions. There
should be also taken initiatives to standardize the mecha-
nisms and protocols that are of great importance to provide
a secure and dynamic service-oriented net-centric environ-
ment (e.g., cross-domain security solutions, quality of ser-
vice principles, common ontologies). Such initiatives are
taken, e.g., in NATO (by the working groups and other
research initiatives provided by NATO Research and Tech-
nology Organization3) and by Network Centric Operations
3More information on RTO web site, http://www.rta.nato.int
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Industry Consortium (NCOIC4), that plays an important
role in establishing a common view of net-centric capabil-
ities and provides technical solutions to enhance the inter-
operability in a multinational environment.
It is also very important to emphasize the need to create
a common technical framework for developing SOA-based
solutions that is based on open or agreed standards. This
process is carried out, e.g., by the standardization bodies
(e.g., OASIS, W3C), but the military environment often
requires additional functionalities, not supported by orga-
nizations working mainly for the commercial sector. It has
been shown in many multinational exercises (e.g., Com-
bined Endeavour CE, Common Warrior Interoperability
Demonstration CWID – currently CWIX, MultiNational
Experimentation MNE, etc.), that the interoperability is
crucial for the mission success in a NATO community. Sys-
tems created for the sole purpose of the country (e.g., cri-
sis management systems) must also interoperate with many
national systems. The interoperability is though, necessary
on many levels. That is why adherence to the open, agreed
standards makes it easier to solve the problem on the tech-
nical grounding.
3.5. Disruption Tolerant Solutions
The utilization of SOA-based systems in a NEC envi-
ronment has been shown in many international experi-
ments [5]. They prove that SOA technologies improve the
collaboration, interoperation and information sharing in
complex environment of heterogeneous systems. However,
the NATO concept of FoS relying on the exchange of in-
formation implies that communications are of critical im-
portance to the entire (C2) system. In order to achieve an
eﬃcient information exchange between the users, the SOA
solutions need to work with diﬀerent types of information
and communication systems. The challenge is though, to
use this – simple in concept and providing a big ﬂexibility –
means of communications on every echelon of command –
from the strategic and operational to the tactical and indi-
vidual soldier’s level.
Going down in the command structure, the network en-
vironment is getting more and more degraded providing
worse and worse communications, e.g. low bandwidth, high
level of unpredictability of quality factors, lack of connec-
tivity guarantee, changing topology, radio silence and high
error rates. The fragile nature of tactical radio networks
requires robust communication mechanisms which current
SOA solutions (e.g., mainly enterprise SOA implementa-
tions, such as Enterprise Service Buses (ESBs)) do not
provide. This includes methods to deal with large delays,
communication failures, network splits and merges. It is
necessary to provide SOA solutions that enable to inte-
grate network elements on all command levels and a smart
communication infrastructure which would deal with pecu-
liarities of the wireless medium. This will allow to create
the situational awareness also on the lowest command lev-
4More information on NCOIC web site, https://www.ncoic.org/home/
els and supply users of the tactical systems with necessary
information and decision support.
3.6. Lightweight Design
In order to adhere to the open standards tenet and take ad-
vantage of the most common WS-based realization of SOA,
it must be ensured that the solutions implemented, origi-
nally derived from the commercial world, do not overload
the network nor overuse the existing resources (network
and terminal ones). SOA solutions, very often based on
XML, known from signiﬁcant overhead it adds, will have
to be eﬀective in the whole NEC environment. They should
have though, a lightweight design that minimizes the de-
mand on the network and implements a minimum range of
functionality.
The requirement for minimum functionality is the most im-
portant in the tactical domain, for nodes with a limited
memory, storage capacity, processing power and battery
life. Such nodes are usually man-portable nodes or sensor
nodes powered by battery, where the minimum functional-
ity can also serve the important goal of energy conserva-
tion. However, the use of complicated, “heavy” software
components on low command levels should be avoided.
3.7. Real Time Service Delivery
The most obvious tenet of net-centricity is the informa-
tion exchange (see Fig. 2). This capability should, how-
ever, be seen not only in terms of what derives from the
usual relation between the commander and the subordi-
nate. Looking down to the battalion, platoon and lower
levels, apart from regular exchange of formalized messages,
operators more and more frequently exchange information
horizontally, sharing information within small formations
(platoon or squad), e.g., positions, alarms, video streams,
pictures and other important elements of building situa-
tional awareness at the tactical level. Individual soldiers
are often equipped with high-quality sensors and hardware
that make them complex technical systems on their own.
Each actor engaged in an operation can thus be considered
both a consumer and a provider of data. Down the echelons
of command, actions are getting more and more dynamic,
decision-making time is shorter, so that actors need real-
time information. Moreover, the information granularity,
low in the military hierarchy, is greater, which means that
military staﬀ needs detailed information about their area of
operation.
SOA solutions must be applicable to the tactical domain
providing the possibility to create common operational pic-
ture (COP) on various levels of command. COP created at
high command levels, tailored to the needs of the oper-
ators and giving them the overview of coalition, neutral
and enemy forces, enabling to plan and conduct operation
in real time, should be also achieved at the lowest levels
including the individual soldier. This would support creat-
ing shared situational awareness and enable military staﬀ
to make reliable decisions in a short timeframe, work to-
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Fig. 2. SOA application in NEC environment on diﬀerent command levels.
gether in new, more eﬀective ways and thus, to improve
the speed of command, leading to a dramatic increase of
mission eﬀectiveness.
It is though necessary to provide technical means to realize
services in real time. This includes messaging mechanisms
that do not necessarily base on web services often con-
sidered not well applicable for real time requirements but
provide good eﬃciency in disadvantaged networks and en-
able the realization of time-constrained services.
3.8. Context Awareness and Dynamic Adaptation
SOA, as an architecture covering the whole FoS will be
used (obviously depending on the level of transformation
particular systems acquire) to integrate all connected sys-
tems. In order to adhere to diﬀerent types of commu-
nication networks and meet the requirements of users on
every command level, SOA solutions must be “aware”of
the context of the service call. Middleware layer of the
SOA should though, maintain a shared perception of the
network state. In order to do so, it should serve as a medi-
ator for collecting, organizing, and disseminating relevant
context information to the upper layers (application) and
lower layers (transport mechanisms). The context may be
also used for selecting the best service realization mode
and can include device, network characteristics, service and
user activities and requirements. It can characterize static
elements that can be deﬁned before a service call is exe-
cuted, as well as dynamic elements that depend on the type
of request, type of response and temporary network QoS pa-
rameters.
The solution to this problem, related to providing interop-
eration with other layers of the architecture, should enable
realizing SOA services in a constrained environment and
facing another challenge, which is to provide the possibil-
ity to adapt to environment limitations.
There are no standard solutions that provide the possibility
for SOA to adapt to limitations of the underlying network.
However, this problem is crucial in terms of SOA suc-
cess in a military environment. In order for the services’
layer to be responsive and provide dynamic access to in-
formation for the users that change their location, privi-
leges and activity during the course of the operation, SOA
solutions must provide end-to end service delivery in the
horizontal and vertical dimension of the NEC environ-
ment. This derives the necessity of dynamic service dis-
covery based also on the user/service requirements, QoS
needs and geo-location, as well as the provision of techni-
cal solutions that enable SOA to adapt to current network
situation.
SOA middleware should have the ability to recognize
changes to its execution context and to adapt its behavior
appropriately. An example would be:
– an adjustment of services provided to an application
(e.g., reduction in frame rates for a real-time video
streaming application), based on middleware aware-
ness of reduced network throughput,
– providing the possibility to realize the service in
a diﬀerent pattern (e.g., peer-to-per instead of client-
server in case of central server unavailability), and
deliver messages when network is degraded, or
– searching for services in the surrounding of the user
in case of service registry unavailability.
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3.9. Reliability of Information
Mission – critical systems that support NEC operations
these days are to deliver appropriate, fused and processed
information in the right time. They assume that the infras-
tructure enables to appropriately deliver binary data. The
problem SOA brings in terms of QoS is related not only
to the quality of service that covers the mechanisms on the
physical, network and data/object levels, but to the relia-
bility of information provision that relates to the reliability
of information sources, trustworthiness of data from that
sources, support for using the information and supporting
the realization of procedures, processes, strategy and doc-
trine, quality of information and quality of operations as
well.
In terms of security, it is necessary to provide appropri-
ate identity management together with the common un-
derstanding of privileges, access rights, as well as an
agreed security policy. The solutions must enable to iden-
tify the users from diﬀerent domains, appropriately han-
dle their access rights and authorize to appropriate net-
work/information resources according to the valid national
security policy. The problem tackles the need for cross-
domain handling of the public key infrastructures (PKIs),
certiﬁcate chains, digital signatures supporting the process
of authentication, authorization, messages integrity, non-
repudiation, privacy, etc. This is particularly important in
terms of the dynamic nature of NNEC environment and the
main SOA tenet of common access to relevant information
by the unknown but authorized users.
In terms of web services, the most commonly used OASIS
WS security (WSS) [8] standard addresses message secu-
rity and focuses on credential exchange, message integrity,
and message conﬁdentiality. It is possible to integrate it
with XML digital signature (DSIG) [9] (e.g., using X.509
certiﬁcates), and support a cross-domain authentication
using existing security standards, such as security assertion
markup language (SAML) [10]. This is a good foundation
for SOA security in NEC environment, however the inter-
operability tests prove a gap existing in requirements in
terms of obligatory elements included in the WS-security
part of the SOAP message or SAML assertion.
4. Potential Solutions
The challenges presented in Section 2 can be met by dif-
ferent solutions. There is no complete product that can be
used for that purpose, but there exist some smaller good
practices and solutions that should be perceived as quick
wins and make a good technological step forward.
NATO started its way towards the transformation by deﬁn-
ing the NATO NEC (NNEC) feasibility study together with
the roadmap, and foundation of the project. Some countries
followed this idea carrying out their own studies, reﬂect-
ing the challenges in terms of both technology and per-
sonnel. This has been done, e.g. by the Swedish Armed
Forces [11] that deﬁned the overarching architecture [12]
and solid foundation for SOA implementation in their sys-
tems, as well as for integration of the legacy systems and
their transformation towards full SOA [13]. Coherent intro-
duction of service oriented architecture into currently em-
ployed and new systems can only be based on previously
deﬁned reference architecture of the C4I system and real
information needs resulting from the planned operational
scenarios.
In order to maximize the gain from linking the needs with
capabilities, the role of business processes as a basis for de-
veloping service oriented architecture has been pointed out
in [3] and [4]. The architecture engineering methodology
(AEM) – developed by the NC3A algorithm for creating
architectures, points out the necessity of creating a model
of dependencies between components and applying them to
a real operational context, to be sure that the proposed ar-
chitecture will provide the required operational eﬀect. For
the graphical notation of operational process diagrams, the
business process modelling notation (BPMN) has been rec-
ommended by the NC3A [3].
In the area of the semantic interoperability, there is a strong
need to provide coherent and agreed standards enabling to
share ontologies, as well as semantic descriptions of meta-
data and data itself. Achieving the interoperability on the
semantic level requires the involvement of multinational ac-
tivities that enable to agree on ontologies, proposed to be
used in interdomain relations. Any proprietary solutions
in this area will be unsuccessful unless other nations and
systems developers agree on using them. The ﬁrst step to
provide semantic interoperability in a heterogeneous envi-
ronment, is to develop a common semantic description of
services for dynamic semantic search and adaptation pur-
poses. This may be done using, e.g., more and more popu-
lar OWL-S. Semantic search engines by means of explicitly
deﬁning the semantics of the sources and by providing a re-
lationship among terms (like a taxonomy) – can provide,
e.g., a concept-based search. For information discovery,
depending on the user preferences or the type of user, the
system would be able to group the possible results that
matched the query or reﬁne the result list by ﬁltering those
that are of interest to the target audience. On the basis of
semantic services descriptions (e.g. using OWL-S), seman-
tic service discovery is able to provide results tailored to the
user preferences, QoS, etc. as well as support orchestration
and choreography.
The eﬀort for providing ontologies for the NATO has
been taken by the TIDE5 (technology for information, de-
cision and execution superiority) community, that aims
to rapidly improve the operational capabilities through
iterative processes based on horizontal and vertical in-
tegration of existing and emerging products. Within its
framework, it stimulates coexistence of NATO and na-
tional programs and services providing proposition of stan-
dards embracing service oriented architectures and dis-
cussing them during regular meetings (so called TIDE
sprints). It has proposed the service and information dis-
5More information can be found by the authorized users on the TIDE
web site http://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php?title=TIDE
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covery protocols (for request-response and publish sub-
scribe modes) used, e.g., within the NATO MSA com-
munity in BRITE and other national solutions (e.g., ﬁnish
MEVAT system). So far, it has also delivered 33 ontologies
used by diﬀerent TIDE focus groups (e.g., MSA, SUCBAS,
NIRIS etc.), based on RDF/RDFS and OWL. There are,
e.g., subscribe-publish ontology, location ontology, sym-
bology ontology (for APP6A and MS2525B visualization
symbols), JC3IEDM ontology and many others.
The conceptual framework developed within the TIDE ini-
tiative describes how the network enabled capabilities will
transform raw data into intended eﬀects, and how they sup-
port achieving NATO’s transformation goals and objectives.
The eﬀort TIDE members put into technology development
has been used also in real life scenarios (e.g., in the BRITE
system for creating NATO Maritime Situational Aware-
ness – MSA). This should be continued and followed by
other existing and possibly new teams that would support
the interoperability on the data and metadata level, also
using ontologies.
Another big step forward in SOA implementation is to put
it into operation at the lowest command levels. According
to the NEC principles and modern command processes,
military operations are conducted in a dynamically, very
often based on the “mission command” pattern. Low level
commanders need to be aware of the possible consequences
of their decisions. This makes it necessary to provide users
down to the individual soldier level with the possibility to
use the information systems and feed them with information
crucial for the mission eﬀectiveness.
The most common realization of the SOA environment
is based on web services. In order for the operators to
use the information from sources located on high com-
mand levels, web services realization must be made reli-
able and it must be adapted to the characteristics of the net-
work.
It must be noted that there are no commercial works on
applying SOA and web services in disadvantaged grids.
There have been undertaken a few initiatives that focused
on the information distribution over disadvantaged grids. In
very low bandwidth environments the use of asynchronous
replication based middleware, provides static information
distribution between partners that have agreed to use a spe-
ciﬁc database format [14]. This solution is, however, not
very convenient for a highly dynamic operational scenario.
For this reason, there have been carried out researches on
WS-based SOA solutions that provide the ﬂexibility and
interoperability, and are well suited to work in federation
of systems. The NATO C3 Agency (NC3A) report on us-
ing WS in tactical domain [15] concludes with a statement
that web services remain promising even in low band-
width links, as long as very fast response times are not
required. Other interesting works on this subject have been
carried out in Norwegian Defense Research Establishment
(FFI) in Norway [5], [16]–[19]. These projects focused
on applying mechanisms that diminish XML-based disad-
vantages of WS and experiment on new transport proto-
cols instead of SOAP/ HTTP (hypertext transfer protocol),
e.g., data distribution service (DDS) or message handling
system (MHS).
Data-rate constraints in tactical networks impose great chal-
lenges that have to be faced in order to fully deploy SOA
supporting NEC. There are several solutions that can be
applied to adapt SOA web services mechanisms to the ca-
pacity of the systems at various C2 levels. The ones which
bring the biggest advantage are compression (e.g., very
popular and available in the application servers GZip al-
gorithm), ﬁltering, caching and non-SOAP transport mech-
anisms.
Two main disadvantages of using XML are as follows: big
overhead related to human-readable format of the docu-
ments and signiﬁcant parsing and processing times of the
XML-based messages. In [15] there has been shown that
XML is very compression-friendly and in many cases, de-
pending on the data set and the size of the message, more
than 95% gain can be achieved. This very simple method
should be set as a requirement for the use of WS in dis-
advantaged networks. It must be noted however, that in
order not to complicate the interoperability, compression
algorithms should be standardized and known by the col-
laborating parties.
Another very eﬃcient method of limiting XML disadvan-
tages is using its binary form. Generally, it reduces the
verbosity of XML documents and the cost of parsing. It
can lead, though, to faster document processing and lower
memory and central processing unit (CPU) requirements,
which is especially appealing on mobile devices.
The ﬁltering enables to limit the amount of information
sent to the end user in order to relieve the tactical network
from sending heavy traﬃc. This method is often used for
the access control based on XML guards (XML ﬁlters), or
for providing subscriptions based on the messages content.
However, the utilization of this method for WS adaptation
to disadvantaged grids is a very complicated matter since
it is very diﬃcult to propose very general ﬁlter rules that
apply to most Web Services, and that can provide the end
user with the right set of information that he really needs
at that moment.
Some of the ﬁltering functionalities are present it HTTP -
like, e.g., requiring only a part of the HTTP page from the
server. In force tracking systems [20] ﬁltering may mean
sending information about objects that are away from the
end user (service requester) by x km creating some kinds
of circles of the service accuracy. For provision of still
images, it can mean sending the image with the resolution
adapted to the end user terminal. For video it may mean
decreasing the frequency of frames per second.
HTTP is one of the most popular binding protocols primar-
ily designed to transport SOAP messages. HTTP holds
its connection after the SOAP request is sent until the
SOAP response is returned in the HTTP acknowledgment.
If the connection times out (e.g., because of delays), the
SOAP response will not be delivered to the service con-
sumer. Therefore, using HTTP over disadvantaged grids or
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a combination of heterogeneous networks may not work
very well [17].
According to [15], sending new service requests is much
more “expensive” (in a performance sense) than extending
the existing ones. For instance, during the HTTP “hand-
shaking” that takes place before each request, a lot of ex-
tra traﬃc is generated each time. Therefore, two 1000-byte
requests will take far longer than one 2000-byte request.
For the same reason, the performance of HTTP commu-
nications, which are made up of sets of data packets, are
much more adversely aﬀected by including more packets
than more data. In other words, a 20-packet “conversation”
equal 1000 bytes will be slower than a 15-packet conversa-
tion equal 2000 bytes.
It is a good practice to use a proxy element with a store-
and-forward functionality that could cope with the unpre-
dictability of QoS parameters of tactical communications
networks, especially in terms of frequent network discon-
nections. Such an element can provide diﬀerent transport
mechanisms, like data distribution service [21] and mili-
tary message handling system [18] that have been designed
to work in disadvantaged environments. Caching is one of
the functions of the proxy element that enables, e.g., stor-
ing information that crossed the proxy to be available for
subsequent requests. If a user requests the same object,
proxy can send it without the need to ask the server again.
However, proxy must be able to handle stored informa-
tion appropriately. This will not work well with short-lived
information, that change frequently and information, the
expiration of which cannot be assessed. Caching function-
ality should be placed at the edge of the low-bandwidth
network – quite near the end user. It can decrease the net-
work load on the server-proxy path and shorten the time to
send the client response. Therefore, the good practice is to
keep the frequently used (or infrequently changing) data at,
or near the client, so that its retrieval does not impact the
network considerably.
Web services compression and ﬁltering can be used in
the ultimate sender and receiver of information, however
NNEC FS and other NATO documents [22] propose the
utilization of edge proxies that provide the possibility to
adapt web service realization to the possibilities of the
network.
Norwegian Defense Establishment proposes, for that pur-
pose, so called Delay and disruption tolerant SOAP Proxy
(DS Proxy) [23] which is able to store-and-forward SOAP
messages, compress them and provide prioritization of the
traﬃc. It is placed between a web service consumer and a
web service. When the web service is temporarily unavail-
able (also due to network disruptions), the DSProxy com-
ponent will cache the Web service request, and retry the
invocation at intervals, returning the Web service response
when ﬁnally successful. The DSProxies can be working in
a group. They are self organizing into an overlay network
consisting of any number of DSProxy components, based
on a mechanism which relies on UDP multicast. This pro-
vides the possibility to traverse multiple and heterogeneous
networks.
Initial tests have proven that the DSProxy solution is able
to bridge heterogeneous networks and oﬀer store-and-for-
ward capabilities. Using TCP and UDP transport protocols,
web services were invoked in links with bandwidth equal
400 bit/s and 300 bit/s which is a very promising result.
Another approach presented in [24] assumes a situation
when the client needs information, but the access network
is degraded and he cannot receive it in a timely manner. In
case when the QoS guarantees cannot be met, it is proposed
that the client interacts with the proxy mediation service,
which is able, on the basis of the current network parame-
ters, to adapt his traﬃc to the possibilities of the network,
and to enable sending it in some other way.
The proxy service aims at delivering web services to the
users located in disadvantaged networks and minimizing
negative eﬀects of the wireless environment, including:
• Connection failures – due to store & forward capa-
bilities and publish/subscribe approach;
• High delays and low throughputs – due to reduction
of the packet size – e.g., compression, binary coding
with compression (e.g., using Eﬃcient XML);
• High error rates – due to reliability mechanisms and
network monitoring.
When the client is temporarily disconnected from the net-
work, the mediation service can store the data and for-
ward them when it will be available again. The proxy
actively interoperates with the service client and service
producer, dynamically adapting contents of the XML mes-
sages, selecting the best communication means from within
the available ones for the speciﬁc service call. Characteris-
tics of the service call are described in the context of a call
that provides the possibility to make appropriate and the
most accurate decision.
The context consists of the user proﬁle (static and dynamic),
terminal proﬁle, network proﬁle (dynamic) and service de-
scription. All of them are described in OWL ﬁles. In order
to take appropriate actions, there is also an adaptation on-
tology that deﬁnes all the actions that need to be taken in
order to fulﬁl the user request.
It must be emphasized that for some types of services web
service technology in the tactical domain can be replaced
with, e.g., DDS middleware (data distribution service),
that is a real time publish/subscribe data-centric platform
for dynamic distribution of information in real time. DDS
has strong and extensive supports for QoS and is used suc-
cessfully in real life in many European armies.
5. Summary and Conclusions
The challenges and solutions presented in this paper have
been gathered based on the available literature on this
subject as well as the experience of the authors in SOA ap-
plication in NEC environment. They show the basic steps
in order to support dynamic, ﬂexible and scalable SOA –
based environment to conduct net-centric multinational
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operation. Brieﬂy, the SOA success factors can be sum-
marized to the list of Quick Win solutions (see Table 1).
This set provides a guide of best practices that enable the
undoubtedly successful architecture paradigm to be used in
highly dynamic and heterogeneous NEC environment that
should technically support multinational missions.
Table 1
SOA success factors
1 Develop service layer based on real information needs
2 Provide semantic description of services for dynamic
semantic search and adaptation purposes
3 Provide high level management of the business pro-
cesses mapped into services, enabling dynamic reac-
tion on new information needs, change into business
process to create dynamic service environment that
ﬂexibly changes in order to meet the information needs
4 Provide low transmission overhead
5 Optimize service realization (minimize the number of
interactions between architecture components)
6 Minimize the utilization of end-terminal resources, es-
pecially in the tactical domain
7 Provide interoperation of the middleware layer with
the transport and application layers
8 Provide the possibility to negotiate a service contract
and adapt service realization to available resources
9 Address the security issues by providing cross-domain
authentication given local authorization and security
policy
The SOA’s greatest advantage is that it provides seamless
information exchange based on diﬀerent policies and loose
coupling of its components. The use of SOAs facilitates the
application and data sharing and provide a ﬂexible mecha-
nism for reusing existing services to enable the development
of new, value-added information services [3], [4].
It appears that the service-orientation and SOAs can
facilitate the implementation of net-centric capabilities, but
by themselves do not guarantee net-centricity. It must be
emphasized that even we have seen many of so called –
net-centric solutions, like often shown in demonstra-
tions – common operational pictures (COPs), the truth is
that current service oriented technology standards and prod-
ucts only support achieving mission eﬀectiveness. It is im-
portant that net-centricity is as much a business model or
organizational relationship issue as it is a technology one.
Many organizations, including R&D institutions, NATO
and industry are beginning to address the issue of service
orientation across enterprise boundaries, in FoS environ-
ment, on all the echelons of command, but still much work
remains to be done.
The article points out SOA technical factors that can ap-
proach to the success of its application in NEC environ-
ment. It is very important to note that only tailoring the
SOA design to military environment limitations, manage-
ment and security constraints as well as operational needs
can provide a true beneﬁt of the SOA paradigm.
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Abstract—The problem of user authentication and authoriza-
tion is usually being solved in a single system. Federated
environment assumes heterogeneity of systems, which brings
the problem of mutual users and services authentication and
authorization. In this article the authors presented security
requirements for cross domain information exchange in feder-
ated environments and a method of secure access to informa-
tion resources on the basis of web services. Special attention
was paid to authentication and authorization of users and ser-
vices. As opportunities, there were presented solutions veriﬁed
in multinational experimentations and exercises.
Keywords—authentication, authorization, military networks,
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1. Introduction
The main tenet of net-centricity is to achieve informa-
tion superiority by sharing reliable information collected
from various sources, creating situational awareness and
distributing it among mission participants, across domains,
context and organizational boundaries. However, the im-
provement of collaboration and information sharing in
highly dynamic, unpredictable network enabled capabil-
ity (NEC) environment is a great challenge. It assumes
transfer of information between users of so called federa-
tion of systems with required quality of service and security
independently of the underlying infrastructure as well as
common access to relevant information by the authorized
users.
Federation of systems (FoS) capability derives from the
strategy for developing the networking and information
sharing aspects of NATO NEC (NNEC) and focuses on
joining together the networking and core information sys-
tems from NATO and NATO nations. The FoS concept
refers to a set of diﬀerent systems, which are not centrally
managed, but are so connected or related as to produce
results beyond those achievable by the individual systems
alone [1]. This implies that networking and information in-
frastructures (NII) consists of national NIIs segments and
a NATO networking and information infrastructure (NNII),
which together will provide capabilities that no system can
provide by itself. This concept is similar to the one known
from Internet, where there is no central control, and the syn-
ergy for the federation is achieved through collaboration
and cooperation. Operational capabilities needed to con-
duct modern military operation, from the technical point
of view, impose the use of ﬂexible, adaptable architec-
ture enabling seamless information exchange in dynami-
cally changing, unpredictable federation of systems. In or-
der to satisfy these requirements, NATO recommends the
use of service oriented architectures (SOAs), that succeeded
in commercial world lately and are seen as the crucial
NEC enabler [1], [2], [3].
Service orientation is a conceptual architecture which
asymmetrically provides services to arbitrary service con-
sumers, facilitating the information sharing in heteroge-
neous environment, and thus supports, to some degree, as-
pects of net-centricity. SOA can make military information
resources available in the form of services that can be dis-
covered and used by all mission participants that do not
need to be aware of these services in advance. That is why
the NII strategy assumes that the system infrastructure will
be implemented as a FoSs, involving the use of SOA to
expose software functions as consumable services that can
be discovered and invoked across the network.
SOA’s greatest advantage is the ability of seamless infor-
mation exchange based on diﬀerent policies and loose cou-
pling of its components. However, this can be realized by
the widespread use of open standards. One of the most ma-
ture realizations of SOA assumes application of web ser-
vices (WS) – the most successful implementation of this
paradigm.
WSs, based on extensible markup language (XML), SOAP,
web services description language (WSDL) and related
open standards, implemented in national systems, allow
data and applications to interact without human interven-
tion through dynamic, ad hoc coalition connections. WSs
are in fact described by a wide range of standards that deal
with diﬀerent aspects of WS realization, transport, orches-
tration, semantics etc. They provide means to build a very
ﬂexible environment that is able to dynamically link diﬀer-
ent system components to each other. The most important
and obvious advantage of this solution is its natural appli-
cability to FoS, where it can be implemented in a wide
variety of communications systems, can coexist with other
technologies and software design approaches [4], and be
adopted in evolutionary way without the need to modify
the legacy systems.
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2. Security Challenges
Sharing information among mission participants in FoS
imposes many technological interoperability on data, ap-
plication and communications levels. What is more, the
unpredictability of this environment, mobility and dy-
namic nature of NEC operations impose several threats
that do not occur in a system managed by single adminis-
tration.
The security challenges inherent to the web services ap-
proach are alarming and unavoidable [2]. Many of the
features that make web services attractive, including greater
accessibility of data, dynamic application-to-application
connections, and relative autonomy (lack of human inter-
vention) are being seen by the security oﬃcers as threat-
ening or even forbidden with traditional security models
and controls. Even the idea of ubiquitous information shar-
ing with diﬀerent security classiﬁcation between domains
building FoS is currently seen as risky.
Security objectives [5] for federated SOA-based systems
are the same as for all IT communication means and cover
conﬁdentiality, integrity, access control, non-repudiation,
accountability and availability. Such attitude guarantees
a controlled access to network elements, services and ap-
plications for identiﬁed users.
Both identiﬁcation of users and services across domains
and providing appropriate information for making au-
thorization decision rise interoperability problems. It is
even more visible in SOA- based systems, where services
can be invoked by users not known in design time, so
that SOA-based systems must face up additional require-
ments [6]:
– balancing information sharing with security,
– trust propagation between federated systems,
– minimizing vulnerabilities (e.g., in terms of software
development),
– providing access to system resources for unantici-
pated users.
First of all, in order for the users to share the informa-
tion and use the received ones, they must be sure that the
source and sink are reliable. Information can be, though
shared only among users/devices that have been identi-
ﬁed and are approved for this kind of data. Only cross-
domain authentication and authorization, based on trust re-
lation between security providers and appropriate identity
management are able to fulﬁll initial security requirements
for FoS.
As shown in Fig. 1, in national C4I system the access to
information is controlled and granted only for authenticated
and entitled users from this domain. Access control is an
internal issue of the system and can be realized in diﬀer-
ent ways. The authorization decision is made locally and
usually bases not only on user rights attributes but also
on invoked web service attributes and valid security pol-
icy. The set of user attributes required for making decision
may diﬀer depending on the system implementation. The
mechanism usually secures all information ﬂows inside the
system.
Fig. 1. Cross-domain authentication and authorization of
users and services. Intradomain and interdomain security mecha-
nisms.
The authentication mechanism is to conﬁrm the identity of
a user or service (see Fig. 2). To perform access con-
trol, web services need to identify and authenticate the re-
questers. In FoS it can be performed by diﬀerent means.
Each domain can have their own authentication services
that base on login/password, X.509 certiﬁcates, biometric
data, etc. Authentication services in diﬀerent domains must
interoperate with each other and accept the identity conﬁr-
mation issued in other domain (some kind of a token). It
must be emphasized that the user must be appropriately
identiﬁed across domain boundaries.
Fig. 2. Authentication, authorization and trust relation in cross-
domain information sharing.
The access to services can be granted or denied based on
the authorization service decision which can use diﬀer-
ent access control (AC) models (e.g., role based – RBAC,
attribute based – ABAC, policy based – PBAC, risk adap-
tive – RAAC). In real life scenarios domains can use dif-
ferent combinations of the above, applying rules that are
deﬁned for this particular system. These rules can be gen-
erally called policy of information sharing, which do not
imply that this is PBAC.
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In disrupted networks, where connections are not stable,
to achieve the reliability of the system, a distributed pol-
icy repository implementation is recommended. This so-
lution allows all policy decision points (PDPs) present in
the system to perform authorization decision invoking lo-
cal copy of the policy. It should be noted that the pol-
icy rules may change dynamically during the system and
mission lifetime (e.g., domains or users may become un-
trusted). The rules may change as a result of the adminis-
trator activities as well as the actual risk assessment. These
changes must be immediately distributed to all policy repos-
itories employed in the system. Eﬀective policy database
replication mechanism is essential to enable all PDPs to
realize access control decisions according to current and
valid rules.
Some users may frequently request particular set of services
provided by own or federated domains. Getting authoriza-
tion each time the user queries any resource may overload
the security services and can make the process of retriev-
ing results more cumbersome. Thus, an important issue is
the provision of a mechanism allowing users to authenti-
cate with one system to a single point (the user’s identity
provider) and, on the basis of that authentication statement
(usually being some kind of a token), use other services and
applications within SOA. This mechanism is called single
sign-on (SSO) (see Fig. 3). SSO allows users to have more
ﬂexible access to system resources which can limit the time
needed to get necessary data and number of authentication
requests.
Fig. 3. Single sign on in FoS.
As it was already stated, one of the core requirements for
sharing information on FoS is trust relation among coop-
erating nations. All entities involved in a transaction or
process must trust one another. A level of trust must be in
place for the parties willing to cooperate in common op-
erations and to exchange sensitive information in a timely
manner. The willingness to share and accept information
depends heavily on trusting the receiver and the provider
of information.
There are several trust relationship models that can be used
in WS security. The most useful is federation of trust,
which bases on the federated identity management. A feder-
ated trust model allows users and web services from various
domains to interact with some level of security. It is based
on both the brokered and bilateral trust models. Particular
domains use so called trusted third party (TTP) that is to
certify that a service or a requester can be trusted within
the domain. Each domain has its own TTP and TTPs of
these domains have mutual relationships. Establishing trust
is very important during the client-provider transactions as
well as in service-to-service interactions.
Provision of security in terms of authentication and au-
thorization in federated environment goes beyond the chal-
lenges presented above. Cross-domain solutions that pro-
vide the identiﬁcation of users, are able to present and then
to analyze their credentials for the purpose of authorization.
They usually base on assertions or tokens that prove local
authentication and enable granting access to the resource.
The problem gets more complicated when we imagine a ser-
vice composition (the chain of services), when one applica-
tion requests data from another one. In this case, the entity
that initiated the process should be granted the access to
particular resources. The problem can be solved by iden-
tity delegation that assumes passing identity of requesting
user through the service chain, however its technical real-
ization can be cumbersome in the range of one system, not
mentioning a federated environment.
3. Opportunities
In order to show the opportunities of authentication and
authorization in a federated environment, we present the
results of experiments that were carried out during prepa-
ration for the multinational experimentation MNE 6 and
demonstrated on the Combined Warrior Interoperability
Demonstration (CWID) in 2009. The solution covers the
basic requirements for authentication and authorization of
users and services and was used to share data between mar-
itime systems supporting creating multinational interagency
situational awareness on the sea. This section describes the
cross-domain authentication and authorization solution that
was implemented in two diﬀerent domains independently,
given existing local interdomain security mechanisms.
3.1. Description of the Trial
The authentication and authorization mechanisms in pre-
sented system are developed in service oriented architecture
as a set of loosely coupled security web services. To ensure
a trust relation between heterogeneous domains forming
federation of systems there was assumed mutual acknowl-
edgement of public key infrastructures (PKIs) approved in
each domain.
When the user wants to get access to a resource located out-
side his domain, he needs to be authenticated in his own
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domain. In order to prove his authentication in the other
domain he gets security assertion (some kind of a passport)
consisting of user identity, public key and attributes. Local
authentication can be made with diﬀerent security mecha-
nisms, e.g., id and password, Kerberos ticket, X.509 certiﬁ-
cate (see Fig. 4). This solution guarantees the independence
of policy rules in each autonomous system. However, the
assertion must be understandable to the cooperating system.
The trust to the users is internal case of the system and
may depend on the authentication method, because there is
a huge diﬀerence of eﬃciency between X.509 and, e.g., id
and password mechanism.
Fig. 4. X.509 certiﬁcate schema.
In the presented solution X.509 certiﬁcates [7] were im-
plemented for the intradomain user authentication. Certiﬁ-
cates based on open industry standards are supported on
many platforms. Additionally, X.509 certiﬁcates can be
used to provide conﬁdentiality and data origin authentica-
tion at the message and transport layer. The identity of
particular participant in a message exchange is unique and
can be conﬁrmed by veriﬁcation of signature made using
X.509 certiﬁcates.
For cross-domain authentication security assertion markup
language (SAML) [8] tokens were chosen. They carry
X.509 credentials and additional values, e.g., signatures
and user attributes. SAML is an XML-based standard
introduced by Security Services Technical Committee of
the OASIS for exchanging authentication and authorization
data between security domains. In the presented model,
SAML assertions are transferred from identity provider
(that can be, e.g., secure token service) to service provider.
It must be noted that signatures included in SAML to-
kens guarantee the message integrity and non-repudiation
(signatures unable to fake identity of user and his at-
tributes).
The advantage of utilizing SAML is its ﬂexibility and adapt-
ability to carrying variety of properties which can be used
for securing communication. In fact, only a few elements
are mandatory in SAML assertion and the rest is optional.
Assertion contains statements that the service provider uses
to make access control decisions.
Fig. 5. SAML assertion schema (grey tags are for obligatory
elements, white ones – for optional).
SAML provides three statements (see Fig. 5.):
• Authentication – asserts the service provider that the
principal (e.g., STS, PEP) authenticated the requester
at a particular time using a given method of authen-
tication (e.g., user/password, biometric data, X.509
certiﬁcates, Kerberos, etc);
• Attribute – provides attributes of requester that could
be used to make access control decision;
• Authorization decision statements – provide permis-
sions for particular actions.
SAML assertion is composed of obligatory and optional
elements. This allowed us to incorporate information about
local authentication of the user based on X509 certiﬁcates
and send user attributes for the purpose of authorization.
SAML assertion used for the trial consisted of the following
elements:
• Issuer – the unique identiﬁer of the requesting service
provider/the unique identiﬁer of STS, PEP;
• Subject – SOAP message source unique identiﬁer (re-
quester or a service provider).
Both the issuer and the subject data are extracted
from X.509 certiﬁcates and consist of common
name, organization unit, organization, country (CN,
OU, O, C);
• Signature – a value obtained from signing the whole
request/response message; it provides the message
integrity and guarantees non-repudiation;
• Conditions – the validity period; it consists of values:
NotBefore and NotOnOrAfter;
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Fig. 6. Core security services system workﬂow diagram.
Fig. 7. Workﬂow of processing SOAP request and response messages.
• Authentication statement – a method used for the au-
thentication of the user;
• Attribute statement – attributes of the user used for
authorization, e.g. military rank, function in organi-
zation, secrecy permissions.
3.2. Implementation of the Solution
Each request to a service must be augmented with appro-
priate SAML assertion, with a token proving the user au-
thentication and its credentials necessary for local autho-
rization. Such an assertion the user usually gets from so
called security token service, that is able to verify its iden-
tity (based on the local authentication mechanisms) and to
prepare an appropriate SAML assertion, understandable to
the requested site. Appropriately prepared SOAP message
is sent to the service.
For the purpose of the trial, a set of security services was
implemented (see Fig. 6). They are to provide cross-domain
authorization and authentication based on the trust relation.
Policy enforcement point is treated as main SAML assertion
processing module (engine). It analyzes part of the SOAP
message header, i.e., SAML assertion and delegates tasks
to particular auxiliary security modules: CertVerify ser-
vice, AuthorizationWS service and KeyNegotiate service.
Together with PEP they create the core security services
system.
PEP and auxiliary modules are implemented as web ser-
vices communicating with each other with SOAP messages.
As mentioned before, PEP with auxiliary services, is re-
sponsible for validating SAML assertions. It:
– validates X.509 certiﬁcate and digital signature of
SOAP message embedded in assertion,
– extracts and validates user authorization attributes,
– obtains symmetric crypto key from KeyNegotiate ser-
vice.
The certiﬁcate included in the SOAP message belongs to
the requester and it is validated against public key of its
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Fig. 8. CWID test infrastructure.
reverse processing workﬂow takes place while sending each
of the SOAP response messages, e.g., to authenticate the
service to the requester. After the client has had an ac-
cess granted, the requested service communicates with au-
thority which was bilaterally exchanged at the memoran-
dum of cooperation (at the level of establishing trust).
User attributes are credentials describing the user place in
the organization hierarchy. Depending on the level of trust
between domains, this credentials may be used to take ap-
propriate authorization decision.
KeyNegotiate service is to exchange seeds that allows to
calculate symmetric crypto key. It could be derived from
shared secret values or from asymmetric computations.
This crypto key is used to encrypt communication between
the user and the requested service, which fulﬁls the conﬁ-
dentiality requirements.
If all of these processing stages return valid and correct val-
ues, PEP module, in turn, allows web service to proceed
further proprietary operations. The only stated require-
ment from the service provider is to call PEP operations
before processing any proper web service task, just after
receiving SOAP message request. The implementation was
based on open source web services frameworks and APIs,
e.g., JAX-WS Java API for web services, Bouncy Castle
Java Cryptography API and EJBCA – Open Source PKI
library.
PEP in order to have its response message appropriately
prepared. Just before sending web service response, PEP
is involved in preparation of the SAML assertion. It gains
user attributes and crypto key and prepares whole SOAP
message including SOAP header. This is implemented by
using output handler (JAX-WS handler), which delegates
the workﬂow to PEP. General logical workﬂow of pro-
cessing request and response SOAP messages is presented
in Fig. 7.
3.3. Verification of the Solution
General overview of tests carried out during workshops and
CWID 2009 exercises is depicted in Fig. 8. Tests and im-
plementations were prepared and developed by Polish and
Swedish teams engaged in realization of objective 4.2 ti-
tled Multinational Interagency Situational Awareness – Ex-
tended Maritime (MISA-EM), which is part of sixth edition
of MultiNational Experimentations (MNE-6).
It must be emphasized that the Swedish and Polish im-
plementation were prepared separately, without exchanging
any line of code. General concept of the cross-domain
security solution for both realizations based on the same
assumptions and was agreed before experiments. However,
the software products and solutions of security web ser-
vices are diﬀerent. The Swedish implementation does not
include PEP, however its functionalities were adopted to
security proxy service adding/removing security assertions
and secure token service (STS).
The tests covered a few scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario
(see Fig. 9) the Swedish side invokes Polish blue force
tracking (BFT) service. At the client side, STS provided ex-
clusively by the Swedish side, was responsible for preparing
appropriate SAML assertions embedded in the SOAP mes-
sages. After receiving message by BFT service provider,
SAML assertion was analyzed by PEP, provided exclusively
by the Polish side. In case of any errors (i.e., wrong
or not valid X.509 certiﬁcates, not appropriate private keys,
modiﬁcations injected into SOAP messages), PEP informs
the BFT provider about such a situation and the processing
chain can be stopped (access denied). In case of success-
ful SAML assertion validation, BFT access was granted
and the service was called. Before sending BFT response
to the Swedish client, PEP was responsible for preparing
appropriate SAML assertion embedded in the SOAP re-
sponse message. After receiving BFT response, STS ana-
lyzed SAML assertion prepared at the Polish side. Similar
checking workﬂow was executed by STS module and in
case of any incompatibilities, BFT access was not granted
and the client was informed about that.
The second scenario was very similar to the mentioned
above. Security services were used in this case to pro-
vide cross-domain access control to the query by example
services (QbE) implemented at both sides. This scenario
tested bidirectional cooperation (SWE service – POL client,
POL service – SWE client).
In third scenario, QbE service was called indirect through
semantic search service. Details regarding the implementa-
tion and working of semantic search are out of scope of this
article but positive results of the tests prove proper work of
the security solutions.
It should be emphasized that all the tests were successful.
During the preparation phase for these experiments, the
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Fig. 9. Basic test scenario sequence diagram.
teams agreed on the solution and set the SAML assertion
speciﬁcation for the purpose of the trial. The implementa-
tions of PEP and STS security modules were independent,
without the necessity of sharing any piece of code.
4. Way Forward, Further Works
The solution presented in the article provides basic cross-
domain authentication allowing to make the authorization
decisions locally, in the domain of the service provider. It
relies on the trust between cooperating domains and sup-
ports the following security goals:
– authentication in the domain of the user which can
be veriﬁed in the domain of the service;
– local authorization in the domain of the service;
– integrity of the SOAP messages;
– non-repudiation of sending the message.
The work under cross-domain security is a broad subject
that should be deeply analyzed in multinational communi-
ties and experimented frequently in order to ﬁnd the most
suitable solution, acceptable for every nation, easy for im-
plementation and interoperable in heterogeneous environ-
ment. The work under these issues in MCI is being contin-
ued to provide coherent solution for cross-domain secure
information exchange in SOA-based dynamic environment.
Currently, we are at the stage of making arrangements for
tests of security solutions with the NC3A Core Services
Testbed, which will be carried out in 2010.
The ﬁrst step forward is to test the cross-domain authentica-
tion of users which utilize diﬀerent intradomain authentica-
tion methods, e.g., login/password, Kerberos and biometric
data. These authentication methods should be appropriately
identiﬁed by the authorization service and reﬂected in the
local security policy.
When dealing with the web services security, it needs to be
emphasised that the publish-subscribe mode of operation
should also be reﬂected. Since in this case the roles of
the service and the client are reversed (the client has the
service interface listening for notiﬁcations, the service has
the client side sending notiﬁcations) validity of the assertion
and the user certiﬁcate should be also checked during the
subscription period.
Another issue worth considering, and very much visible
in the web service environment is the concept and imple-
mentation of service chaining and single-sign-on mecha-
nisms. Service chaining is being used more and more of-
ten in service orchestration and is an intrinsic feature of
the SOA-based world. In order to guarantee appropriate
authentication, authorization, integrity and non-repudiation
of sending the message, there needs to be a mechanism
providing the identity delegation in the chain of services
allowing to recognize the initiator of the process and grant
the access to the service based on his credentials.
In the area of reliability of the information exchange the
need for combining the mechanism providing security and
quality of service must be emphasized. In this area the
work is conducted in scope of:
– joint security and QoS policy for application and net-
work layer resources access control,
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– dynamic policy modiﬁcation according to changing
conditions, e.g., risk evaluation, detected threats and
changing situation,
– access control rules (policy) negotiation between au-
tonomous systems using XACML before they start
information exchange.
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Abstract—The article presents results of web services (WSs)
eﬃciency tests carried out in the testbed emulating disadvan-
taged network environment. The authors discuss the advan-
tage of diﬀerent WS adaptation techniques that allow to mini-
mize the XML message size (i.e. compression, ﬁltering and bi-
nary coding) and the size of JPEG image attachment (i.e., res-
olution reduction, decreasing colour depth, JPEG compres-
sion). The presented results show the eﬃciency of selected
methods that adapt the web services realization to the possi-
bilities of the network. The article is summarized by conclu-
sions and recommendations in terms of sending XML SOAP
messages in disadvantaged networks.
Keywords—compression, filtering, image resize, SOA in tactical
networks.
1. Introduction
Service oriented architecture (SOA) is one of the crucial
enablers to achieve network enabled capability (NEC) and
mission eﬀectiveness [1]. It provides means for information
sharing among various elements of federation of systems
(FoS). It also oﬀers services to arbitrary service consumers,
meets their information needs, takes part in a business pro-
cess carried out within military operation and thus, supports
achieving the net-centricity.
Many of the countries have chosen web services (WS),
as the most interoperable and easily extendable SOA plat-
form, widely used in commercial applications and sup-
ported by the biggest and most advanced software devel-
oper companies in the world. WSs are described by a wide
range of standards that deal with diﬀerent aspects of ser-
vices realization, transport, orchestration, semantics, etc.
They provide means to build a very ﬂexible environment
that is able to dynamically link diﬀerent system components
to each other. These standards are based on the extensi-
ble markup language (XML) that was developed for the
enterprise systems and operates in high bandwidth links.
XML became very popular because it solves many interop-
erability problems, even though it adds a signiﬁcant over-
head.
The utilization of web services in SOA-based systems
operating in NEC environment has been shown in many
international experiments (e.g., coalition warrior interoper-
ability demonstration (CWID) [2], currently CWIX). They
prove that the WS technology improves collaboration, in-
teroperation and information sharing in federation of sys-
tems (FoS). In order to achieve eﬃcient information ex-
change between the users and to give the biggest advantage
to the operators, the SOA solutions need to work with dif-
ferent types of information and communication systems.
The challenge is though, to use this simple in concept and
providing big ﬂexibility means of communications on all
command levels, including low bandwidth tactical commu-
nications systems.
Tactical network environment used by the lowest echelons
of command has many limitations that make it diﬃcult
to provide reliable communications. It usually copes with
high error rates, intermittent connectivity problems, radio
silence and frequent disruptions. It also often changes its
topology. Data rates of the low tens of kilobits per second
and below are common.
Given their maturity level and the software tool support,
web services would be the best choice for all command
levels. However, the above-mentioned factors characteriz-
ing tactical disadvantaged environment provide limitation
for the XML-based SOA information distribution mecha-
nisms. The application of web services in tactical systems
has been though, subject to experiments. According to the
NATO C3 Agency (NC3A) report on using WS in tactical
domain [3], web services continue to function adequately
even at the lowest levels of network capacity, although their
performance is diminished. They remain promising even in
low bandwidth links, as long as very fast response times
are not required.
In order to fully take advantage of SOA and web services
methods for adapting WS realization in tactical networks
must be provided. It is, though, very important to dis-
cover the level of WS applicability in a disadvantaged en-
vironment and to investigate the eﬃciency of diﬀerent opti-
mization mechanisms that enable the performance of simple
XML SOAP communications to improve.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 presents the test scenario and the results of tests that
were carried out by our team, and discusses the possibilities
of WS realization optimization methods; Section 3 presents
the summary and recommendations for SOA solutions in
low bandwidth tactical environment.
2. SOA Web Services Eﬃciency
Tests’ Results
The objective of the tests was to discover the edge net-
work parameters below which web services cannot be re-
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alized. As the web services provider, the authors used
own implementation of the blue force tracking (BFT) ser-
vice that sends unit tracking information consistent with
the STANAG 5527 NFFI (NATO Friendly Forces Informa-
tion) standard [4]. This service was augmented with the
possibility to send image sensor information (JPEG ﬁles).
The authors focused on verifying the eﬃciency of:
– pure SOAP message exchange,
– SOAP message ﬁltered out (allowing to send only
obligatory NFFI information about the unit),
– compressed SOAP message exchange,
– exchange of JPEG images of diﬀerent sizes.
2.1. SOAP Messages Filtering
The ﬁrst experiments were focused on showing how the ﬁl-
tering (extracting only obligatory NFFI XML schema data)
and the Gzip compression of NFFI messages can decrease
the time needed to receive response from the service. The
authors assumed that a response SOAP message consists of
30 objects.
BFT service based on NFFI can send tracks of objects. The
track following NFFI 1.1 XML schema contains 3 types of
information about the object:
– positional data – obligatory: track source, data/time,
coordinates; optional: bearing, speed, reliability, in-
clination;
– identiﬁcation data (optional) – unit symbol, unit short
name;
– operational status data (optional) – footprint,
strength, status code, alert, remarks.
Filtering is a process of cutting out all optional information
elements of the NFFI message from the original message
(so called “long track”), leaving only the obligatory ones
(so called “short track”). This process results in limiting
the SOAP message size (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Filtering gain.
The results of the experiment show that the use of ﬁlter-
ing with Gzip compression remarkably reduces the size
of SOAP messages and makes it possible to exchange
NFFI messages properly through low bandwidth networks.
By using compression we are able to provide informa-
tion exchange in circumstances where the available band-
width is about 2 kbit/s. Simultaneously, the time when the
application receives a response was decreased below 7 s
(see Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. Application response time for mediation service operation
(in seconds) of available throughput.
As depicted in Fig. 2, the same information sent with-
out using compression through links with low throughputs
takes much more time (application response time is about
934 s). It is unacceptable in case of exchanging short-
life information (e.g., quickly changing positions of forces,
sensor information). The results show that it is recom-
mended to use the compression when the traﬃc ﬂows
trough tactical, low bandwidth networks, particularly where
the available throughput is below 56 kbit/s.
2.2. Gzip Compression and Efficient XML
Standard web services traﬃc bases on the exchange of
SOAP messages usually sent in the request-response mode.
The most popular and widely supported by SDKs SOAP
binding is HTTP over TCP/IP. This protocol stack per-
forms well in a stationary high bandwidth networks and
over the Internet. However, its performance in a tactical
environment is usually diminished [3]. In order to evalu-
ate the level of web services performance in a disadvan-
taged environment, the authors carried out tests of “pure”
SOAP communications and compression/binary encod-
ing techniques that signiﬁcantly reduce the message size.
The web service producer was the Blue Force Tracking
service.
In general, we distinguish “lossy” and lossless compression
techniques. In case of a data transmission system, design-
ers are interested in using only lossless ones. These com-
pression algorithms usually exploit statistical redundancy
in such way, as to represent the sender’s data more con-
cisely without error. The lossless compression uses the
fact that most of the real-world data has statistical re-
dundancy. However, lossless data compression algorithms
will always fail to compress data that has high entropy
63
Joanna Śliwa, Tomasz Podlasek, and Marek Amanowicz
(high disorder). This applies to already compressed data,
random data or encrypted data. In such cases the attempts
to compress data will usually result in an expansion.
One of the most popular and eﬃcient lossless compression
algorithms is Gzip1, which was created as a fusion of two
algorithms: Lempe-Ziv (LZ77) and Huﬀman Coding. It is
based on the DEFLATE algorithm, which was designed to
replace LZW and other patented data compression. It ﬁnds
duplicated strings in the data to be compressed. The sec-
ond occurrence of a particular string is replaced by a pointer
to the previous one, in form of a pair represented by the
distance and length. Distances are limited to 32 kB and
lengths are limited to 258 B. When a string does not oc-
cur anywhere in the previous 32 kB, it is represented as
a sequence of accurate bytes.
This characteristic of Gzip indicates that it can be satis-
factory only with data that has some order. This makes
it inappropriate, e.g., for already compressed ﬁles and the
encrypted ones. In the tests, the authors were using this al-
gorithm to compress SOAP messages – a text document
in XML format. For this data type, Gzip compression
achieves a high gain. However, for other data formats,
e.g., already compressed JPEG images, which can be also
sent as attachments to SOAP, it does not yield satisfactory
results.
In Fig. 3, there has been depicted the message size com-
parison for diﬀerent number of NFFI tracks sent in original
XML SOAP messages and in SOAP messages compressed
with Gzip.
Fig. 3. SOAP message size comparison – original SOAP with
compressed SOAP message.
It is clear that the bigger the message is – the best per-
formance we get. This performance can be described as
compression gain (CG) which the authors deﬁne as fol-
lows:
CG = 100− size o f compressed message
size o f original message 100 (1)
Compression gain can be, though, even 97% for 100 kB
XML SOAP message, but reaches only 54% when the orig-
inal message size is 1.6 kB (see Fig. 4).
1More information can be found Gzip home page, http://www.gzip.org/
Fig. 4. Compression gain.
It should be noted that the process of compressing the
message is resource consuming and takes considerable
amount of time. On the server with processor with 4 cores
(2.8 GHz) it took even 30 ms for the biggest 100 – track
message (see Fig. 5).
Fig. 5. Compression time for diﬀerent sizes of SOAP message.
As compression is a resource consuming process, it has
been proven that in an Ethernet with 100 Mbit/s through-
put, it does not give considerable eﬀects. The compression
gain resulting from minimizing the message size is limited
by the fact that the machine needs time for compressing
and decompressing the message (see Fig. 6). The applica-
tion response times for a compressed and a not compressed
SOAP message transmission are though very similar when
the network links are quite fast and reliable.
Fig. 6. Application response time for original SOAP transmission
and with Gzip compression.
The true advantage of compression can be seen when the
network is degraded with limited throughput, high error
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Fig. 7. Application response time in disadvantaged network
for compressed and original 100 – track SOAP message. Net-
work parameters: changing throughput (2048 kbit/s, 512 kbit/s,
56 kbit/s, 9.6 kbit/s, 4 kbit/s, 2 kbit/s), packet error rate = 0,
delay = 0.
rates and high delays. The authors carried out tests of
Gzip compression in an emulated disadvantaged environ-
ment, where links were conﬁgured by variable values of the
throughput, delay and packet error rate (PER) (see Fig. 7,
Table 1).
Table 1
Minimum throughput requirements at diﬀerent values
of per and delay
PER Delay Minimum
[%] [ms] throughput [kbit/s]
SOAP without ≤ 10 ≤ 1000 9.6
compression ≥ 25 ≥ 100 512
≤ 10 ≤ 100 2
SOAP with ≤ 10 > 100 4
compression ≥ 25 > 1000 56
≥ 50 0 2048
In a network with very good quality parameters (PER = 0,
delay = 0), an original 100 – track SOAP message could not
be sent in a network with throughput equal 4 and 2 kbit/s.
For 9.6 kbit/s, the application response time amounted to
about 11 seconds, however, when the network parameters
turn to degrade, this time is being extended (e.g., 134 s for
delay = 100 ms, PER = 0). In comparison, a compressed
SOAP message is transmitted in 2.56s for 9.6 kbit/s link,
5.62 s for 4 kbit/s link and in 28.8 s for 2kbps link, through
links with the same QoS.
The results (see Table 1) showed that SOAP without
compression can be sent through links not slower than
9.6 kbit/s, with PER ≤ 10% and delay ≤ 1000 ms. When
PER > 10%, the throughput must not lower than 512 kbit/s
with a delay not lower than 100 ms. Compressed SOAP
can be sent by 2 kbit/s links with PER ≤ 10% and
delay ≤ 100 ms. If the delay is higher (over 100 ms),
the throughput should amount to at least 4 kbit/s.
When PER > 10%, the lowest throughput is 56 kbit/s
(delay ≤ 1000 ms). Sending compressed SOAP through
a very bad link, where PER ≥ 50% can be done with the
lowest throughput of 2048 kbit/s.
Apart from using the Gzip compression algorithm, it is
possible to reduce the size of SOAP message with other
mechanisms, including an additional eﬃcient coding, like
Eﬃcient XML (EXI) [5], [6] or Fast Infoset.
Fast Infoset speciﬁes a standardized binary encoding for the
XML information set [7]. It uses the existing and proven
ASN.1 standards. The speciﬁcation is standardized as an
ITU-T Recommendation within ITU-T Rec. X.891 [8] and
ISO/IEC 24824-1 [9].
Eﬃcient XML is a speciﬁcation of binary coding of the
XML data. EXI is a very compact representation of the
XML information set that is intended to simultaneously op-
timize the performance and the utilization of computational
resources. The EXI format uses a hybrid approach drawn
from the information and formal language theories, plus
practical techniques veriﬁed by measurements for entropy
encoding of the XML information. To eﬃciently encode
XML event streams, the EXI format uses a relatively simple
algorithm, which is acquired for a fast and compact imple-
mentation, and a small set of data type representations.
The EXI speciﬁcation consists of the grammar production
system and the format deﬁnition. EXI is compatible with
XML at the XML information set level, rather than the
XML syntax level. It permits to encapsulate an eﬃcient
alternative syntax and grammar for XML, while facilitat-
ing at least the potential for minimizing the impact on
XML application interoperability. EXI is schema-“in-
formed”, which allows utilizing the available schema in-
formation to improve the compactness and performance.
It also uses a grammar-driven approach that achieves very
eﬃcient encodings.
Table 2
Compression gain and data processing time
using Gzip, FI, EXi and EXI with compression
for diﬀerent message sizes
SOAP message size
Compression 0.6 kB 12.3 kB 406 kB
mechanism CG RTD CG RTD CG RTD
[%] [ms] [%] [ms] [%] [ms]
XML – 2.2 – 2.8 – 9
Gzip 49.3 1.7 95.3 2.5 98.2 19.5
FastInfoset 30 1.9 53.5 3 55.2 11.9
EﬃcientXML 49.7 0.23 93.2 0.9 94.4 3
EﬃcientXML
71.8 0.44 97.4 1.7 99 6.8+ compression
The subject of the tests was the eﬃciency of these com-
pression techniques. The MCI team also investigated this
problem in terms of using: an open source Gzip compres-
sion algorithm, a binary form of XML Fast Infoset and
EXI (the EXIﬁcient implementation2). The authors tested
three diﬀerent sizes of SOAP messages (0.6 kB, 12.3 kB
2More information can be found on EXIﬁcient web site,
http://exiﬁcient.sourceforge.net/
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and 406 kB) in a simple web service, and measured the
compression gain (CG) and the round-trip delay (RTD)
time (see Table 2). The veriﬁcation proved the high gain
in compressing XML messages more eﬃcient with large
ﬁles. The most eﬃcient compression mechanism is bi-
nary form of eﬃcient XML, especially with compression,
which, for big amounts of data, achieved compression gain
equal 99%.
2.3. Image Resolution Change
Apart from XML, SOAP messages can easily carry image
attachments. In the emulated environment, the authors also
tested the eﬃciency of reducing JPEG images resolution.
WANem application was used to emulate high error rates,
delay and PER values. Three diﬀerent JPEG images were
sent (JPEG image with original size 486 kB and its two
smaller equivalents –50% and 10% of it original size) (see
Table 3).
Table 3
Minimum throughput requirements for images
and their transmission time at diﬀerent values of PER
JPEG PER
Minimum
Transmission
(2706× 3657) [%]
throughput
time [s]
[kbit/s]
JPEG 486 kB
0 56 80–100(100%)
JPEG 240 kB
≤ 10 9.6 250–299(50%)
JPEG 58 kB
≤ 10 9.6 62–87(10%)
The results show that it is possible to send still images
in low throughput channels, however with signiﬁcant value
of the transmission time. Reducing their resolution can
decrease this time (see Table 3, Fig. 8).
Fig. 8. Application response time for diﬀerent image sizes. Net-
work parameters: changing throughput (2048 kbit/s, 512 kbit/s,
56 kbit/s, 9.6 kbit/s), packet error rate = 0, delay = 0.
In the tests, reducing the image size was decreasing their
resolution (see Fig. 9). However, image modiﬁcations can
also include decreasing the colour depth and decreasing
the image quality (inherent in the JPEG coding). Yet,
changing the colour scale to greyscale in fact does not
Fig. 9. Eﬀect of reducing the image resolution for three dimen-
sions 2706× 3657 (a); 1913× 2585 (b); 855× 1156 (c).
Fig. 10. Changing the original JPEG colour depth to greyscale.
give much gain (673 kB of original size to 565 kB in the
greyscale – see Fig. 10).
In contrast, the reduction of the JPEG image quality can
give surprisingly good results. The most common and
widely supported one is a lossy JPEG compression inher-
ent to the nature of this image coding method. The degree
Fig. 11. JPEG compression ration versus image ﬁle size.
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Fig. 12. Image quality reduction for a segment of an image and
diﬀerent values of JPEG quality ratio (QR).
of the compression can be adjusted, allowing a selectable
tradeoﬀ between the storage size and the image quality. In
fact, decreasing the image quality, signiﬁcantly reduces its
size. Compression ratio equal 50 can reduce the size at
over 83% of the original size (see Fig. 11), not degrading
signiﬁcantly the subjective image quality that can be as-
sessed by the viewer. This is most visible when the user
wants to zoom in a particular segment of the image where
the details are most important (see Fig. 12).
3. Summary and Recommendations
The tests carried out by the authors proved that adaptation
of the SOAP message by compression and modiﬁcation of
the image attachment (if present) can reduce the size of
this message and improve its transmissions performance in
a disadvantaged environment. The message size reduction
can be achieved by the use of Gzip compression run in
the application server at the HTTP level. This is a method
very simple to use and widely supported by the application
servers. As shown, compression is a time consuming pro-
cess but its application during communication over links
that have 56 kbit/s and below is highly recommended.
There should be also considered the application of binary
coding techniques, especially the EXI, that provide good
eﬃciency both in terms of compression gain and process-
ing time. The measured web service response time for
EXI was shorter than for Gzip, but the authors expected
a greater diﬀerence for EXI solution. It may be caused by
some deﬁciency in the used open source EXI implementa-
tion [9]. The measured compression ratio proved that EXI
can signiﬁcantly limit the size of SOAP messages (95%
for medium messages), however, Gzip has also very good
results (94% for medium messages). FI binary encoded
messages gave worse results (53% for medium messages).
The results proved that the Eﬃcient XML standard is very
promising, however, its eﬃciency strongly depends on the
implementation.
Apart from tracking information, units located at the low-
est command levels need recognition of the surrounding
terrain. The sensor image services, though, need to be
provided also through the disadvantaged tactical networks.
The results of the tests provided in this article prove that
sending high resolution big images through disadvantaged
networks is related to a long transmission time (79 s for
56 kbit/s, impossible transmissions in 9.6 kbit/s network,
almost 1 minute for the smallest ﬁle experimented). It is
necessary to establish other methods for sending image
sensor information through disadvantaged low bandwidth
links. These can be fragmentation into smaller parts, or,
e.g., decreasing the quality of the image. This latter one is
very eﬃcient, however only for a user that does not need
to zoom in the image to see it in great details.
The presented results show the eﬃciency of selected meth-
ods that adapt the web services realization to the possibili-
ties of the network. The original service producers can be
equipped with such a functionality or the WS traﬃc can
be redirected through a content proxy that would help to
improve the communication at the lowest command lev-
els. What remains to be done is the mechanism that would
limit the impact of connection losses and other connectivity
problems.
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Abstract—In this paper a modification of the widely used
Kademlia peer-to-peer system to tactical networks is proposed.
We first take a look at the available systems today to cover
the range of possibilities peer-to-peer systems offer. We iden-
tify candidates for use in military networks. Then we com-
pare two candidate systems in an environment with highly
dynamic participants. The considered environment is focused
on the special conditions in tactical networks. Then we give
rationale for choosing Kademlia as a suitable system for tac-
tical environments. Since Kademlia is not adapted to military
networks, a modification to this system is proposed to adapt
it to the special conditions encountered in this environment.
We show that optimizations in the routing may lead to faster
lookups by measuring the modified algorithm in a simula-
tion of the target environment. We show also that the pro-
posed modification can be used to extend the battery lifetime
of mobile peer-to-peer nodes. Our results show that peer-
to-peer systems can be used in military networks to increase
their robustness. The modifications proposed to Kademlia
adapt the system to the special challenges of military tactical
networks.
Keywords—Kademlia, network enabled capabilities, peer-to-
peer, wireless tactical military networks.
1. Introduction
Today peer-to-peer applications and protocols have gone
far beyond the notorious ﬁle sharing. Applications like
remote assistance search, distributed data storage or VoIP
systems like Skype make use of peer-to-peer (P2P) systems.
Starting with only a handful of protocols, an overwhelm-
ing variety of systems for quite every imaginable purpose
has been developed. Peer-to-peer networks span the globe
and consist of hundreds of thousands concurrent partici-
pants. Despite the success in civilian applications, no broad
use in military applications is known yet. Especially the
resilience of peer-to-peer networks is able to increase the
availability of military communication infrastructure. Cen-
tralized networks have a single point of failure and facilitate
eﬀective adversary actions against the network. Peer-to-
peer systems oﬀer a distributed approach contrary to tra-
ditional server-centric architectures. We show that peer-to-
peer systems exist which are able to work under diﬃcult
network conditions encountered in military network envi-
ronments. Until now peer-to-peer networks have focused
on wired infrastructure. In military environments, not only
wired networks but also a large variety of wireless networks
with mobile devices is used. An adaption of the broadly
used Kademlia peer-to-peer system is proposed to adapt it
to the military environment. The communication devices in
the considered environment have to cope with limited CPU
power, small bandwidths, high delay and many connec-
tion disruptions due to the nature of the wireless medium
and their mobility. According to the network enabled ca-
pabilities (NEC) principle it is necessary to interconnect
the closed legacy networks of today. An adapted peer-
to-peer network available today may signiﬁcantly improve
the availability of the right information at the right place
at the right time.
2. P2P Systems and Solutions
An overview of the state of the art of peer-to-peer systems
is given in the following section. The scope of the overview
of existing peer-to-peer systems is limited to the usage pur-
pose of the system. It should oﬀer a search functionality to
ﬁnd information elements which were previously stored in
the network and a method to retrieve them. The network
should be scalable so that thousands or even millions of
participants can take part without a degradation of service.
This respects the fact that in the NEC concept, sensors and
systems may also be equipped with information technology
resulting in a potentially huge number of network partici-
pants. The peer-to-peer system – more speciﬁc – the overlay
network infrastructure employed by the system, should be
resilient against network failures and the unexpected fail-
ure of participating nodes. We identify structured overlay
systems to be the most promising as they have advantages
regarding resilience against attackers and networks failures.
2.1. Early P2P Systems
Peer-to-peer systems which rely on a dedicated server [1]
for search or login purposes have disadvantages. Such sys-
tems are a single point of failure. Load issues also render
this approach unsuitable in a mobile environment. The so
called unstructured overlay networks overcome the depen-
dency on servers but searching for content is more diﬃcult
in such networks. In server based architectures searching
and indexing is trivial and may be enriched with range
queries or semantic search. A simple approach to ﬁnd con-
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tent in an overlay network without a server is to ﬂood it with
a search query [2]. This imposes heavy load on the net-
work. If the search is limited to a ﬁxed number of hops to
increase scalability, the search may fail even if the content
exists. The search is then considered incomplete. Super-
peer networks are an alternative to ﬂooding networks. All
following approaches are considered to be complete, mean-
ing the search succeeds if the content is available in the
network or fails if it has not been stored.
2.2. Super-Peer Networks
Super-peer networks use a two-tier architecture. Long-lived
or high-bandwidth nodes are declared as supernodes, while
other nodes are declared as ordinary nodes. Super-peer net-
works form clusters of peers around supernodes (Fig. 1).
The supernode answers search and storage requests on be-
half of its connected peers. Every ordinary peer has to be
connected to a supernode. The supernodes communicate
by a dedicated protocol.
Fig. 1. Diﬀerent schemes of information exchange: (a) client-
server; (b) super-peer; (c) peer-to-peer.
Super-peer networks are used in Skype and FastTrack-based
networks. FastTrack is believed to use a controlled ﬂooding
algorithm among the supernodes to handle overlay network
updates and search requests [3]. Flooding is done also by
the 0.6 protocol version of Gnutella [4]. Still, ﬂooding the
supernodes is a comparatively ineﬃcient method to search
for content in an overlay network. Existing implementations
show an increased robustness to churn compared to some
unstructured ﬂooding-based overlay networks [5]. Churn
in context of peer-to-peer systems denotes the process of
members joining the network and leaving it. Churn may
either be caused by network failures or user behavior. The
startup of nodes, or bootstrapping, is more diﬃcult than
in pure peer-to-peer systems, as nodes need to ﬁnd a su-
pernode ﬁrst. Bogus clients can obtain supernode status by
fraud and cause more damage to other clients than a nor-
mal peer in an decentralized network. Users may also try
to prevent to be elected a supernode to save bandwidth
and computational power, increasing the load on the re-
maining supernodes. Every decentralized system can be
transformed into a supernode network by deﬁning the su-
pernode’s cluster as a single member of the decentralized
network [6].
2.3. Structured Overlay Networks
Today peer-to-peer networks can grow to impressive
size [7]. Structured overlay networks were designed to
support a very large number of participants. The largest
existing overlay is based on the Kademlia structured over-
lay and is named KAD [8].
Structured networks use a key space where peers are placed
in and searching for a node in the key space then follows
a (structured) routing algorithm. Each peer carries a unique
identiﬁer, deﬁning its position in the key space. Kademlia
is based on a structured peer-to-peer overlay network [9].
In Kademlia an XOR metric is introduced to deﬁne a dis-
tance between two nodes. The XOR distance is the bitwise
exclusive OR on the peers’ identiﬁers interpreted as an in-
teger. The other important metrics used by other protocols
are the preﬁx-based metric used by Tapestry [10], the ring
metric of Chord [11] and the combined preﬁx/proximity
metric of Pastry [12].
The routing scheme is similar for all structured peer-to-
peer systems. The overlay routing is responsible for ﬁnd-
ing nodes according to their identiﬁer (key) in the overlay.
This is called key based routing (KBR). The routing algo-
rithms diﬀer but they share the principle of approaching
the destination key in every routing hop and terminating at
the closest node.
A simple store and retrieve functionality can be supplied
by a distributed hash table (DHT) on top of the KBR. The
DHT facilitates to store information into the overlay and
retrieve information from the network. The application
programming interface (API) is similar to a standard hash
table. The idea is to attach a key to every piece of informa-
tion which has to be stored in the overlay. The key is often
derived by hashing the representation of the information.
The information is then routed and stored at the r nodes
with the identiﬁers closest to the key of the information,
with r as a redundancy parameter. At these locations, the
information can also be found by other nodes. Any node
looking for the information calculates the key from it and
uses the key based routing for ﬁnding the node the data is
stored at (DHT GET). The DHT is described as an integral
part of Kademlia, but it is possible to deploy a DHT on top
of every overlay network with key based routing.
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As an example of a structured peer-to-peer routing scheme
we take a closer look on Kademlia. The routing table of
Kademlia is a binary tree (Fig. 2). Each leaf contains a list
Fig. 2. Kademlia routing table.
of nodes, the so called buckets. A bucket holds a ﬁxed
number (k) of references to reach other nodes. As the
network may contain up to 2b nodes, the routing table size
has to be limited. In Kademlia the memory requirement for
the routing table is O(k · b), with b as the number of bits
of an identiﬁer. A node carries a tag which deﬁnes which
identiﬁers are contained in its subtree. In the ﬁgure, b and
k are assumed to be 4, the standard key length of Kademlia
is 160. A tag of 1xxx means that the highest value bit is 1
for the whole subtree and the other bits are unknown. The
right subtree of the root carries this tag. The local node
identiﬁer is assumed to be 0000 in the depicted tree.
The two subtrees below the root separate the identiﬁer space
in two halves: one subtree contains references to nodes
closer to the local node than half of the maximum dis-
tance (the left side) and the other one contains references
to nodes further away (the right side). The rightmost bucket
holds k references to nodes which diﬀer in their most sig-
niﬁcant bit from the identiﬁer of the local node. The left
subtree is constructed recursively with increasingly match-
ing preﬁx length. This enables the local node to store
more references to closer nodes than to nodes which are
far away. The leftmost bucket contains only the reference
to the local node, its sibling bucket may hold exactly one
node which diﬀers only in the least signiﬁcant bit. It is less
and less likely that the buckets to the left are ﬁlled the far-
ther left they are. That is due to the equal distribution of the
identiﬁers.
During a key lookup it is tried to cut the distance to the
destination key at least by half. For doing so the source
node XORs the own node identiﬁer with the key to look up.
The bucket with the longest shared preﬁx tag is selected and
α nodes are picked from the bucket and the routing request
is forwarded to them. Kademlia is able to parallelize its
routing requests. The degree of parallelization is α and
can be chosen freely. The method of picking a node from
the bucket is not speciﬁed by the authors of Kademlia.
A common implementation is to take the closest node to
the destination key. This minimizes the hop count to the
ﬁnal destination. If the routing tables are reasonably ﬁlled
and identiﬁers are equally distributed the routing algorithm
terminates in O(log(n)). The contacted node sends back
the ntell closest nodes of the requested key to the sender
and adds the sender if the routing table is not already full.
In a pathologic case with no lookup traﬃc for a long time,
a stabilization interval tstab is used to ping nodes from the
routing table.
The Chord system is another popular peer-to-peer overlay.
Chord and Kademlia share the way how node identiﬁers
are generated. The main diﬀerence is the structure of the
key space. In Chord, every node is positioned in a ring
according to its identiﬁer. The identiﬁer next to another
identiﬁer in the ring has a numerically higher identiﬁer,
featuring a wraparound at 0. The routing table – or finger
table – of a node contains a reference to the next node in
the ring. This node is called the successor of the node.
The ﬁnger table contains b references to the successor of
the identiﬁers (n + 2i)− 1, i = 0..b− 1. As in Kademlia
this leads to a good knowledge of the node about its near
nodes and less knowledge about far nodes. Routing can
be done in a matter of binary search in the ring and runs
in O(log(n)) overlay hops. The distance to the destination
node can be cut at least by half each routing hop if the
routing table is correct.
If nodes join or leave the system without notice the Chord
routing table gets outdated. A stabilization algorithm is
used to repair the ﬁnger table and the successor reference.
The stabilization uses a reference to the predecessor of
a node. In a periodic manner the local node requests the
predecessor from its successor. If the local node is not the
predecessor, the successor reference is adapted to the node
that is returned as a predecessor. The requested node may
also adjust its predecessor reference. To be more resilient
against node failures, a node may keep up to nsucc succes-
sor candidates in a list which are tried one after another if
the ﬁrst entry fails.
To stabilize the ﬁnger table, periodic search requests for
the identiﬁers in the table are done and the found node
replaces the ﬁnger reference. The stabilization uses band-
width which may not be available for search purposes. The
setting how often successor stabilization (tsucc) and ﬁnger
table stabilization (t f inger) is done, is an important perfor-
mance parameter.
The diﬀerence of Kademlia to other structured overlay net-
works is the symmetry of the XOR metric. That follows
directly from the symmetry of the XOR operation. Peer A
has the same distance to B as B has to A. This allows peers
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to learn about close nodes from incoming routing requests.
It reduces the traﬃc necessary to maintain the overlay net-
work. This feature makes it more promising for use in
disadvantaged networks.
2.4. Performance Analysis Approaches
To analyze the performance of peer-to-peer systems, a peer-
to-peer system is often simulated to isolate the inﬂuences
of the underlying network and the user behavior. Experi-
ments in real networks also exist, but for some peer-to-peer
systems no widely used networks exist (e.g. Pastry). If
available, often the DHT function of the system is used as
a test application. The approaches to measuring a DHT’s
performance diﬀer. Mostly the correctness of the algorithm
is shown. Measurements in Pastry [13] were conducted as
a simulation within a single Java VM, so node interaction
breaks down to Java object invocation. The network model
used was derived from [14]. The same network model is
used in CAN’s performance analysis in [15], but in con-
trast the node interaction has a ﬁxed delay. Some publi-
cations [16], [17] deal with comparing diﬀerent algorithms
in a similar environment with diﬀerent link delays, making
the results somewhat comparable.
In [18] not only the algorithms, but also implementations
of Chord, Pastry, Kademlia and Bamboo are measured.
The analysis took place in an internet environment emu-
lated by Linux Traﬃc Control. In [19] the Kademlia net-
work is crawled and the behavior of network nodes is
described. The decisive inﬂuence of its implementation
on the content retrieval delays is shown in [20]. Perfor-
mance measurement in peer-to-peer systems is challenging
because a large number of nodes have to be set up and mea-
sured in a controlled manner. The conducted measurements
show diﬀerent approaches to this issue. A balance between
simple setup with a precise measurement and realistic net-
work behavior with a suﬃcient number of nodes has to
be found.
We examine one study in further detail. In [17] the rout-
ing of Chord, Tapestry, Kademlia, Kelips and OneHop
are evaluated. As Kelips uses large routing tables in size
of O(
√
n) and Chord and OneHop are not well suited for
networks with high churn rate the comparison breaks down
to a comparison of Tapestry and Kademlia. The authors
also identiﬁed the most important parameters and gave rec-
ommendations for the parameter values. Kademlia is able
to invest bandwidth either in neighborhood consolidation
or lookup correctness. The original authors of Kademlia
propose a consolidation interval of one hour. The authors
of the performance analysis decided to measure the system
with a stabilization interval from 4 to 19 minutes. The
stabilization interval of 19 minutes resulted in best behav-
ior in terms of routing correctness and delay performance.
Although identiﬁed as only a minor eﬀective parameter by
the authors, it would be interesting to investigate the eﬀect
of a consolidation interval longer than 19 minutes.
As Tapestry and Kademlia show similar success in simula-
tions while Kademlia has the ability to learn new contacts
through incoming routing requests and is also able to par-
allelize its requests it is considered the more promising
overlay for even more diﬃcult environments as considered
in the prior analysis. The Chord overlay was not included
in the comparison, so an analysis was done to compare
Chord and Kademlia.
3. Comparison of Chord and Kademlia
Chord and Kademlia are compared in a simulated tacti-
cal environment to ﬁnd out, which system is more suitable
in a military network. Kademlia has been identiﬁed as
a possible candidate in the previous section. We take the
churn-optimized parameter settings from [17] as a starting
point. Then we analyze the behavior of the two overlays
in the presence of network errors and compare the results.
We use the Chord and Kademlia implementations of the
OverSim framework described in [21]. OverSim runs in-
side the OMNet++ network simulator [22]. The simulation
includes a network and delay model as well as a model of
the behavior of the nodes themselves.
The network model consists of wireless terminals equipped
with IEEE 802.11b wireless LAN infrastructure mode
and a ﬁxed transmission capacity of 2 Mbit/s. There are
32 nodes per access point, forming an isolated collision
domain. Each access point is attached to an IP router with
a 100 Mbit/s Ethernet link. The router has a ﬁxed de-
lay line to every other router. The tactical network model
(Fig. 3) has 4 access points and 4 routers. We used the
INET extension of OverSim to simulate the full network
stack from overlay down to physical layer. This model re-
spects the increased availability of commercial of the shelf
(COTS) hardware for military purposes and the tendency to
use broadband radio equipment. The availability of a back-
bone network is anticipated as well.
Fig. 3. The tactical network model.
Before a packet is sent, a packet error is applied according
to a Bernoulli experiment with variable error probability.
If the experiment yields 1, the message is tagged with an
error bit. The packet is sent and network resources are
consumed. The receiver silently discards the message if
the error bit was set.
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The delay between the routers is set to a ﬁxed value of
178 ms. It is the mean value from the “King” data set [23],
a collection of delays between servers in the internet. The
delay on the wireless link is determined by the data link
access and media access layer of the WLAN.
The simulated network contains 128 nodes. A tactical net-
work may have connectivity to other tactical networks or
even networks of strategic scale. The node count may rise
up to thousands of peers. In the simulation the number of
peers was limited by the used simulation framework and the
peer and network model, not by the P2P systems. All over-
lay nodes are equal in capabilities and connectivity. Nodes
are evenly distributed around the access point and do not
move.
The nodes are dynamic in their behavior. This means that
new nodes arrive and nodes leave the network over time.
This behavior is called churn and reﬂects user ﬂuctua-
tion, either due to network failures or user behavior. Churn
can be described by the arrival process of new nodes
and their lifetimes. Diﬀerent churn models are described
in [24], [25] and [26]. Tactical users ﬂuctuate more than
the typical P2P user, reﬂecting roaming and network fail-
ures within the tactical domain. In [27] a distribution is
proposed to model the lifetime process of a P2P system
user in the internet. The lifetime of user connections fol-
lows the Weibull distribution with a mean of 164 minutes
and a median of only 16 minutes. It shows a preference for
short-lived connections. This is an eﬀect which is assumed
to be present in tactical networks as well. As no tactical
peer-to-peer systems are known to the authors, the behavior
of its users has to be estimated. Our model reﬂects this fact
by assuming a similar Weibull distribution with the same
shape but diﬀerent mean lifetime. We introduce use two
churn models: normal churn with 163 minutes mean life-
time and intense churn with an even shorter mean lifetime
of 60 minutes.
The most important parameters of Chord and Kademlia in
a churn intense environment were isolated by Li et al.
We took the “best” parameter set of Chord from their pub-
lication [17] to optimize for a high success ratio. The churn
intense scenario in this publication is modeled as a Pois-
son arrival process with a mean of 1 hour. Due to the fact
that we use a diﬀerent churn model as described above,
a diﬀerent network underlay, message sizes and a reduced
node count of 128, the resulting traﬃc production was
10 byte s−1node−1. Experiments with diﬀerent parame-
ter settings for nsucc, t f inger, tsucc showed that the initial
parameter set already resulted in good success ratios in the
tactical environment.
The newly derived parameters with the highest success ra-
tio are shown in Table 1. The parameters for Kademlia
were found by matching the traﬃc rate for our environment
with Chord’s traﬃc rate while maximizing the success ra-
tio. Especially the stabilization interval could be chosen
longer, as Kademlia needs stabilization only if not enough
routing traﬃc is present. The packet error rate was var-
ied to measure the inﬂuence on the performance of the two
overlays. In every simulation run the error rate for all nodes
was equal. We varied the packet error rate (PER) in steps
from 0.001 to 1.
Table 1
The overlay parameters used for comparison of Chord
and Kademlia in the tactical model
Parameters Chord Parameters Kademlia
nsucc 8 ntell 8
t f inger 120 s k 8
tsucc 20 s α 3
b 2 tstab 1000
We measure the delivery ratio of the overlay routing pro-
cess. This is the ratio of terminating routing request per
total number of routing requests. The higher the ratio the
more reliable the routing is. Another method to measure the
correctness of the routing is to measure the success ratio,
that is to take the ratio of successful routing by the amount
of total routing request. A successful routing terminates
at the node closest to a given search key. A terminating
request does not necessarily ﬁnd the node closest to the
requested key. Successful routing requests are measured
by issuing a search request on a key which is identical to
a node identiﬁer in the network. As this approach introduces
a priori knowledge about the existence of certain nodes,
a higher success ratio than expected is measured. A cor-
rect measurement of the success ratio would require com-
plex distance comparison, slowing down the simulation.
For these reasons we preferred to use random keys and the
delivery ratio to test the lookup correctness. It has to be
noticed that the success ratio of a DHT exceeds the deliv-
ery ratio of the routing by far. As the DHT may use the
r closest nodes storage locations, the success ratio of the
DHT mainly depends on this parameter.
Fig. 4. Delivery ratio of Chord.
The results of the comparison between Chord and Kadem-
lia are shown in Figs. 4 and 5. As a comparison three
diﬀerent levels of churn: no churn, normal churn and in-
tense churn are depicted. The delivery ratio of both over-
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Fig. 5. Delivery ratio of Kademlia.
lay types declines with increased packet error rate. Chord
achieved higher delivery ratios if a low packet error rate
is present. As packet error rate increases, Kademlia shows
better performance.
Fig. 6. Delivery ratio of Kademlia with α = 1.
This provides rationale to prefer Kademlia in environments
with high churn and high packet error rates. Chord is not
able to use parallel lookups. To isolate the eﬀect of paral-
lel routing requests the measurement is repeated with the
Kademlia parallelization parameter α = 1, eﬀectively dis-
abling parallel lookups (Fig. 6). Still Kademlia is more
stable when high packet error ratios are encountered. The
reason for better performance in the presence of high packet
error ratios is to be found in the rigidity of Chord where
node failures have a more serious impact on the correctness
of the routing table than in Kademlia.
4. Modiﬁcation of Kademlia
We propose a change to the Kademlia routing mechanism
to improve its performance in the presence of network er-
rors and high latency. The modiﬁed Kademlia is able to
incorporate signaling from lower layers or applications [28].
Our aim is to make the routing more adaptive to the under-
lying network structure. As the concept of proximity rout-
ing [29] requires additional messages, the proposed concept
does not. It incorporates information from the routing or
application layer, which can be delivered without cost in
terms of additional traﬃc. The guarantees of the Kadem-
lia routing, especially the completeness and the complexity
properties remain untouched. A node running a modiﬁed
version integrates seamlessly in running networks without
modiﬁcation.
Our approach is not to modify any existing routing param-
eters but to use a diﬀerent method of choosing contacts.
Although the method is also applicable to other peer-to-
peer systems, the scope of this paper is limited to Kadem-
lia. Cross-layer information is integrated into the routing
decisions. The additional information is called preference
value or simply the preference of a link or node.
The Kademlia routing described in Subsection 2.3 is
changed in the way the sender of a lookup request selects
nodes to contact. The original algorithm ﬁrst selects the
appropriate bucket (Fig. 7) and puts the contained routing
entries into a list L of candidates. The ﬁrst α candidates
are then contacted and the lookup request is forwarded to
them. In some situations if a bucket is very sparsely ﬁlled,
entries from adjacent buckets may be used. In the modiﬁed
version every contact is now augmented with a preference
value. We introduce a weight factor w, which determines
the inﬂuence of the preference. A factor of 1 means the next
hops are determined according to the preference value and
L is sorted according to the preference values. A weight
of 0 represents the unmodiﬁed algorithm. Intermediate val-
ues of the weight aﬀect the order in a continuous manner.
The new sorting order is deﬁned by:
md = weight
pre fs,d length(L)
max pre f +(1−weight)posd,
where: s denotes the local source node making the routing
decision and d a remote destination node. The original
position of d the in L is posd . The list L is then reordered
in descending order according to md .
The eﬀect is shown in Fig. 7, a diﬀerent node of the same
bucket is preferred over a closer one. As the original ver-
sion minimizes the hop count by always choosing the clos-
est nodes the modiﬁcation increases the hop count.
We test three methods to generate a preference value. The
ﬁrst method is to take the channel delay between the local
node and the next hop i of L as preference value. After
a normalization step the delay is used as preference. We
call this modiﬁcation modification 1. The second method
is to take the bit error rate between the local node and
the remote node BERs,d as a preference value, it is called
modification 2. Modification 3 only takes a value deﬁned
by the remote node into consideration. The node may set
a low value to attract routing traﬃc or a high value to
avoid it.
We use a simpliﬁed model of a tactical environment to be
able to simulate more nodes. The simpliﬁed network model
contains 1024 nodes. For modiﬁcation 1 and 2 all nodes
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Fig. 7. Next peer selection: (a) original version; (b) changed
lookup.
are equal, modiﬁcation 3 introduces two diﬀerent types of
nodes.
The simulation time is 5 hours including a warm up time of
1 hour. Every run was repeated 10 times with diﬀerent ran-
dom number seeds. All nodes in the network feature a UDP
network stack. Before a packet is sent to another node an
error model and a delay model are applied. Before a packet
is sent, a bit error may be applied according to a variable
error probability. No churn is used in the simpliﬁed model.
The nodes are placed equally distributed. The link delay
between two nodes increases linearly with the Euclidean
distance of the nodes. The maximum delay is about 7 s,
this is below the message timeout value of 10 s. This sim-
ulates the eﬀects of lower layer protocols such as multi hop
propagation in a simpliﬁed manner. Lost messages get de-
tected by the overlay 10 s after they have been send. In
Fig. 8 the results of modiﬁcation 1 and 2 are shown. The
measurement with weight set to 0 is included as a refer-
ence to the unchanged Kademlia routing algorithm in the
simpliﬁed network model. The ﬁgure depicts the time it
takes to perform a DHT GET request with modiﬁcation 1
and modiﬁcation 2. The DHT GET latency is the duration
it takes to retrieve a previously stored value from the DHT.
The weight was modiﬁed to analyze the eﬀect of the prefer-
ence values to the routing. The absolute numbers of sender
traﬃc and success ratio are of lesser importance as they are
mainly dependent on the parameter settings of the overlay.
It is possible to increase the success ratio for example by
an increase of parallel lookups. The absolute values for the
DHT latency are mainly dependent on the network model
and the link delays. We focus on the relative change of the
values when we modify the routing. In Fig. 8a the eﬀects of
both modiﬁcations on the DHT GET latency is shown. The
preference for faster connections in modiﬁcation 1 does not
seem to pay oﬀ in terms of latency. The reason for the low
impact of modiﬁcation 1 is how Kademlia sends parallel
lookups during the routing process. Since Kademlia tries
to hold α lookup request in ﬂight, the fastest response is
immediately processed and the routing continues with the
sending of another routing request. The parallelization ele-
vates the eﬀects of preferring fast nodes as the probability
is high that 1 of α nodes reacts. Timeouts dominate the
inﬂuence on latency. Timeouts occur if a node has failed.
Sending slots are blocked for the duration of the timeout.
Fig. 8. Eﬀects of modiﬁcation 1 and 2: (a) DHT GET latency;
(b) overlay traﬃc sent; (c) DHT success ratio.
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If all slots are blocked the routing stalls until the ﬁrst time-
out occurs. Because less timeouts occur, modiﬁcation 2
(which prefers low BER links) performs better in terms of
reduced latency. This observation is in contrast to existing
implementations as the RTT is often used to approximate
the reliability of a link. In environments with high BER,
preferring low BER links is better than to use faster links.
Modiﬁcation 2 facilitates a trade-oﬀ between delay and the
amount of transmission capacity needed to maintain the
peer-to-peer overlay.
Figure 8b shows the mean number of bytes sent per node
per second for a ﬁxed weight. Modiﬁcation 1 does not
change the amount of sender traﬃc as it has a too little
eﬀect on the routing decisions. Modiﬁcation 2 increases
the bytes sent. This is because the original Kademlia rout-
ing decision is optimized for low overlay hop count. Any
change to the routing decision will increase the hop count.
The higher hop count leads to an increase of the traﬃc of
modiﬁcation 2. At a weight of 0.5 the modiﬁcation oﬀers
minimum latency, at this weight it causes an increase of
17% in overlay routing traﬃc. Our results show the possi-
bility to exchange reduced latency for an increase in sender
traﬃc.
The success ratio of the DHT lookups is shown in Fig. 8c.
A DHT lookup was counted as successful if the value could
be retrieved without timeout from 1 of the redundant stor-
age locations (r = 3). The success ratio stayed constant
or increased slightly with increased weight. The absolute
rate of success is less important as it is always possible to
trade bandwidth for increased success ratio by parameter
changes. The important observation is the success ratio
does not decrease as an eﬀect of the modiﬁcations.
To test modiﬁcation 3 we set every 10th node to the least
preferred value. This simulates a node with limited battery
capacity. As sending consumes scarce battery power, we
measured the accumulated number of bytes sent out by the
tagged nodes over the whole simulation duration. The re-
sults can be seen in Fig. 9. The original amount of data
sent out is shown as crosses, the simulation run with mod-
iﬁcation 3 is shown in an x-shape. The amount of bytes
Fig. 9. Traﬃc shaping by modiﬁcation 3.
per node is not equal for all nodes even in the unmodiﬁed
scenario. Nodes join the network successively, so node 0
is the ﬁrst and 255 the last. The eﬀect is not visible if
churn is applied. In Kademlia long lived nodes are pre-
ferred over newly arrived nodes if a bucket is full. This
bucket eviction policy leads to the fact that node 0 features
the highest traﬃc and node 255 the least. The low battery
nodes can lower their amount of sending by up to 25%
with modiﬁcation 3, while still taking part in the overlay
with no disadvantages. The accumulated traﬃc of all nodes
over the whole simulation time remains nearly unchanged
at 151.11 MB versus 153.38 MB with modiﬁcation 3, also
the success ratio remains nearly unaﬀected.
5. Summary
We analyzed diﬀerent peer-to-peer systems for their suit-
ability in an error-prone military network. Chord and
Kademlia were identiﬁed as candidates to be suitable in
such networks. The candidates were compared in a simu-
lated tactical environment. The environment features wire-
less and wired networks and a faithful media access simu-
lation. We showed that Kademlia oﬀers a higher delivery
ratio than Chord in the presence of churn and high packet
error rates. Then we introduced a change to Kademlia’s
routing algorithm to include cross-layer information. We
gave three examples how to use the extension. Error rates
of links are reported through the new interface (modiﬁ-
cation 2). It was shown that it is possible to reduce the
number of timeouts and thereby decrease the latency of
the peer-to-peer system. A cross-layer signaling of the link
latency did not improve the performance of Kademlia in
the considered environment because the parallelization of
routing requests in Kademlia elevates the eﬀects. Nodes
which need to save battery power can use extension 3 to
reduce their contribution to the overlay network. Low bat-
tery nodes remain full members of the network and suﬀer
no disadvantages but they send signiﬁcantly less traﬃc. The
overlay can cope with a considerable percentage of disad-
vantaged nodes with no limitations. Our modiﬁed client
may join a Kademlia network without interfering with ex-
isting clients and overlay networks. The presented results
show a possibility to increase the availability of informa-
tion in tactical networks. Future steps include the analysis
of the peer-to-peer system with a tailored publish/subscribe
capability.
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Abstract—As the capabilities of individual nodes in wireless
sensor networks increase, so does the opportunity to perform
more complicated tasks, such as cooperative distributed beam-
forming to improve the range of communications and save
precious battery power during the transmission. This work
presents a review of the current literature focused on imple-
menting distributed beamformers; covering the calculation of
ideal beamforming weights, practical considerations such as
carrier alignment, smart antennas based on distributed beam-
formers, and open research problems in the field of distributed
beamforming.
Keywords—beamforming, distributed antenna array, smart an-
tenna, virtual array.
1. Introduction
With recent advancements in both size and power efficient
computing, the concept of the ubiquitous wireless sensor
network has quickly emerged as a legitimate research topic.
It is now possible to have a large network of relatively small
devices distributed over a large area, all with limited means
of communications, and precious little power to spare for
long haul links. Significant research has been done on ef-
ficient routing algorithms, mutual information coding, and
multi hop transmission schemes in an effort to reduce the
amount of power required to transfer sensor data from the
individual nodes in a network to a final destination where
the data can be used. In an effort to further reduce power
consumption, the use of distributed phased arrays has come
into focus as a method for nodes to collaborate in their
transmissions, saving power overall during the data transfer.
By cooperating, the nodes are able to emulate a traditional
fixed array of antenna elements and achieve the same gains
in terms of main lobe enhancement, side lobe reduction,
and null pointing to improve the intended receiver’s SNR
and remove the interference caused by unwanted transmit-
ters. These arrays are called distributed smart antennas, or
distributed beamformers, and have their own unique set of
problems over fixed beamformers when it comes to ideal
weight calculations.
Use of the term “distributed” has two distinct meanings in
the sense of distributed beamforming. The first meaning
indicates that the antennas of the array themselves are dis-
tributed over the receiving plane in some randomly struc-
tured fashion. This is a departure from traditional beam-
forming literature, which relies on a strict, uniform place-
ment of the antenna elements to reduce the complexity of
the analysis through the removal of dependence on the in-
dividual locations of nodes within the arrays. When the
nodes are no longer structured so nicely, the location of
each element must be considered on its own, rather than
simply considering the location of the array as a whole. In
this scenario, the elements are still controlled by some cen-
tral source; hence the locations, phase offsets, and transmit
capabilities of each node are known quantities to be taken
advantage of during ideal weight calculations.
The second meaning builds on the first, implying that the el-
ements are not only distributed in terms of location, but are
also independent processing units, such as with a wireless
sensor network in a field. This second scenario severely
limits the quantity and quality of information available to
a beamformer. In this case, methods for determining ideal
complex weights must distributed in the sense that they can
be carried out by each node individually without sharing
significant amounts of information. If the nodes were al-
lowed to share the total amount of information about them-
selves, such as through some pre-communication phase, the
second scenario would collapse into the first, where ideal
weights could be calculated based on the global information
and disseminated through the network by a single cluster
head.
Early work with systems where the global parameters for
each transmitter are known, but the transmission elements
are not in an organized regular array allowed for an ini-
tial insight into how arrays of unfixed elements might be
approached. When the elements are distributed as in wire-
less sensor network, new considerations can be added to
the algorithms, taking into account the need for distributed
processing and synchronization. Growing from there, the
capabilities of randomly distributed networks with specific
distributions can be analyzed in terms of their capability
with respect to steering both peaks and nulls.
The remainder of this review is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 presents early work performed in the area of unevenly
distributed and randomly distributed antenna arrays and its
application to modern distributed arrays. This groundwork
paved the way for virtual antenna arrays in distributed wire-
less nodes, which are discussed in depth in Section 3. This
section is focused on the ideal calculation of beamforming
weights in distributed networks to achieve the ideal beam-
pattern for broadcasting and reception. Section 4 covers
the practical aspects of beamforming in a distributed net-
work and the methods for using the ideal weights discussed
in Section 3. Finally, Section 5 gives some open research
problems in the area of distributed beamforming and smart
antennas.
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2. Early Work in Random Antenna
Arrays
Due to the nature of original phased array systems, the
concept of a distributed phased array was not something
that was inherently obvious. As the topic grew from sonar
and acoustics into the electromagnetic domain, it was seen
as a given that arrays could be placed in specific patterns
as dictated by a designer, there was just no need to analyze
distributed or random arrays.
There was a small body of work, however, that focused
on the properties of both non-uniform and random linear
arrays; usually with the intention of decreasing the num-
ber of required elements, eliminating the need for individ-
ual amplitude control hardware, or analyzing the effects of
placement errors when building a physical array. The first
attempts at moving away from a strict linear array was pre-
sented in [1], which introduces the idea that elements in
a linear phased array need not be evenly distributed over
the length of the antenna. The main goal was the reduction
of the number of elements, the author demonstrated that
by placing the elements at arbitrary points along the line,
the designer increases the degrees of freedom in the overall
design because through the addition of location. The extra
degrees of freedom allow for an increase in the capabilities
of the array (while necessarily increasing the complexity
of design). To reduce this complexity, [2] introduced the
concept of an equivalent uniformly-spaced array (EUA),
which reduces the non-uniform array to an equivalently
driven uniform array with a chosen spacing. Building on
these original papers, other researchers continued to de-
velop the concept of non-uniform linear arrays, and new
methods for the design and optimization of phased arrays
were discovered. Initial mathematical models and descrip-
tions allowed for the general construction of arrays with
desirable properties, but left out optimization of specific
parameters [3]. Further development of these models led
to more practical design considerations such as sidelobe
reduction [4], as well as some experimental verification of
the models being derived [5] .
With a strong understanding of the physical characteristics
of non-uniform arrays in hand, researchers were able to
build on the available models to generate theories based
on random non-uniform arrays and how they behave sta-
tistically, rather than over a single iteration. Work in-
cluded the analysis of general arrays [6], [7], the proper-
ties of the sidelobes [8], and even multidimensional arrays
(disks and spheres) [9], [10].
3. Optimum Beamforming Weights
With the popularity of wireless sensor networks increasing
steadily, there is now a need to further the analysis of arrays
with truly random element spacing. Using the initial anal-
yses from Section 2, especially those on multidimensional
arrays [9], as a basis for the analysis of distributed beam-
forming in wireless networks allows researchers to apply
the old concepts of fixed random arrays to wireless sensor
networks.
Modern arrays benefit from a number of factors not avail-
able to the original body of research. First, the rapid ad-
vances in computers allow for fast, statistically significant
numerical simulations, which allows potential schemes to
be quickly evaluated. Second, increasing transmission ca-
pabilities allow for better control of arrays through the use
of dynamic weighting. Arrays can now be weighted in
software using complex weight multiplication, rather than
cumbersome fixed phase and amplitude modifiers at the
antenna elements themselves. With these improvements
in technology, random array beamforming in wireless sen-
sor networks bears only a slight resemblance to the previ-
ous work done on random arrays, but the initial research
still provides valuable insight into the relationships between
node placement and the achievable beam patterns.
The core of any modern beamformer is the complex weights
used to modulate the signals at each element of the array
in order to achieve the appropriate constructive and de-
structive interferences required for optimum results during
cooperation. There are several problems unique to the cal-
culation of ideal weights when beamforming using a dis-
tributed virtual array. The first change in weight calcula-
tion is clearly that the elements of the array are no longer
in a fixed pattern, leading to extra complexity in the con-
vergence of smart antenna algorithms. Additionally, it is
possible that the elements may even be moving, introducing
yet another factor in the calculation of ideal weights. This
section focuses on the calculation of beamforming weights
for individual nodes under these circumstances. In most
cases, an ideal array of nodes is assumed; that is, the nodes
have synchronized carriers and total knowledge of the array
topology and source locations. When weight calculation
methods deal with arrays where these assumptions do not
hold, it will be specifically mentioned.
3.1. Distributed Beamformers as Wireless Relay
Channels
At its heart, distributed beamforming can be modeled as
a relay channel, with the transmitting nodes as sources,
and the cooperative nodes as relays. It does not mat-
ter that often the sources and relays are the same node,
or that every node may be able to reach the receiver on
its own; the analysis is still pertinent in terms of ideal
weight calculations. In this type of analysis, the definition
of ideal may be flexible, meaning maximum gain at the
destination, minimum power consumed, or minimum inter-
ference to unintended receivers. The benefit of this type
of analysis is that little information about the array geom-
etry or actual nodes is necessary, the network as a whole
is abstracted, allowing generic analysis of performance un-
der constraints on power consumption (weight magnitudes),
available channel state information, and the number of co-
operating nodes. The main drawback is that the geometry
of the array, location of intended receivers, and location
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of interferers is abstracted into the channel state informa-
tion between the nodes, which is not always available or
easily estimated. In addition, knowledge of the antenna ge-
ometry may alleviate a number of constraints that are artifi-
cially introduced in dependence on the inter node channels.
The analysis is beneficial, though, as a fair comparison of
theoretical ideal weight calculation methods for individual
nodes. Relay channels are characterized by what they do
to the message from the source node, such as amplify-
and-forward (AF), decode-and-forward (DF), or filter-and-
forward (FF); each with different challenges in terms of
the presence of noise, algorithm complexity, and required
node information. The most complex of these, in terms
required information and potential sources of noise is the
AF case; both the DF and FF network types are special
cases of the AF network with constraints placed on the
types and placement of noise and the complex weights
used to amplify the signal. Figure 1 shows an example of
Fig. 1. Sample relay network.
a relay network with noisy channels and individual node
weights. Due to the abstract nature of relay channels,
and their application across a wide variety of domains,
there exists a large body of work devoted to their analysis.
When applied to distributed network beamforming, sev-
eral limitations in traditional relay channels are added into
the problem. First, it is not typically assumed that the
transmitting node is involved in the cooperation to reach
the receiver, in distributed network beamforming the trans-
mitter is usually part of a cluster, and takes part in the
transmission. Second, typical solutions rely on a single
constraint, the quality of the link the receiver. This has
the effect of creating a maximum main lobe towards the
intended target, but gives little consideration to the rest of
the beampattern generated by the cooperating nodes. Addi-
tional constraints, such a minimizing the side lobes or steer-
ing nulls towards unintended receivers, add complexity to
systems that already require significant relaxations to reach
closed form solutions. As such, these systems may not
be useful in practice due to the extreme complexity of the
solutions.
Useful coverage of relay networks with respect to beam-
forming and beamcoding would warrant more coverage
than this paper is capable of providing. As such, the re-
mainder of the section will only provide a brief introduction
on relay network methods with specific application to dis-
tributed beamforming, e.g. calculating ideal transmission
weights to overcome channel effects, with a specific exam-
ple of a paper with good coverage on that topic. To begin,
[11] presents an excellent introduction to application of re-
lay networks with respect to beamforming. It gives excel-
lent examples of the workflow used when analyzing relay
network beamformers. First, the constraint is chosen, in
this case the SNR at the receive nodes, however any quan-
tifiable quantity can be chosen, such as the capacity of the
total link, the total power consumption, the per-node power
consumption, etc. Second, an analytical derivation for the
optimized value of interest is created based on the relay
network model, and a method for iteratively reaching that
optimum is presented. Finally, the problem is broken up
such that the transmitter or receiver (or both) can calculate
a single coverage parameter that leads the individual nodes
to find their own optimum weights, distributing the calcu-
lation over the network. Here, basic AF and DF networks
are analyzed with in terms of maximizing the SNR at the
receiver based on varying degrees of channel state infor-
mation, as shown in Fig. 2. For application to cognitive
Fig. 2. Error analysis of DF and AF networks [11].
radio, it is possible to treat the relays such that there are
multiple transmitters and receivers (either paired, or in one-
to-many configurations), such as in [12]. This allows max-
imization of the constraint at each pair of nodes commu-
nicating through the relay. Additional constraints may be
added to reduce the interference to primary users of a chan-
nel. In most cases, channel state information is a required
piece of information (due to the lack of node geometry in-
formation). It is possible, however, to overcome this utiliz-
ing the relay network model, which utilizes the second or-
der statistics of the channel, allowing for a more distributed
approach.
3.2. Adaptive Distributed Arrays
When a target is moving, or ideal weight calculations
are not possible due to lack of information, an adaptive
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method may be used to home in on ideal weights by itera-
tively changing the phases based on the array performance.
This leads to distributive smart antennas; capable of com-
pensating for movement within the array, target or interferer
as well as other changes in the channel.
In order to arrive at the ideal weights without full CSI,
[8] attempts to iteratively find the optimum weighting at
each relay using one bit feedback from the destination node.
Two methods of iteration are introduced which randomly
perturb the weights based quality information fed back from
the destination node. The first method, take/reject pertur-
bation (T/R), the weight is either perturbed or not based on
the feedback; that is, if the receiver feels that the signal is
sufficient, there is no perturbation. If the weights are to be
changed, the perturbation new value is chosen such that
a˜′k = ak + µqk mod N ,
where µ is a scaling factor which affects the rate of con-
vergence and qk is a preset value from the perturbation
set q.
Utilizing T/R allows for constant improvement in the qual-
ity of the weights, that is, the quality of the overall link
in each successive iteration is at least as good, or better,
than the previous iteration. However, this method will be
slow to converge, as it is possible that the quality may re-
main constant over several iterations. In the second method,
plus/minus perturbation, the next weight is perturbed twice
during transmission, and the feedback bit specifies which of
the two was the best. In this case, the tested perturbations
are
α˜±k =
αk ± µqk mod N
‖αk ± µqk mod N‖
.
The additional values allow for a faster convergence to an
ideal weight vector because there are twice as many per-
turbations available in each iteration. However, it may also
be the case that neither α+ or α− are better than the old
weight αk, leading to worse performance in the immediate
time window. In both cases, the calculation of the pertur-
bations needs to be normalized by the weights of the entire
array. Because this would require each element to share
Fig. 3. Comparison of perturbation feedback schemes.
its random weight with the entire array, a method of de-
terministic perturbations is introduced which allows each
of the relay nodes to calculate its weights independently
of the others. Figure 3 shows a BER comparison between
each of these schemes under fading conditions along with
a traditional ideal weight method that require full knowl-
edge of the CSI based on gain equalization. Modifications
to this scheme in [9] show that utilizing multiplicative per-
turbations rather than additive can give an increase in the
performance of the system due to the fact that the determin-
istic multiplicative perturbation set Q can be chosen such
that a set phase rotation is applied regardless of the current
weight value. In this case, the weights are perturbed as
such
a˜′k = ak + Qk mod N .
Figure 4 demonstrates the benefits of this method versus ad-
ditive perturbation. Each perturbation moves the weights
closer to their ideal values, as the multiplication prevents
perturbation magnitude in irrelevant dimensions. In [13],
the authors show that optimum beamforming weights can
be found iteratively by having each node broadcast an ef-
fective cost to the other nodes in terms of its own inter-
ference. With of an idea of how its transmissions affect
the other users, a single node can maximize its utility (data
rate) while minimizing its interference to the other nodes.
In addition, the updates of the users cost are distributed
throughout many frames. In fact, when the costs are up-
dated simultaneously, it causes oscillations and prevents the
nodes from converging on an optimal solution.
Fig. 4. Multiplicative versus additive perturbations [14].
A common relay channel technique is to use singular
value decompositions (SVD) to obtain ideal beamforming
weights using global CSI information. The SVD method
allow the transmitter to precode data (x) sent over a MIMO
channel (h) with the left decomposition of the channel (v)
and the receiver to decode with the right decomposition (u),
giving the received vector (y)
y = uH Hvx + uHn .
The authors of [15] present an iterative method for cal-
culating the right SVD vector, relying on blind adaptive
methods for calculation of the left. This method works by
treating the multiple paths as parallel SISO links with gain
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Fig. 5. Effects of feedback threshold on SVD weight calcula-
tions [15].
specified by the diagonal elements of the SVD, allowing
nodes to calculate their ideal weights based on their local
element. The amount of information sent over the feed-
back channel is reduced by using a predictor to estimate
the value of the current singular vectors at each transmit-
ting node, rather than feeding back the vector in each itera-
tion. After each iteration of the transmission, the values of
the singular vector are transmitted back to the relay if the
difference between the estimated values and the calculated
values exceed a set threshold, allowing for a balance be-
tween performance and the overhead in the control channel.
In Fig. 5, the BER performance for varying thresholds is
shown.
3.3. Distributed Weight Calculation
The greatest overhead in distributed beamforming is the
sharing of locations or channel state information between
the nodes to allow for weight calculations across the net-
work. Methods for calculating these weights in a distributed
fashion, sharing as little data as necessary, allow for vast
improvements in the overall performance of the distributed
arrays; making it one of the most important research topics
in the field.
The best way to prevent the need for sharing CSI for every
node is to not use CSI during the weight calculations. The
authors of [16] present a system that uses the second order
statistics of the individual node channels. Starting with an
initial estimate of ideal weights, the individual nodes can
continue to refine their own weights locally using only a pa-
rameter based on the combination of the transmissions in
the uplink, which is fed back from the receiver. This idea
is carried forward in [17] , where the second order statis-
tic calculation includes multiple source transmitter pairs,
adjusting the weights at the relay nodes to optimize the
signal at several receivers rather than just one, that is, the
beamformer adjusts to minimize the transmit power (PT )
subject to the required SNR between each transmit/receive
pair
min
w
PT SNRk ≥ γk∀k ,
where SNRk is the SNR at each transmitter pair and γk is
the minimum required SNR for that pair.
In this case the SNR is actually the signal to interference
and noise ratio (SINR) as the signals from other pairs are
treated as interference,
SNRk =
Pk
Pnk + ∑
i6=k
Pi
,
where Pnk is the noise at Pk and the sum term is the power
at each of the other pairs.
Utilizing these constraints, we can find the optimal weights
through the following minimization
min
w
wHDw s. t.
wH Rkw
wH(Qk + Dk)w+ σ2
≥ γk ,
where R, Q, D, and σ2 are the correlation matrix of the
channels, the average of the complex paths, the diagonal
values of R, and the noise variance. The authors of [18]
the less common route of constraining the energy per node
as well as the total system power, but still uses common
information transmitted back from the receiver; namely the
maximum SNR capability (Γopt) and computed scalar chan-
nel statistics (ξ , βopt):
wi = min
ξ li
1 + βopt+ λoptΓoptNi
(
higi
)∗
.
Here the common scalar channel characteristics taken in
accord with the local values of the channel (hi,gi,Ni) al-
low the local node to compute its own value without
sharing weights individually. The calculation of the com-
mon statistics, in particular Γopt, takes into considera-
tion the transmission power at individual nodes. Figure 6
shows the performance of the systems as a comparison of
Fig. 6. Distributed beamforming constraints [19].
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the SNR at the receiver dependent on the total SNR of
the relay, the total transmit power divided by average noise
power. It is clear to see that the per node power constraints
allow for a higher SNR at the receiver when the overall
SNR is low, but that when the links are of a higher qual-
ity, the total power constraint method is superior. In [14],
a system for weight calculation is presented such that
there will be one node whose impact is the greatest, and
will transmit at full power, or at some value depending
only on the local information at the node. This is based
on traditional relay selection where only the best relay
is chosen, and the others remain quiet to conserve bat-
tery power. However, rather than remain quiet, these other
nodes can still contribute power based on their own chan-
nels. The scheme in [14] feeds back an indication to the
nodes as to which of them has been selected as the op-
timal transmitter, the chosen node will transmit at full
power as in the traditional relay selection schemes, but the
rest of the nodes will also transmit with a small amount
of power based on their own channels to the receiver.
A distributed SNR balancing approach in [20] that finds
ideal weights to balance the transmission capabilities so
that the lowest SNR of the transceiver set is maximized
within the constraints, that is
max
w
min(SNR1,SNR2) PT ≤ ˜P .
Here the lowest SNR at the two receivers is maximized
subject to the total transmit power of each transceiver and
all the relays
PT = P1 + P2 +
N
∑
i=1
Pri .
They find that in the optimal case, it falls out that the SNRs
become balanced, that is, SNR1 = SNR2. The authors go
on to show that the phases of the individual relay nodes
are essentially irrelevant (they are always a static linear
combination of the phases of the transceivers, and there-
fore do not change over time), and that the ideal weights
depend only on the ideal amplitude α . With these sim-
plifications, the optimization problem can be reduced to its
distributed form, which is dependent only on local informa-
tion ( fi,gi,bi) and scalar values transmitted over a common
control channel (ξ1,ξ2,ξ3,αT b).
αi =
(
| fi|2
1 + ξ1 +
|gi|2
1 + ξ2 +
β ξ3
(1 + ξ1)+ (1 + ξ2)
)−1 bi
(αT b) .
When an array is large, it is possible that only certain nodes
will be selected to cooperate in the beamforming. Subsec-
tion 4.1 discusses this topic in length, but it is common to
select nodes, which approximate a uniform array, and ap-
ply a least squares estimation to the weights to correct the
non uniformities. In [21], the authors present a system that
uses this method, with the weight estimation distributed
over the nodes. Though the entire steering matrix is still
needed to calculate the ideal weights, the processing in-
volved with calculation of the matrix itself is be distributed
over the nodes. A statistical method for distributed weight
calculation is presented in [22] and discussed in the next
Subsection 3.4, on statistical analysis.
3.4. Statistical Analysis
Because the nodes in a distributed array might be randomly
placed, it is useful to look at the average beampattern ca-
pabilities of distributed virtual arrays. The assumption in
this avenue of research is that given a large enough set of
nodes, there will be some subset that is capable of per-
forming at least as well as the mean, giving a strong set of
design criteria for ubiquitous distributed networks where
the number of possible nodes is very high. In [23], an
initial analysis of the average beam pattern for a random
array is presented. The array is uniformly distributed over
a disc, and derivations for both the average and distribution
of the achievable beampattern is presented. The properties
of both the main lobe and first side lobe are investigated.
They show that on a good distribution, the beampattern is
capable of approaching a main lobe with gain N and a side-
lobe with gain 1/N where N is the number of cooperating
nodes. Specifically, the beampattern approaches
P(φ) = 1
N
+
(
1− 1
N
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
J1
(
4piRsin
(φ
2
))
4piRsin
(φ
2
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
,
where J1 is the 1st order Bessel function. The first 1/N
term is the average sidelobe gain, and is the minimum of
the average pattern, while the (1− 1/N) term contributes
to the main lobe.
Figure 7 shows the average beampattern for a variety of
scenarios with different disc sizes (R) and Ns. It can be
seen that when N equals 16 and 256, the average side-
lobes are equal to 1/N (−10 log10(16) = −12.04 and
−10 log10(256) = −24.08 respectively). If the nodes are
distributed in a non-uniform manner, the mean (and distri-
bution) of the main lobe will clearly change. Gaussian
distributed nodes have a smoother mean curve for both
the main lobe [19] and side lobe [25] areas of their pattern.
Fig. 7. Average beampattern for random networks [23].
83
Jason Uher, Tadeusz A. Wysocki, and Beata J. Wysocki
Fig. 8. Peak and sidelobe comparison [19].
This means that the Gaussian nodes have a wider main
lobe, but the average pattern outside of the main lobe does
not oscillate. Figure 8 shows a comparison of the aver-
age beampattern from a Gaussian and uniformly distributed
random network. The smoother sidelobe achieved in the
Gaussian distribution is clear to see, as is the wider main
lobe. In comparison to the above equation, the average
beampattern for the Gaussian network is
P(φ) = 1
N
+
(
1− 1
N
)∣∣∣∣∣e
−
4pi sin
( φ
2
)
σ2
2
∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
In this case there are no sidelobe oscillations from the
Bessel function, only a smooth approach to the minimum.
In [26], the authors extend the analysis of uniform distri-
bution to include the concept of null steering, looking at
the average interference rejection capabilities of distributed
nodes without knowledge of the array geometry. Approx-
imations for the locations of the other nodes based on the
their random distribution are used, and achieve similar per-
formance results when the number of nodes is high due
to the fact that the approximations are based on the values
of the beamformer as that number goes to infinity. When
nodes are mobile in addition to being randomly distributed,
the ideal weights will change with time. In [27], the mod-
eled beampattern from the preceding paper [23] is simpli-
fied to an ideal pattern where the gain is the maximum
(N or N2 depending on the arrangement) in the mainlobe
beam width and the minimum (1/N or N) everywhere else.
The capacity of the network under this simplified assump-
tion is derived and simulated as compared to a traditional
pie wedge. The inclusion of the sidelobes in the approx-
imation gives a better estimation of the capacity than the
pie wedge. The authors of [28] present a method for deter-
mining the time required between updates when the nodes
move with respect to a particular theoretical motion dis-
tribution. These models, based on the number of nodes
and mobility distribution, can give guidelines based on the
required fidelity at the receiver.
4. Practical Considerations in
Distributed Beamforming
4.1. Node Selection and Placement within Virtual Arrays
The coordination of distributed nodes to find optimum
weights for beamforming focuses on finding weights for
every node cooperating in the solution, but it is not always
prudent for every node in a network to cooperate in a given
transmission. Often, a given subset of the network is capa-
ble of transmitting with the same quality as the entire net-
work. Each extra node is using energy in the transmission,
and is adding extra local overhead in the pre-transmission
phase. In energy constrained wireless networks, this extra
battery drain is unacceptable.
The topic of optimizing the size of a beamforming cluster
is presented in [29], where the total energy for a cluster is
calculated, based on the number of cooperating nodes. This
paper presents an excellent introduction into the processes
to take into account when selecting nodes for ideal power
consumption. It is shown that there are an optimum num-
ber of cooperating nodes to obtain the minimum energy
expenditure for the same quality of link. If the amount of
power required to receive (PR), transmit (PT ), and process
a frame (Ps1) are known, then N nodes can collaborate us-
ing frames of length L1 at rate R utilizing energy equal
to
Pcol = (2N−3)(PT + PR + Ps1)
(
L1
R
)
.
During their responses of length L2, the nodes will consume
Pres = (N−2)(PT + PR + Ps1)
(
L2
R
)
.
Finally, the nodes will collaborate to reach the destination
by sending their messages, consuming a total of
Ptot = (PT + PR + Ps1)
[
(2N−3)
(
L1
R
)
+(N−2)
(
L2
R
)]
+NPs2
(
L2
R
)
.
Because each of the variables is known, the equation can
be minimized with respect to N, giving the least amount
of required power to transmit the frame. This is shown to
be convex and to have one global minimum. This is be-
cause when the number of nodes is small, the amount of
required energy to reach the source per node is very high,
but as the number of nodes increases, the energy cost of
collaboration becomes prohibitive. In [30], the authors take
a different approach. They provide a method for node se-
lection with an emphasis on carrier synchronization. Al-
though this topic is covered in depth in Subsection 4.2,
those methods focus on synchronization of the selected
nodes. In this paper, the authors select nodes based on their
relative phases, rather than try to synchronize the phases
directly. Nodes are clustered by their carrier phases to pro-
vide synchronized transmission, optimizing the selection
criterion to maximize the received energy as opposed to
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minimizing transmission energy. Because the phase offsets
from some reference should be evenly distributed across
all of the nodes, you will find that there are even num-
bers of nodes in each phase group, distributing the beam-
forming load across the entire network. In [31] the au-
thors present a scheme that adaptively changes the number
of beamformers to maintain the optimum ergodic capacity
of the network. As channel information is fed back to the
collaborating nodes, the overhead grows with the number
of nodes. If this overhead is large enough, there will be
an optimal number of nodes to participate in the beam-
forming process. The authors show that the capacity of
a beamforming link is described by
C = log2
(
1 + PT
N
∑
i=1
Li
)
,
where Li is the large scale fading factor in the channel.
Utilizing the large scale fading factor from each node, the
network can decide which users should are hindering the
process, and selectively coordinate only the beamformers
who increase the capacity at a given point in time based
on their large scale fading factors. When nodes are chosen
within an array for collaboration, they must be able to com-
municate with one another. As shown in [24], it is often
the case that the ideal beamforming nodes will be out of
communications range with one another, requiring the use
of relay nodes and increasing the overhead of the node
synchronization phase. By appropriately selecting nodes
for beamforming based on their relative locations to one
another, rather than solely on their fitness in terms of the
desired beam, communications between the relay nodes can
be maintained. If a specific area is required for the cooper-
ative nodes in 4-order to maintain a good beam, the nodes
from the edges of the necessary area should be chosen, pro-
viding a strong mesh network around the perimeter, rather
than a loose network across the entire area. The achiev-
able beampattern of this randomly chosen group of nodes
is similar to that derived in [26], however there is no longer
the chance that an iteration of the random process will have
nodes in the middle of the disc. As such, the new average
beam pattern is equal to
P(φ)≈ 1
K
+
(
1− 1
K
)∣∣∣∣J0
(
4piRo sin
(φ
2
))∣∣∣∣
2
,
where Ro is the outer radius of the disc.
This perimeter selection method is expanded upon in [26],
where a series of concentric circles are chosen from the
center outward to provide several strongly linked group of
collaborative nodes with different capabilities in terms of
possible main lobes and interference rejection based on the
equation for P(φ) above.
Utilizing only certain nodes within a wireless sensor net-
work to perform as a virtual array allows for a distribu-
tion of work to help prolong the life of a power con-
strained group of nodes. By finding the optimum number
of beamformers and shutting down the transmission beyond
the point of diminishing returns and by reducing the pre-
transmission overheard, the overall power consumption in
these networks can be reduced in an effective manner.
4.2. Carrier Synchronization
With traditional beamforming systems, when each of the
array elements are controlled by a single source, the car-
rier signal of each of the elements is assumed to be of
the same frequency and phase, so the ideal weights calcu-
lated can make the necessary phase adjustments from the
same baseline. Obviously, it is very difficult to assume that
a distributed array of independent sensors in an array would
have the same carrier phase across the whole network just
by chance. Accommodations for the differences in the car-
rier must be made, either through direct synchronization of
the carriers, or through changes in the calculated weights
at each node. Though this problem is very important, in-
deed at the heart, of distributed virtual arrays; it is also
important in a variety of applications in the wireless sen-
sor network domain, including certain sensing applications,
distributed space-time block coding, inter node relays, and
timing applications. As such, there is a wealth of informa-
tion regarding the carrier synchronization of nodes in a lo-
cal distributed wireless sensor network. Because of this,
a brief review of the carrier synchronization literature with
specific applications to distributed virtual antenna arrays is
presented.
The initial literature on distributed beamforming focused
on the calculation of ideal weights for a non-uniform ar-
ray, leaving the carrier synchronization of the nodes as
a problem for the future. Paper [32] gives a general in-
troduction to a two node beamformer which automatically
adjusts the phase between the two collaborating transmit-
ters so their transmitted symbols sum constructively at
a receiver. A system is presented which allows the two
nodes to synchronize via master slave architecture, and to
“precode” their transmissions with a measured channel re-
sponse, what we would call beamforming weights. This is
a good general model for carrier synchronization in a dis-
tributed beamforming system, and is a theme that is of-
ten repeated. In [33], a test bed was built to monitor the
performance of distributed acoustic beamforming for lo-
cating sources of noise. This initial, practical implementa-
tion showed the potential success for distributed beamform-
ing without perfectly synchronized carriers, the authors
of [34] and [35] sought to provide an analytical estima-
tion of the limitations that distributed beamforming sys-
tems might see from unsynchronized carriers. When a ref-
erence carrier is transmitted from a master node, the effects
of different phase differences are summed in the received
carrier
ui(t) = cos
(
2pi f0t + θo + θe(i)
)
+ ni(t) ,
where θo is the static offset between the carriers, θe is the
error in the phase due to transmission and placement errors
and n is the transmission noise.
Both analytical and numerical results were presented for
a master-slave architecture in which cooperating nodes lock
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their carriers to a master based on the received carrier ui(t).
Each of the slave nodes is then able to adjust its own carrier
based on this received waveform and the known distance
between the two nodes. Guidelines are also presented as
to the limitations of such a system when there are esti-
mation errors in the received carrier and measured inter
nodal distances. Paper [36] introduces a system in which
a copy of the carrier is transmitted continuously from a each
of receiving nodes, who merge their carriers on this dis-
tributed reference, requiring a significant amount of addi-
tional hardware at each cooperating node. Improvements
to [36] are implemented in [37], where the number of re-
quired transmitting beacons was reduced (along with hard-
ware complexity). This reduction comes in the form of
carrier transmissions over time slots, effectively turning
the carrier synchronization beacons into TDMA users who
share the channel to broadcast their carrier information.
With only a single bit a feedback from the receiver, an
iterative approach to carrier synchronization can be car-
ried out [38]. The authors introduce a system where the
nodes are synchronized through the difference of groups
of phases. In each iteration, nodes are assigned randomly
to one of to groups, which transmit their data sequentially.
The aggregate phase difference is calculated and transmit-
ted to the second group, who update their own phases by
this correction factor. After each iteration, the total syn-
chronization of the entire set is closer than it was before.
In comparison to the individual random perturbation
scheme from [39], the pair wise updating method con-
verges much more quickly, though it requires extra feedback
information. By restricting the random search space, the
new algorithm will converge quickly, but will not neces-
sarily be able to guess the correct phase in a single itera-
tion. However, because such feat has a very small proba-
bility anyway, so restricting the space leads to an overall
improvement. Analysis and simulations include the per-
formance gains when the search space (possible offsets)
is restricted to a particular probability distribution, as well
as the implementation of the algorithm on software-defined
radios. Rather than attempt to synchronize the carriers
of cooperative nodes at all, [40] presents a method in
which the unsynchronized carriers do not matter. By
having the cooperating nodes simply repeat each symbol
several times, there will be a point when the carriers con-
structively interfere naturally, which can be detected at the
receiver. Analysis of the number of repetitions required
based on the number of cooperating nodes is presented,
and numerical results show that the probability of align-
ment, and hence the number of repetitions required, reaches
a steady state point for a specified number of cooperating
nodes.
Though carrier synchronization is necessary in order to
perform optimum beamforming in distributed networks, the
preceding papers have shown that the problem is not as
daunting as it seems. Through various combinations of data
sharing between nodes, feedback from the end sinks, and
statistical analysis of the networks the carrier synchroniza-
tion problem is not insurmountable. Further research into
optimum methods for carrier synchronization can only im-
prove the quality of beamforming in distributed networks,
but the problem is well defined.
5. Future Work in Distributed Smart
Arrays
Though the topic of distributed smart arrays has been stud-
ied from a high level to ensure that appropriate com-
plex weights for individual nodes can be calculated op-
timally, the high level approach leaves significant gaps
in the path toward utilizing DB in a non-coherent appli-
cation like a wireless sensor network. Before DBF can be
used in systems such as wireless sensor networks, personal
area networks, and even mobile phone networks, further
research into what might be physically capable by these
networks is needed. The topics below present a brief cross
section of some of the open problems in distributed beam-
forming that are available to researchers in the wireless
communications field.
5.1. Achievable Beampatterns
In the current body of distributed smart array work, most
attention is focused on the maximum achievable exten-
sion of the main lobe, and methods for steering that main
lobe towards an intended receiver while directing nulls in
the directions of interferers. A virtual array created from
a wireless sensor network will have a significant number
of elements available to it. This should allow for a beam-
pattern that is capable of multiple beams and nulls. The
capabilities of randomly distributed arrays in terms of am-
plifying and nullifying multiple incoming sources is a topic
that would have strong applications, as a network rarely
needs to interact with a single sink, or a single source of
interference.
5.2. Cognitive Radio
As the ubiquity of sensor networks grows, so will the
chance of utilizing bandwidth in an area where it is already
assigned to some other entity. Cognitive radio attempts to
diminish or eliminate interference with the primary of a par-
ticular channel and insert secondary communications into
the spaces between primary transmissions. A virtual array
should be able to find an ideal set of weights that can be
used to eliminate interference at the primary user’s loca-
tion allowing the array to communicate at the same time as
the primary user. Further investigation into the applicabil-
ity of distributed phased arrays for the purposes of cogni-
tive radio is essential to allowing wide spread operation of
sensor networks in densely populated areas.
5.3. Heterogeneous Node Types
If distributed arrays are to be expanded beyond the scope
of wireless sensor networks and be applied in other net-
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work types such as a personal area network (PAN) or
a group of military units, the assumption of identical coop-
erating nodes must be dropped. For example, a deployed
group of soldiers may form a network between themselves,
a local radio relay, and support vehicles. Each of these
types of units will have a different antenna type on their
equipment and different capabilities in terms of constraints
on maximum transmit power, which is something not con-
sidered in the current body of literature. Further investiga-
tion into the cooperation of multiple node types can lead to
distributed smart antennas in networks where it is currently
considered impractical, and research into the methods for
optimizing these heterogeneous networks will allow them to
operate longer, possibly even longer than a similarly sized
homogeneous network. Additionally, investigation into the
situations where a homogeneous vs. heterogeneous group
of contributors would perform better will lead to an ad-
vantage when designing systems that use distributed smart
antennas. For example, it may be beneficial for a desig-
nated cluster head in a network to have a different antenna
type than the cooperating radiators to optimize the radiation
pattern of the virtual array.
5.4. Number of Cooperators
The current body of research into distributed smart arrays
focuses on networks of either many, many nodes that all
cooperate at once, or limited groups that take turns coop-
erating. Little attention is paid to the number of nodes in
a beamforming array; for example, it is highly likely that
there is a rule of diminishing returns in distributed arrays,
where adding extra cooperating nodes will not provide an
adequate performance gains to justify their power expen-
diture. Research into the optimum number of nodes to
balance the power usage with the desired beampattern will
allow networks to prolong their battery life by limiting the
amount of unnecessary power expended. Additionally, re-
search into adaptive algorithms capable of dynamically ad-
justing the number of cooperating nodes required to reach
a receiver could maximize the efficiency.
5.5. Channel Estimation
Though the topic of channel estimation between two wire-
less radios is well researched, there may be benefits to be
derived from estimating several channels in a distributed
array environment. Given a sufficient distance between the
information sink and the network, the channels between the
sink and each node should be similar. It may be possible
to find new ways to estimate the channel between the sink
and each node in a distributed fashion, such as finding an
average channel for the virtual array, and then deriving the
individual channels from the average based on the known
topology of the network.
5.6. Carrier Synchronization
By far, the largest roadblock to distributed antenna ar-
rays is synchronization of the cooperating nodes. There has
already been headway into this area, but further research
into not only methods of synchronization, but the effects
of unsynchronized carriers, is necessary to ensure that the
theoretical research into distributed arrays can be applied
to its fullest.
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